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Abstract 
 
 The main purpose of this study is to find out whether celebrity endorsers’ behaviors, such 
as large endorsement contract and multiple product endorsement, will influence consumers’ 
correspondence inferences on those celebrities’ genuine attitudes towards the endorsed products 
in print advertisements and how such attributional inferences will differ according to the 
perceived level of product congruence with the endorser. For meaningful analysis and 
interpretation, the differential effects were examined in terms of correspondence bias and 
suspicion of ulterior motives. The bias refers to people’ attributional inference tendency to 
relying on other persons’ dispositions; whereas, the suspicion of ulterior motives accounts for 
people’s suspending such inferential tendency to the bias. The moderating roles of individual 
need for cognition and implicit theory of personality were also scrutinized along with the 
inferential process. Lastly, the mediating role of correspondence inference to attitudinal and 
behavioral measures of advertising effectiveness was tested. 
 Results support the differential effects of suspicion by perceived product congruence on 
persuasiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. Consumers did bias their correspondence 
inferences when the product was not perceived to be highly congruent with the image of the 
celebrity endorser; however, consumers did not bias their correspondence inferences when they 
were highly suspicious of the endorser’s ulterior motives whether the product is perceived to be 
highly matched with the image of the endorser or not. Those effects were also found to be 
moderated by consumers’ level of need for cognition, but not the implicit theory of personality. 
Irrespective of their suspicion levels, low need for cognition consumers did bias their 
correspondence inferences whether the product was perceived to be highly matched with the 
image of the endorser or not. An additional investigation on the mediating role of 
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correspondence inference confirmed its positive effects on consumers’ attitudes toward the ad 
and the brand, and behavioral intentions. Based upon the empirical findings from the experiment, 
theoretical and managerial implications as well as limitations and suggestions for future research 
are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 The use of endorsers for products is prevalent in advertising and leading advertisers 
spend millions of dollars in paying famous people to endorse their products. Endorsers can be of 
many different types, from typical consumer or peer endorsers, to experts, created product 
characters, CEOs and company presidents, and of course celebrities (Friedman & Friedman, 
1979). Celebrities have always been among the favored choices for advertisers in order to 
guarantee their promotional success, perhaps due to the images and status they project as well as 
their ability to grab the audience’s attention by a famous name paired with a product (Shimp, 
2000; Till & Ship, 1998).  
 Practitioners’ intuitive arguments and academic researchers’ empirical evidence clearly 
supported that utilizing a celebrity endorser is effective (Agrawal & Kamankura, 1995; Atkin & 
Block, 1983; Erdogan, 1999; Friedman & Friedman, 1979; Gabor, Jeannye, & Wienner, 1987; 
Kahle & Homer, 1985; Kamins & Gupta, 1994; Miciak & Shanklin, 1994; Misra & Beatty, 
1990). Advertisers tend to rely on several persuasive attributes when determining the 
appropriateness of a celebrity endorser such as popularity, attractiveness, expertise, likeability, 
and familiarity (Friedman & Friedman, 1979). Since the late 1970s, researchers developed and 
tested theories based on source credibility, source attractiveness, match-up hypotheses, and the 
meaning transfer model in order to uncover the mechanism at work. As a consequence, 
corporations have invested significant marketing dollars in celebrity endorsements that have 
eaten up larger and larger percentages of advertising budgets in each passing year (Erdogan, 
Baker & Tagg, 2001; Sports Business Journal, 2002; CNN Money, 2003; Clark & Horstmann, 
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2005; White, Goddard, & Wilbur, 2009). Top-earning celebrities now boast multi-million dollar 
sponsorship and endorsement contracts (e.g., $57 million for Taylor Swift and $52 million for 
Lady Gaga in 2011). Employing a celebrity for the brand endorsement has also become a 
lucrative and sought-after part of show business (Pomerantz, 2012).  
 The usefulness of celebrity endorsers, however, appears to be limited by certain 
constraints. The previous research on consumers’ attribution of celebrity endorsers suggested 
that if consumers suspiciously perceive situational factors surrounding the endorsement, they 
tend to correspondently attribute the endorser’s endorsement motives to money, self-publicity, or 
image enhancement, thereby lessening the persuasiveness of celebrities’ supportive claims 
(Cronley, Kardes, Goddard, & Houghton, 1999; Moor, Mowen, & Reardon, 1994; Silvera, & 
Austad, 2004; Sørum, Grape, & Silvera, 2003; Sparkman, 1982). That is, such unexpected 
perceptions from situational information could lead consumers to think more carefully about 
their correspondence inferences rather than mindlessly assuming the celebrity endorser have 
genuine preferences on the endorsed product.  
 If this is the case, what could be the situational cues around celebrity advertising that 
generate suspicion on the minds of consumers? One previous study from Tripp, Jensen, and 
Carlson, (1994) gives some clues for that inquiry. In the qualitative interviews with study 
subjects, they found that: 
 All informants stated that celebrities endorse products because they are paid for those 
 endorsements. … While informants thought that "more" money caused celebrities to 
 endorse more than one product, this motive did not necessarily reflect negatively on the 
 endorser (e.g., no statements of greed, etc.). … However, when prompted via open-ended 
 questions (salient), all informants offered that the endorsement of more than one product 
 by the same celebrity could diminish the effectiveness of the ads either through product 
 comparisons, ad comparisons, or questions concerning the endorser. These informants 
 questioned the sincerity of the endorser’s relationship with the products. Some questioned 
 the endorser's trustworthiness relative to the  product endorsement while other informants 
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 stated that they thought the endorser should be loyal to one product. (Tripp et al., 1994, 
 p. 543) 
Taken as a whole, the interviews revealed that consumers tend to attribute the celebrity's motives 
for the endorsement to money, but this money motive does not necessarily induce their negative 
correspondence inferences to the endorser; however, consumers probably question the celebrity's 
sincerity or trustworthiness, either directly or indirectly if they recognize that the celebrity is 
endorsing multiple products. It should be also noted that both of situational constrains (i.e., the 
large endorsement fee and multiple product endorsements) are analogous to attribution issues, 
people’s tendency on correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, which have been 
concretely examined in the social psychological literature (Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990; Fein, 
1996; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Silvera & Laufer, 2005). 
 With those phenomenological facts and theoretical orientations in mind, this study tries to 
explain why consumers differ in their correspondence inferences on the celebrity endorser in 
multiple situations, how those differences can be empirically examined by advertising and social 
psychological theories, and what persuasive effects will be generated from those attirbutional 
inferences. In order to achieve those purposes, this study developed a set of hypotheses from 
several theoretical perspectives in literature. Based on theoretical perspectives from 
correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, this study posited that consumers, 
depending on their degrees of suspicion on endorsers’ motives and perceived product congruence 
with endorsers, would generate predictable patterns of attributional responses to the celebrity 
advertising, which subsequently influences their attitudes toward the ad and the brand, and 
behavioral intentions. Additionally, personal differences in need for cognition and implicit 
theory of personality were hypothesized to test their moderating roles in the relationships among 
suspicion, perceived product congruence, and correspondence inference. Lastly, the mediating 
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roles of correspondence inference were also proposed to assess the causal links from suspicion 
and perceived product congruence to advertising effectiveness measures. 
 A quasi-experimental design was administered by employing online consumer panelists 
from a private research party. The final sample composed of 289 respondents from stratified 
samples of 3,000 panelists. In order to ensure the internal validity of the study, three pretests 
were conducted and the developed test advertisements were checked on their manipulated levels 
of suspicion and perceived product congruence in the main experiment. All of scale items were 
adapted and contextually adjusted from previous relevant studies for the measures’ internal 
reliability. A series of univariate analyses were employed to test the causal relationships from 
treatment conditions to correspondence inferences and the moderating roles of personality 
differences. The occurrence of correspondence bias and high suspicion of ulterior motives was 
examined by the probability test of planned contrasts, which compared each pair of means of 
correspondence inferences. The mediating roles of correspondence inference were analyzed 
using the hierarchical regression and Sobel test.  
 The present study extends the celebrity endorsement research in two important ways. 
Although the theoretical perspectives of attribution have been applied in the several studies of 
celebrity endorsement advertising (e.g., Cronley et al., 1999; Moor et al., 1994; Hunt, Kernan & 
Mizerski, 1983; Karmins, 1989; Silvera, & Austad, 2004; Sørum et al., 2003; Sparkman, 1982; 
Tripp et al., 1994), they have usually centered on addressing direct relationships between 
consumers’ attributional inferences and their ad/product evaluations. On the other hand, this 
study not only delves into the mediating role of consumers’ attributional inferences (i.e., 
correspondence inferences on the celebrity) in the whole process of attribution, but also tries to 
assess the moderating effects of individuals’ personality difference on attributional inferences. In 
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addition, the theoretical perspective, suspicion of ulterior motives, is firstly applied to the study 
of celebrity endorsements. Such attempts enable strong theoretical implications because 
consumers’ evaluative responses to celebrity-endorsed products seem to be thoroughly 
articulated by a more complex perceptual mechanism rather than the simple path from 
attributions to attitude changes.  
 In practical terms, the present study will also be informative to advertising practitioners. 
Above all, the findings of consumers’ correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser will provide 
advertisers strong justifications for their choice of a celebrity in their promotional campaigns; 
whereas, consumers’ reaction due to their high suspicion on multiple celebrity endorsements will 
provide insights into why advertising creators and planners should guarantee the originality of 
the advertisement when a highly profiled celebrity is employed. The meaningful relationships 
between consumers’ correspondence inferences and the effectiveness of celebrity advertising 
will put forward the need to refine celebrity endorsement strategies particularly to enhance 
consumers’ beliefs that the celebrity is sponsoring the brand based on his/her true attitude and 
experience with the product. 
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as the following order. Chapter 2 provides 
the comprehensive review of literature, proposes a theoretical framework, and sets forth the 
hypotheses based on the theoretical relationships among variables. Chapter 3 discusses the study 
design along with the experiment procedure. Chapter 4 presents the results of statistical tests. 
Lastly, in chapter 5, interpretations, implications, limitations, and suggestions for the future 
study are provided. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
 This chapter reviews four domains of the literature in association with celebrity 
endorsement advertising and attribution theory. In the first section, the celebrity endorsement in 
advertising will be defined with details of its historical advance, and the advantages of this 
advertising strategy will be pinpointed by comparison to its disadvantages. The second section 
will appraise the main theoretical models previously applied to the study of celebrity 
endorsement advertising, along with their theoretical limitations. The third section will review 
the previous studies on attribution theory and the phenomenon of correspondence bias in order to 
find out their theoretical applicability on celebrity endorsements. The fourth section of this 
literature review will inspect the theoretical perspective on the suspicion of ulterior motives and 
its implications in the study of celebrity endorsements. In addition, based on the theoretical 
tenets of correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, the fifth section will propose a 
guiding theoretical framework for generating hypotheses. In the final section, multiple 
relationships reflecting on this study’s points of interest will be hypothesized  
Celebrity Endorsement in Advertising 
 This section mainly discusses both advantages and disadvantages of using a celebrity in 
advertising. Before presenting the pros and cons on the subject, the history and definition are set 
forth in order to show how the celebrity endorsement has been developed and conceptualized as 
an important advertising strategy in the U.S. society. 
 History of Celebrity Endorsement. The idea of using celebrities in advertising is not a 
recent phenomenon. It dates back to the 1760s. Josiah Wedgwood, the founder of the Wedgwood 
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brand of pottery and chinaware, also called the father of the modern brand, creatively employed 
marketing devices, especially royal endorsements, to create an aura around the name of his 
company in order to give the brand a value far beyond the attributes of the product itself (Pringle, 
2004). Between 1875 and 1900, the trade card, either handed along with the product to the 
customer or inserted in the packaging itself, popularized the use of celebrity endorsements. The 
card had a picture of a celebrity along with product descriptions which featured actresses like 
Lily Langtry and Sarah Bernhardt, and baseball players like Cy Young and Ty Cobb (Tuner, 
2004). It was at those times that author Mark Twain appeared on three brands, Great Mark 
Cigars, Mark Twain Cigars and Mark Twain flour (Ketcham, 2001). In 1890, a soap 
manufacturer, Pears, hired a famous and beautiful actress, Lily Langtry, to do a testimonial, 
‘Since using Pears Soap, I have discarded all others.’ This testimonial advertising is believed to 
be the first celebrity endorsement on a large scale (Sternheimer, 2011). 
 By the early twentieth century, the cigarette industry began including baseball cards in 
their packs of cigars. These baseball cards were intended to be given away as gifts to loyal 
customers and people soon started buying the cigarettes for the cards and endorsements caught 
on fast with marketers (Tuner, 2004). Though no evidence exists to show whether these brands 
had the direct permission of the celebrities, it was known that Honus Wagner, a baseball player, 
stopped a tobacco company that was using his name in the baseball cards to sell its products 
(Ketcham, 2001). It became so popular that later T206 Wagner card in a near mint condition was 
sold in 2007 for $2.8 million, which is the highest price ever for a baseball card (Davis, 2007). In 
addition, Wheaties, one of the oldest brands of breakfast cereals in the U.S., so aggressively 
adopted celebrity endorsements for the product that, at the 1939 major league all star baseball 
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game, forty-six players among the total of fifty-one endorsed Wheaties at the time (Ketcham, 
2001). 
 Till the early 1930s, the major endorsers were athletes, but by 1945, movie stars like 
Charlie Chaplin became more sought-after (Pringle, 2004). With the rising popularity of 
commercial radios in the 1930s and color TVs in the 1960s, TV personalities and entertainers 
also became popular (Erdogan, 1999; Swerdlow & Swerdlow, 2003). During the 1970s, one in 
eight TV commercials and one in every six advertisements featured a celebrity (Thompson, 1978; 
Howard, 1979). Clark and Horstmann (2005), from their analysis on the collection of 1000 
endorsement advertisements from the year of 1920 to1970, found that celebrities were 
predominantly used by cigarettes, beauty products, beverages and audio equipment. Since then, 
the use of a celebrity has evolved from simple soap or cigarette ads to multi-million dollar 
campaigns for tantalizing the consumer (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995). 
 By 1980, however, Athlete endorsements picked up again when Nike discovered a young 
and extremely talented basketball player, Michael Jordan. Nike relied heavily on Jordan’s image 
to make itself a global mega-brand. As such, over the period from the year of 1980 to 1992, 60% 
of the endorsement deals involved soft-drink companies and athletic shoe manufacturers, and 
almost 75% of all sports-related products like clothes and shoes used athletes to endorse their 
brands (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995). Athletes like Jordan, Bo Jackson, Chris Evert, and Bill 
Cosby dominated the late 1980s (Ketcham, 2001). 
 In the late 1990s, companies took the celebrity endorsement to a new level by holding 
press conferences to announce deals with celebrities. Celebrities were no longer just endorsers. 
They had become spokespersons for the endorsed brand (Sternheimer, 2011). Also, with the 
popularity of sit-coms (e.g., Friends) and movies, advertisers paid much attention to the PPL (i.e., 
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product placement), where celebrities' made-up characters promoted the sponsored brands in 
more contextual or effective ways.  
 The popularity of using a celebrity to endorse products and services as an effective 
advertising strategy was not exceptional in recent decades. Recent estimates indicate that almost 
25% of the U. S. companies use celebrities in their advertising campaigns (Shimp, 2000) and as 
much as 25% of all television commercials involve celebrity endorsements (Erdogan, Baker & 
Tagg, 2001). Accordingly, advertisers’ spending also increases such that around 10% of 
advertiser's budgets reportedly involve celebrity endorsements (Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995). 
In 1998, it was estimated that companies in the U. S. spent $800 million on acquiring celebrities 
for advertisements, promotions, and PR campaigns (Clark & Horstmann, 2005). In 2001, the U. 
S. companies paid $897 million to athletes, coaches, and sports personalities (Sports Business 
Journal, 2002). In 2003, Nike spent $1.44 billion on celebrity endorsements (CNN Money, 2003). 
Between two and three billion dollars were spent on celebrity advertising in 2006 in the U. S. 
alone (White, Goddard, & Wilbur, 2009).  
 Definition of Celebrity Endorsement. In general, endorsers can be of many different 
types, from typical consumer or peer endorsers, to experts, created product characters, CEOs and 
company presidents, and celebrities (Friedman & Friedman, 1979). Among those types, 
celebrities have been regarded as the most selectable candidate for the endorsement advertising 
(Shimp, 2000), perhaps because of their highly dynamic, attractive, and engaging personal 
qualities as well as the attention-drawing appeal of a famous name paired with a product (Atkin 
& Block, 1983). The term celebrity refers to “an individual who is known to public (e.g., actor, 
sports figure, entertainer, etc) for his or her achievements in areas other than that of the product 
class endorsed” (Friedman & Friedman, 1979, p. 63). According to McCracken (1989), the 
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celebrity endorser can be defined as “any individual who enjoys public recognition and who uses 
this recognition on behalf of a consumer good by appearing with it in an advertisement” (p. 310). 
 The celebrity endorsement could encompass a variety of activities. Erdogan (1999) and 
Pringle (2005) illustrated six major ways a celebrity can get involved to promote a brand: 
celebrity customer (e.g., Puff Daddy and Courvoisier), celebrity sponsorship (e.g., Wayne 
Rooney and Ford), celebrity testimonial (e.g., Geoffrey Palmer and Audi), celebrity employee 
(e.g., Stella McCartney and Stella), celebrity owner (e.g., Michael Jordon and Air Jordan), and 
celebrity’s product placement (e.g., Will Smith and Ray Ban in the movie ‘Man in Black’). In a 
modal way, McCracken (1989) identified four types of endorsements: explicit (i.e., I endorse this 
brand), implicit (i.e., I use this brand), imperative (i.e., you should use this brand), and co-present 
(i.e., mere association with the brand). If one more type is added to the roles of celebrity 
endorsers listed by Erdogan (1999) and Pringle (2005), that must be the celebrity entrepreneur, a 
celebrity endorser who is involved in the management or creation of the brand he or she 
promotes (i.e., Boxer George Foreman and his counter-top meat grill machine). 
 Advantages of Celebrity Endorsement. In a world where media messages abound, 
advertisers need to have potent and effective messages to reach the consumer. Many previous 
studies have shown the potential benefits of celebrity endorsements for advertisers. For example, 
Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) found that customers are more likely to choose goods and 
services endorsed by celebrities than those without such endorsements. Miciak and Shanklin 
(1994) compiled a list of 1,500 US celebrities by way of appealing qualities to consumers and 
found that consumers rated most of those celebrities as familiar and reliable.  
 Among the main justifications for the use of celebrity endorsements are that celebrities 
lead to higher advertisement recall and increased brand-name recognition (Friedman & Friedman 
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1979; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983) and create the preferred image for a product through 
the meaning transfer (Debevec & Iyer, 1986; McCracken, 1989; Goldsmith, 2000; Lafferty, 
2002). In a study for exploring the moderating role of individuals’ situational involvement 
between central and peripheral routes to the advertising effectiveness, Petty, Cacioppo, and 
Schumann (1983) identified that people are more likely to favor products endorsed by celebrities 
than by non-celebrities, and participants’ exposure to a famous endorser increases their recall of 
the product category under low-involvement conditions. Besides higher recall and brand 
recognition, celebrities can also transfer their positive qualities and meanings to the brand. 
According to McCracken (1989), celebrities are the most useful in transferring meanings from 
culture to products because anonymous models could not offer configurations of meanings that 
celebrities can possess, such as projected demographic match, favorable personality, and 
preferred lifestyle. In practice, companies can hire celebrities who have proper meanings to 
establish new positioning for existing products. Pizza Hut Interactional, for instance, increased 
its global market share by utilizing global celebrities such as the supermodel, Cindy Crawford, 
and the Baywatch star, Pamela Anderson (Erdogan, 1999). 
 Some researchers explained the merits of celebrity endorsements in terms of social power. 
Both increasing competition for grabbing consumer consciousness and new product proliferation 
in the market have encouraged advertisers to use attention-creating techniques to promote their 
products successfully. Also, the recent technological advance from old to new media, which 
serves to increase consumers’ control over programmed advertisements, have made advertisers 
more responsive to consumers’ demands (Lurie, 2004). The use of celebrity endorsements in 
such complex and interactive environments may ease those threats because of celebrities’ 
reference power (e.g., celebrity as a role model) and expert power (e.g., celebrity as an expert 
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within his/her fields) (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998). For example, a female movie 
star, if he/she is attractive enough to create strong attention, might reasonably be expected to 
stand out from surrounding clutter with a great deal of knowledge related to beauty 
care/cosmetics or health-promoting foods/drinks (Sørum, 2003). Celebrities also help the process 
of self-invention with which they make up clear, coherent, and powerful selves that everyone 
seeks (McCracken, 1989). 
 In addition to tactical and psychological benefits, the economic worth of celebrity 
endorsers has been studied with emphasis on the expected profitability of a company. Dickenson 
(1996) suggested that celebrity endorsers help boost sales tremendously. She took as an example 
the soft drink brand, Oasis, which used a TV personality as a voiceover in its TV commercial for 
launching the brand. As a result, Oasis was chosen as the most successful soft drink launch of 
1995 by Super Marketing and Asian Trader. Gabor, Thornton, and Wiener (1987) exemplified 
that Michael Jackson carried Pepsi sales up 8% in 1984, the first year of its contract with Jackson. 
In addition, the Advertising Age International reported that, in 1997, Pepsi’s 2% global market 
share increase was attributable to using the British pop group the Spice Girls as a spokesperson 
(Erdogan, Baker, & Tagg, 2001). 
 Lastly, both the usability of a celebrity endorser in inter-cultural advertising campaigns 
and the positive relationships between celebrity endorsement advertising and consumers’ 
ad/brand evaluations have been frequently mentioned in the literature (Atkin & Block, 1983; 
Freiden, 1984; Kaikati, 1987; Kamins, 1989; Petty et al., 1983). Celebrities with worldwide 
recognition (e.g., Tom Cruise) have been said to help reduce unexpected difficulties coming 
from cultural differences in global marketing communications (Kaikati, 1987). Atkin and Block 
(1983) found that celebrity endorsers were viewed as significantly more trustworthy and 
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competent, and slightly more attractive than non-celebrity endorsers. Their findings also 
indicated that purchase intentions as well as brand evaluations were greater on advertisements 
featuring celebrity endorsers than on advertisements featuring non-celebrity endorsers.  
 Disadvantages of Celebrity Endorsement. Despite the preceding potential benefits of 
using celebrity endorsers in advertising campaigns, the disadvantages of using them deserve 
serious consideration. Both advertisers and academics have shown a greater interest in the 
potential hazards of celebrity endorsements. Consumers no longer necessarily accept the sales 
pitch at face value. In fact, Cashmore (2006) reported that “20% of shoppers were actually 
‘celebrity resistant,’ 60% were ‘bored with celebrities,’ and only 8% indicated that they would 
buy a celebrity endorsed product, and even then only if the celebrity was someone they admired 
or trusted” (p. 166). According to researchers, those unfavorable responses might be influenced 
or caused by negative publicity associated with certain celebrities (Klebba & Unger, 1982; Till & 
Shimp, 1998; Bailey, 2007), deviating consumer attention by overshadowing endorsed products 
(Cooper, 1984; Rossiter & Percy, 1987), as well as credibility loss by celebrity overexposure 
(Kaikati, 1987; Tripp et al., 1994) 
 Of the various risks celebrity endorsers might pose to their endorsed brands, negative 
celebrity information has been considered the most important one because most of celebrity 
endorsements are vulnerable to the celebrity scandal. Therefore, when advertisers employ 
celebrities as their product endorser, they also take a risk of their brand being tarnished by 
negatively published celebrity information (Erdogan & Baker, 2000). Amos, Holmes, and 
Strutton (2008) speculated that the high risk associated with using celebrity endorsers as well as 
the substantial impact negative information about those celebrities can have on consumers’ 
perceptions would exercise the largest impact on the effectiveness of celebrity endorsements in 
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advertising. That is, when negative information about a celebrity endorser emerges, the 
accompanying unfavorable perceptions consumers develop can dilute the brand equity of the 
celebrity associated product. Till and Shimp (1998) also found that a strong associative link 
between celebrity and product must be lessened if negative celebrity information happen to 
lower consumers’ brand evaluations. However, regardless of consumers’ perceptual strength on 
associations between the celebrity endorser and the product, negative information about celebrity 
endorsers appears to put a company’s products and built-in images at risk. For example, the fact 
that the famous pop star Michael Jackson was indicted for reported child molestation produced 
such negative connotations that the negatively transformed image resultantly attenuated the 
celebrity’s endorsement power for Pepsi. 
 The overshadowing by celebrities on their endorsed products puts forth another negative 
aspect on using celebrity endorsements. That is, consumers would focus their attention on the 
celebrity and fail to notice the brand being promoted. According to Petty et al. (1983), due to the 
enhanced attention drawn to celebrities in many types of advertisements, a general lack of 
people’s interest in assessing merits of the product may occur, which can result in reductions in 
their brand recognition (Petty et al., 1983). Rossiter and Percy (1987) also suggested that this 
phenomenon, the celebrity overshadowing effect, is likely to occur when the ads featuring 
celebrity endorsers focus on the celebrity rather than on the products endorsed. For this negative 
effect, Cooper (1984) cautioned advertising practitioners that the product, not the celebrity, must 
be the star. 
 The third important issue is that benefits of using celebrities can reverse markedly if they 
become an endorser for many diverse products. Celebrity greed and the frequent appearance of a 
particular celebrity in TV commercials or in print ads are likely to undermine the effects of 
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his/her endorsement. As Mowen and Brown (1981) suggested, if a celebrity‘s image is 
associated with many brands in the consumer mind, the celebrity and the particular brand would 
not be distinctive. If then, consumers tend to attribute the true nature of the celebrity’ 
endorsement to generous compensation, leading consumers to overt cynicism about the 
celebrity‘s motives (Tripp et al., 1994). Previous studies (Mowen & Brown, 1981; Moore, 
Mowen, & Reardon, 1994; Tripp et al., 1994) have suggested that use of multiple product 
endorsements negatively affects consumers’ perceptions of endorser trustworthiness, as well as 
their brand evaluations. Mowen and Brown (1981) discovered that the product and ad evaluation 
were higher and product purchase intention was greater when a celebrity endorsed only one 
product. Using multiple print ads as the stimuli, Tripp et al. (1994) also found that as the number 
of products endorsed increased, consumers ‘perceptions of celebrity credibility, celebrity 
likability, and their attitude toward the ad become less favorable. 
Theoretical Models on Persuasiveness of Celebrity Endorsement 
 This section discusses theoretical models which scholars have constructed to aid in 
selecting celebrity endorsers. First, two of source models including source credibility and 
attractiveness are reviewed in their theoretical developments and applications in celebrity 
endorsement advertising. Second, this is followed by the match-up hypothesis and meaning 
transfer models. The former models inform this study of various characteristics of a perceived 
communication source, the latter two models reflect the importance of congruence and symbolic 
meaning transfer between communicators and products. Lastly, some theoretical limitations of 
those four models are addressed. 
 The Source Credibility Model. Celebrities have been viewed by consumers as credible 
sources of information about the product or company they endorse (Goldsmith, Lafferty, & 
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Newell, 2000). Therefore, when researchers reflect on the topic of celebrity endorsement, they 
have generally employed the source credibility model as one of two foundational source models; 
the other model was alleged to be the source attractiveness model. Likewise, advertising 
practitioners have utilized the source credibility model as a basis for evaluating consumer 
perceptions of a celebrity endorser (Amos, Holmes, & Strutton, 2008). Ohanian (1990) defined 
source credibility as “a communicator’s positive characteristics that affect the receiver’s 
acceptance of a message” (p. 41). Indeed, the source-credibility model was originated from the 
results of a landmark study by Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953). From their analysis on factors 
leading to the perceived credibility of the communicator, they found that sources’ exhibiting 
expertise and trustworthiness are credible and persuasive in some extent. In that study, Hovland, 
and his associates (1953) defined expertise as "the extent to which a communicator is perceived 
to be a source of valid assertions," and trustworthiness as "the degree of confidence in the 
communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid" (p. 59).  
 As the first dimension of the source credibility model, expertise generally refers to the 
knowledge, experience, or skills possessed by an endorser. This dimension also includes diverse 
meanings of authoritativeness (McCroskey, 1966), competence (Whitehead, 1968), expertness 
(Applbaum & Anatol, 1972), or qualification (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969). Also, adjectives 
such as "trained-untrained," "informed-uninformed," and "educated-uneducated" commonly have 
been used to measure this dimension (Ohanian, 1990, p. 41). However, some researchers 
strongly asserted that what does really matter is not whether an endorser is actually an expert but 
how the endorser is perceived by the target consumer (Hovland, et al., 1953: Ohanian, 1991).  
 Previous research on the source credibility in the context of persuasive communications 
generally indicates that consumers’ reactions in response to the source’s recommendations seem 
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to be varied directly according to their perceived level of source expertise, which in turn 
positively influences source effectiveness (Ohanian 1991). By experimentally manipulating the 
dimensions of expertise, Crano (1970) found that subjects exposed to a high expert source 
exhibited more favorable agreement with the advocated position than did those exposed to a low 
expertise source. Similarly, Biswas, Biswas, and Das (2006) compared general experts to 
celebrity endorsers, and found that expert endorsers are more effective in increasing brand 
evaluations than celebrities when their endorsements pertain to higher risk products such as new 
technology gadgets. They also mentioned that the finding was especially the case among 
consumers with more knowledge about the product category. 
 Trustworthiness, the second dimension of source credibility model, has been regarded as 
another important predictor for effectiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. 
Trustworthiness was referred to as the integrity, honesty, or believability of an endorser 
(McGinnies &Ward, 1980). As with expertise, it depends on target audience perceptions. 
Adjectives such as "dependable-undependable," "honest-dishonesty," “reliable-unreliable,” and 
"sincere-insincere" commonly have been used to measure this dimension (Ohanian, 1990, p. 50). 
Giffin (1967) suggested that the positive consequences of trustworthiness would be consumers’ 
favorable disposition, acceptance, psychological safety, and perceived supportive climate in 
association with the sponsored product.  
 The effect of trustworthiness on attitude change has been studied increasingly. Miller and 
Basehart (1969) stated, “a highly opinionated message from a highly trustworthy communicator 
produces an effective attitude change, while non-trusted communicators’ impact proved 
immaterial” (p. 4). For their reasoning that trustworthiness is the major determinant of source 
credibility, Friedman and Friedman (1976) and Friedman, Santeramo, and Traina (1979) claimed 
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that celebrities who are liked will also be trusted and celebrity trustworthiness was highly 
correlated with a respondent's perceived similarity to the source, the level of source's expertise, 
and the source's attractiveness. However, some researchers caution as our naïve interpretation of 
those effects.  Perceived communicator trustworthiness appears to produce a greater attitude 
change than perceived expertise (McGinnies & Ward, 1980); whereas, trustworthiness of a 
celebrity was not significantly related to customers' intentions to buy an endorsed brand 
(Ohanian, 1991). Desphande and Douglas (1994) insisted that an endorser's ethnic status would 
affect endorser trustworthiness and as a result brand attitudes and these interactions occur 
because people trust individuals who are similar to them. So, it was claimed that ethnic 
background should be carefully evaluated when targeting particular ethnic groups (e.g., Africans, 
Europeans, and Asians). 
 The Source Attractiveness Model. Researchers in social psychology have frequently 
mentioned that physical attractiveness is an important indicator for an individual's initial 
judgment of another person (Baker & Churchill, 1977; Chaiken, 1979; McGuire, 1985).  
Admitting such source effects from his/her attractiveness, advertising practitioners have chosen 
celebrity endorsers on the basis of their attractiveness, which gave them dual effects of celebrity 
status and physical appeal (Singer, 1983). However, source attractiveness as a construct appears 
to be multi-dimensional in nature. As a construct, attractiveness comprehends not only physical 
attractiveness but also other potent characteristics that consumers might perceive as attributes of 
a given celebrity endorser (e.g., intellectual skills, personality properties, lifestyles, or athletic 
strength) (Erdogan, 1999). Also, the attractiveness of any source is moderated or determined by 
consumers’ perceptions of the source’s similarity, familiarity, and likeability, where Similarity 
was defined as a “supposed resemblance between the source and the receiver of the message”, 
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familiarity as “knowledge of the source through exposure”, and likability as “affection for the 
source as a result of the source's physical appearance and behavior” (McGuire, 1985; McCracken, 
1989, p. 316). According to Amos et al. (2008), both familiarity and likeability, when it is used 
in the context of celebrity endorsements, would make a substantial additive influence to the 
predictive ability of the source credibility model.  
 As detailed in the previous research, physically attractive communicators seem to be 
more successful than their unattractive counterparts at changing consumers’ beliefs (Baker & 
Churchill, 1977; Debevec & Keman, 1984) and thereby generating their purchase intentions 
(Petroshius & Crocker, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1980; Patzer, 1983). This reasoning was 
originally based on two theoretical perspectives: the theory of ‘halo effect,’ which occurs when 
people who rank high on one dimension are assumed to excel on other dimensions as well, and 
‘consistency theory,’ which states that people are more comfortable when all of their judgments 
about a person go together (Solomon, 1996). Cohen and Golden (1972) suggested that physical 
attractiveness of a communicator determines the effectiveness of persuasive communication 
through a process called “identification” which is assumed to occur when information from an 
attractive source is accepted as a result of desire to identify with such endorsers (Kelman, 1961, 
p. 59). 
 The significant effects of Endorsers’ attractiveness on persuasive outcomes were broadly 
examined in the literature. Early, Joseph (1982) summarized his experimental evidences 
concerning physically attractive communicators' impact on opinion change, product evaluation, 
and other dependent measures. In particular, he mentioned that attractive endorsers have a more 
positive impact on the products they endorse than less attractive endorsers. Joseph's findings are 
clearly consistent with Patzer’s (1983) study. As an opponent for the attractiveness model, Patzer 
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(1983; 1985) claimed that physically attractive endorsers used in advertising lead consumers 
have more favorable attitudes toward the advertisement and stronger purchase intentions across 
culture because a definite pattern of verifiable cultural  differences would be transcended by 
attractive endorsers’ subtle, pervasive, and inescapable informational cues. Kahle and Homer 
(1985) also suggested that increasing the communicator's attractiveness enhances positive 
attitude change. In specifics, these researchers manipulated celebrity physical attractiveness, and 
likability, and then measured attitude and purchase intentions on the product (i.e., Edge razors). 
Their findings showed that participants exposed to an attractive celebrity liked the product more 
than participants exposed to an unattractive celebrity. Although the same interaction was not 
statistically significant for likeable endorsers, recall for the brand was greater both in attractive 
and likeable celebrity conditions. Surprisingly, unlikable celebrities performed better on 
recognition measures than likeable and attractive celebrities. Also, one interesting finding 
indicated that an attractive celebrity created more purchase intentions than an unattractive 
celebrity; whereas, controversially an unlikeable celebrity produced consumers’ more intentions 
to buy the product than a likeable celebrity. 
 The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) has been applied for comprehending such 
complicated relationships between the attractiveness of endorsers and the effectiveness of 
advertising message types. The ELM perspective, which argues that persuasion under high and 
low involvement conditions varies. For instance, the quality of arguments contained in a message 
has a greater impact on persuasion under high involvement conditions, whereas under low 
involvement conditions peripheral cues, such as source attractiveness and credibility, have 
greater impact on persuasion (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Contrary to expectations of 
Petty and Cacioppo (1980), endorser attractiveness was equally important under both high and 
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low involvement conditions. The authors argued that in addition to serving as a peripheral cue, 
the physical appearance of endorsers might have served as a persuasive visual testimony for 
product effectiveness under low involvement conditions. Under high involvement conditions, the 
physical attractiveness of endorsers may have served as a persuasive product related cue. In 1983, 
Petty et al. replicated the earlier study of1980, but they employed a peripheral cue that was not 
be perceived as being relevant with the product. Findings revealed an interaction between 
involvement levels and endorser types. Under low involvement conditions, the endorser type had 
a significant impact on attitudes towards the product though no impact was found on behavioral 
intentions. Regarding recall and recognition measures, their findings indicated that exposure to 
celebrity endorsers increased recall of the product category under low involvement conditions, 
but it did not affect recall measures under high involvement conditions. In addition, the results 
by manipulating the endorser type revealed that celebrities had marginally significant impact on 
brand name recall over typical citizens. Interestingly, the use of celebrity endorsers was found to 
reduce the brand name recognition under low involvement conditions but not under high 
involvement conditions. Petty, et al. (1983) reasoned that this rather awkward finding occurred 
because people were more interested in the product category under high involvement situations 
and might be more motivated to assess what the brand, rather than the personalities, is offering. 
 As detailed in aforementioned models, advertising professionals have relied on the 
assumption that using a celebrity to endorse a brand will result in an increase in consumers’ 
recall and attitude change of the brand. However, increasingly, researchers question empirical 
evidences, which resulted from a direct link between using a celebrity endorsement to achieve 
higher brand recall. For instance, McCracken (1989) cautioned practitioners’ inappropriate 
choice of celebrity endorsers such as Bill Cosby for endorsing E.F. Hutton and Ringo Star for 
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Sun Country Classic wine coolers.  Soon, advertising researchers and practitioners accepted that 
effective celebrity advertising should foster, in the mind of the consumer, a match or connection 
between the endorser and the endorsed brand (Keller, 1993).  
 The Match-up Hypothesis Model. The match-up hypothesis model generally refers to 
the balance of matching between the celebrity endorser and the endorsed product (Till & Busler, 
2000). The model predicts that messages conveyed by the celebrity image and the product should 
be congruent for effective advertising (Kahle & Homer, 1985; Kamins, 1990) and the 
determinant of the congruence between the celebrity and the product depends on the degree of 
perceived fit between the celebrity’s projected image and the product’s attributes (Misra & 
Beatty, 1990; Lynch & Schuler, 1994). In one of early research studies, Kanungo and Pang 
(1973) found that the effect of the models varied depending on the product with which the 
models were paired. They explained those findings in terms of the “fittingness” of the model for 
the product (Kanungo & Pang, 1973, p. 177). Friedman and Friedman (1979) and Atkin and 
Block (1983) also explored that the type of a endorser may interact with the type of a product 
endorsed and concluded that the better celebrity endorsers are appropriate where product 
purchases involve highly social and psychological risk, the higher the level of endorsement 
effectiveness will be.  
 Among the diverse dimensions of match-up factors, sources’ physical attractiveness has 
been frequently tested on its matching effects between a celebrity and a product (Kahle & Homer 
1985; Kamins 1990). Kahle and Homer (1985), referring to the social adaptation theory,  showed 
that respondents have more favorable brand evaluation when the product (i.e., razor blades) was 
paired with an attractive, rather than an unattractive, celebrity endorser. Kamins (1990) also 
tested the match-up hypothesis by pairing either an attractive (i.e., Tom Selleck) or unattractive 
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(i.e., Telly Savalas) celebrity with either a product intended for enhancing one's attractiveness 
(i.e., luxury car) or a product not intended for enhancing one's attractiveness (i.e., home 
computer). Similarly, Kamins (1990) argued that including an attractive models in an 
advertisement may in some consumers’ minds intrinsically prompt the idea that use of a brand 
endorsed by those models will enhance their appearance as it did for the celebrity, Also, Kamins 
and Gupta (1994) found that the match-up between a celebrity endorser and the endorsed brand 
enhanced the celebrity endorser's believability and attractiveness. Those researchers reasoned 
that the match-up effect occurred because of the celebrity endorser's familiarity and consumers’ 
identification and initialization processes of social influence from celebrity endorsers.  
 However, it was frequently found that consumers often do not connect the celebrity to the 
product. That is, matching salient traits from the specific celebrity to the specific product’ 
attributes does not necessarily improve the persuasiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. 
Shani and Sandler (1991) found that although consumers could correctly identify the endorsers, 
they were less accurate in matching the endorsed brands. Wells, Burnett, and Moriarty (2000) 
speculated that consumers often remember a commercial but forget the product. In addition, 
Callcoat and Phillips (1996) reported that consumers are generally influenced by spokespersons 
if products are inexpensive and low involving, and if few differences are perceived among 
available brands. For the match up factor as a moderator to the measures of advertising 
effectiveness, Mehta (1994) found no significant differences between celebrity and non-celebrity 
endorsers on persuasion variables such as brand attitudes, ad attitudes, and intentions to buy. 
Mehta further found that there were no differences in the performance of the celebrity and non-
celebrity commercials. In other studies, the fit between a celebrity and a product was found to be 
only effective for certain effectiveness measures like brand attitudes, but not for other measures 
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such as purchase intentions. These seemingly paradoxical findings lead to the conclusion that 
some complex mechanisms of meaning transfer resides in the celebrity endorsement advertising 
such that virtually any endorsed product can be made to take any meaning (McCracken, 1987). 
 The Meaning Transfer Model. The importance of using celebrity endorsers does lie in 
how these celebrities add great values to companies, products, and eventually consumers.  J. G. 
Frazer (1992), Scottish anthropologist, speculated that an object can become imbued with the 
meaning of those connected to the object and, once touched by a respected person in a tribe or 
society, the object carries that person’s essence. In McCracken’s (1989) conception, modern 
celebrity endorsers lend their essence to the products they support, thereby rendering the objects 
more valuable through the process of meaning transfer. According to McCracken (1989), 
Celebrity endorsements are special examples of a more general process of meaning transfer. In 
his conceptual model, marketplace exchange is envisioned as the site of meaning exchange. 
Fowles (1996) stated that advertisers' rationale for hiring celebrities to endorse products is that 
people consume images of celebrities and advertisers hope that people will also consume 
products associated with celebrities. As a featured example, Michael Jordan was selected by 
many advertising practitioners as an ideal combination of success and charisma, which has made 
him one of the most well managed celebrity endorsers. That is, his success as a basketball athlete 
is well transferred to the products he endorsed, leading to impressive business success. 
 McCracken (1989) proposed the three staged model of meaning transfer, which at first 
seems a merely theoretical concept from empirical points of views, but its applicability to real 
life was demonstrated by researchers. According to McCracken (1989), in the first stage, 
celebrities develop their images through the role types they develop in society as well as how 
they are depicted in the media. In other words, the “culturally constituted society” assigns 
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meaning to celebrities (McCracken, 1989, p. 315). But, it should be noted that the number and 
variety of meanings contained in celebrities are extensive. Celebrities represent distinctive 
portraits of status, class, gender and age as well as personality and lifestyle and such varied and 
subtly constructed meanings are well presented by way of the marketing system (Erdogan, 1999). 
As Atkin and Block (1983) have shown, consumers have a pre-conceived image of a celebrity 
endorser and the meaning transfer seems to hinge on audience perceptions and the associations 
an endorser has already cultivated. St. James (2003) investigated image transfer on evaluations 
of highly technological products. He found that the strongest evaluations of a digital cable 
recorder emerged when the product was paired with the endorsement from a science fiction actor 
in television shows, not endorsements from a situational comedy actor or a pop singer. St. James 
(2003) stated that entertainers did not in reality have expertise in relation to new technology 
products; whereas, the image of a science fiction starship captain lent the actor who portrayed 
him a stronger association with technology and thus gave more credibility for endorsing the 
technology product. 
 The second stage is about the process from the celebrity to the product. When celebrities 
endorse a product, the cultural meanings residing in a celebrity, going beyond the person, are 
transferred on to the products. Acceding to McCracken (1989), the brand personalities are 
shaped in this stage. McCracken (1989) described that the meaning of celebrity endorser’s 
images tends to be dynamic and could be rendered malleable in the hands of designers, 
advertisers, producers, and consumers. For meaning to adhere to a product, McCracken (1989) 
indicated that the matching must synchronize the celebrity image and endorsed product. Merely 
employing a familiar face might not achieve that synergy. For instance, Langmeyer and Walker 
(1991) explored meanings communicated by celebrity endorsers (i.e., Madonna and Christie 
26 
 
Brinkley) by different types of products (i.e., bath towels as an unendorsed commodity product; 
VCR as an unendorsed technical product with high information needs, and blue jeans as an 
endorsed high-image product). Their study found that, before being endorsed by celebrities, 
products had original images for each product category, but when endorsed by celebrities, they 
took on the images of each celebrity. This finding supports McCracken (1989) suggestion that 
advertisers should explore the symbolism that encompasses a celebrity to determine whether 
these meanings are desirable for brands since the effectiveness of the endorser depends, in a 
large part, on the meanings he/she brings to the endorsement process.  
 Lastly, the process of meaning transfer could be accomplished when consumers’ 
meaningful identification with a celebrity lead them to purchase the endorsed product “in the 
hope of claiming some of these transferred meanings for their own lives” (McCracken, 1989, p. 
317). That is, “meaning movement from goods to consumer is achieved through rituals” 
(McCracken, 1989, p. 317). According to McCracken (1989), ritual is a kind of social action 
devoted to manipulating cultural meaning for purposes of collective and individual 
communication and categorization. So, ritual is an opportunity to affirm, evoke, assign, or revise 
conventional symbols of cultural order (Mick, 1986). McCracken (1986) also added that four 
types of ritual are used to move cultural meaning from goods to consumers; exchange rituals, 
possession rituals, grooming rituals, and divestment rituals. In conjunction with McCracken's 
(1989) argument, the role of advertising is to support those rituals by shaping products to take on 
any relevant meaning. Domzal and Keman (1992) claimed that advertising is an integral part of 
social systems, whose function is to communicate the culturally constructed meaning of products 
to consumers. According to these authors, consumers learn meanings by interpreting product 
definitions, which usually are implicit in promotional contents.  
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 Limitations of Theoretical Models on Celebrity Endorsement. As identified in 
aforementioned research results for each model, advertising researchers and practitioners tend to 
believe that using expert, credible, and attractive celebrity endorsers is effective. However, 
extent research also shows theoretical and practical limitations on each model. Intuitively, most 
of those limitations appear to be centered on two source models. Erdogan (1999) stated that the 
source credibility research regards the celebrity endorsement process as one dimensional, so it is 
impossible to provide a well grounded explanation of what factors construct source credibility 
and what factors are more important than others in certain situations. For instance, McCracken 
(1989) criticized that the source model can tell us only that a celebrity is attractive, not what 
attractive is, and prevent us from identifying the matches and mismatches with endorsed entities. 
In short, the source models tell us only about degrees of credibility and attractiveness even when 
what we need to know about is special kinds of credibility and attractiveness (1989, McCracken). 
The evidence for this criticism is prevalent. 
 A possible exception to the belief that the more credible a source is, the more persuasive 
the source is likely to be, has been pointed out by Karlins and Abelson (1970) in terms of the 
cognitive response theory. According to the theory, a message recipient's initial opinion is an 
important determinant of influence. This theory advocates that if individuals have a positive 
predisposition toward the message issue, a source who lacks credibility can be more persuasive 
than a high credibility source, since those individuals favoring the advocacy will feel a greater 
need to ensure, or control, that a position with which they agree is being adequately represented 
(Aaker & Myers, 1987). On the other hand, if individuals have a negative disposition, a high 
credibility source is more persuasive than a less credible source since the highly credible source 
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is thought to inhibit individuals' own thought activation and facilitate their acceptance of 
message thoughts (Stemthal, Dholakia, & Leavitt, 1978; Harmon & Coney, 1982).  
 Expertise and physical attractiveness have generally been identified and studied as very 
important dimensions (Homer & Kahle, 1990) in source models, but the other dimensions, such 
as trustworthiness and familiarity, have not been sufficiently investigated.  Amos et al. (2008) 
stated that, next to source’s expertise, trustworthiness is the second most important predictive 
construct for explaining the source effect. They claimed that the trustworthiness should proxy the 
confidence consumers have in the integrity and reliability of a given source. In other studies, 
celebrities’ familiarity and likeability were treated as if each were analogous to attractiveness 
and each celebrity attribute was regarded as being subsumed within the attractiveness construct 
(Kahle & Homer, 1985). In contrast, some studies approached to the familiarity and likeability 
separately, investigating each construct’s effectiveness as if each were distinct from endorsers’ 
attractiveness (O’Mahoney & Meenaghan 1998). In sum, endorsers’ attractiveness is certain to 
be a relevant construct both with familiarity and likeability within the broader context of 
celebrity endorsements; however, the scope and nature of the attractiveness construct remains 
totally unidentified, and therefore appears worthy of additional attention (Kahle & Homer, 1985).  
 Additionally, research in the marketing and advertising literature has been still equivocal 
about the impact that credible endorsers have on individuals’ evaluation on the advertisement 
and brand. Many researchers confirmed that physically attractive models used in endorsement 
advertising led to more favorable attitudes toward the advertisement and stronger purchase 
intentions (Baker & Churchill, 1977; Petroshius & Crocker, 1989; Patzer, 1983). Inconsistently, 
the effect of model attractiveness was not found in two previous studies. Studies from Caballero, 
Lumpkin, and Madden (1989) and Till and Busler's (1998) presented evidence that celebrity 
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inspiring positive feelings toward the exposed advertisement and the product do not necessarily 
translate into actual behavior or purchase intention. A possible explanation for the lack of 
celebrity endorsers’ effect on purchase intention would be that celebrity endorsements “seem to 
work on the cognitive and affective components of attitudes rather than the conative components” 
(Baker& Churchill, 1977, p. 550). 
 Academic findings regarding gender or cross gender interactions between endorsers and 
target audiences are also inconsistent and unable to provide any theoretical or practical direction. 
In researching gender interactions between endorsers and target audiences, Debevec and Kernan 
(1984) found that attractive female models generated more enhanced attitudes than attractive 
male models across both genders, but particularly among males. Inversely, Caballero et al. (1989) 
found that males showed greater intentions to buy from male endorsers and females hold greater 
intentions to purchase from female endorsers. Baker and Churchill (1977) found a rather 
unexpected interaction amongst female models, product types, and intentions to purchase 
products among male subjects. When the endorsed product was coffee, an unattractive female 
model created more intentions to buy the product than her attractive counterpart among male 
subjects; whereas, when it was perfume/aftershave, male subjects reacted more positively to an 
attractive female model. On the other hand, Petroshius and Crocker (1989) found that endorsers’ 
gender had no impact on consumers’ attitudes toward the advertisement and no major impact on 
their intentions to buy products.  
 Lastly, for the match-up hypothesis model, DeSarbo and Harshman (1985) argued that 
although the theory on match-up hypothesis recovers some of the pitfalls of source models, the 
real world applicability is also limited since it is almost impossible to develop all of the needed 
matchup between a product and a celebrity. Amos et al. (2008) also stated that due to the variety 
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of source effects identified when examining the fit between a celebrity and a product, it is almost 
impossible to make any generalization. Methodologically, respondents’ perceptions on the fit 
between a celebrity and a product could also be distorted because when consumers are asked to 
perceive the level of congruence, they are consciously attempting to match the celebrity with the 
product. As a matter of fact, no consensus was reached regarding what source effects should be 
matched with a product.  
 To summarize, previous studies on celebrity endorsement advertising found that; 1) the 
source credibility, typically viewed as a function of expertise and trustworthiness, has been 
spotlighted as a main factor for determining how influential the endorser would be (Ohanian, 
1991); 2) Sources’ attractiveness, whether it is psychological or physical, has been emphasized 
when determining liking for the endorser and thereby increasing endorsement effectiveness in 
general (Friedman & Friedman, 1979); 3) the match-up hypothesis model has been admitted for 
its usefulness for identifying the fit of celebrity endorsers and their endorsed products, especially 
in situations where expertise or attractiveness is relevant to the product domain (Kamins, 1990); 
4) The meaning transfer model tells us more a broad concept that celebrity endorsement 
advertising is not a one dimensional process but a symbolic meaning transfer from culture to 
endorsement to product to consumers. It also suggests an exact assessment of those transferred 
meanings in the empirical study together with the theoretical development (McCracken, 1989).   
 However, measuring comprehensive celebrity attributes like expertise and attractiveness 
are likely to be an uneasy task because the effectiveness of a celebrity endorser varies as a 
function of the product type, the present popularity of the celebrity, and perhaps even situational 
conditions at the time and place where the advertisement is shown. Especially, the informational 
value of an endorser’s communicated affection for a product seems to be valid only to the extent 
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that consumers believe the endorser’s motive to be genuine. Furthermore, it could be meaningful 
to directly measure how much consumers evaluate the celebrity’s genuine affection for the 
endorsed product in advertising. In order to do that, two steps of application are needed; first, 
finding psychological explanations that can enlighten such an inferential process, and next 
applying the theory to the phenomenon of interest. One possible explanation is a psychological 
process originating in attribution theory: correspondence bias. 
Attribution Theory and Celebrity Endorsement 
 Attribution theory may be helpful in forming the theoretical framework for the present 
study because attribution theory can explain whether consumers attribute celebrities’ 
endorsement to their affection to products they endorse or their personal motives reflected in 
situational cues. Especially, the correspondence bias rooted in attribution theory can explain both 
how consumers generate correspondence inference from celebrity endorsers’ disposition on 
products within clear situational constraint information and why they underestimate such 
constraints.  
 Attribution Theory. Attribution theory explains the processes by which people come to 
understand their own behavior and that of others. Causal attribution process is not only means of 
providing the individual with perceptions of reality about the world, but also of maintaining 
effective control in that world (Kelley, 1972; Stryker & Gottlieb, 1981). According to Jones 
(1990), attribution theory rests on three assumptions that; 1) individuals attempt to determine the 
causes of their own and others' behavior, 2) individuals do not assign causes of behavior 
randomly but rather employ rules, and 3) the causes attributed to behavior will influence 
subsequent behavior.  
32 
 
  The ‘naïve psychology’ proposed by Heider (1958) is widely viewed as a starting point 
for contemporary research on attribution theory. His two contributions that continue to influence 
the attribution research appear worth noting. First, Heider distinguished personal or dispositional 
causation in which the behavior of some individuals is the primary cause of an outcome from 
environmental or situational causation in which some type of external influence is the primary 
cause of an outcome. Heider’s second contribution is his proposition that behavior “has such 
salient properties it tends to engulf the total field rather than be confined to its proper position as 
a local stimulus whose interpretation requires the additional data of a surrounding field - the 
situation in social perception” (1958, p. 54). With this proposition, Heider correctly predicted 
that observers would tend to prefer dispositional over situational causal explanations, although 
the claim that salience would be the cause of this effect has been the subject of theoretical debate 
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995). 
 Although Heider’s (1958) work provides some core ideas that have played a central role 
in subsequent attribution studies, two later theories clarified those ideas both to render them 
more easily tested empirically and to enable the development of attribution theory as a 
mainstream topic in social psychology. The first of two is Kelley’s (1967) ‘co-variation theory,’ 
which describes the three types of information that attributors use to verify whether they have 
correctly linked causes and effects. The direction of individuals’ causal inferences differs 
depending on the basis of the three types of information: distinctiveness, consistency (i.e., both 
temporal and modal), and social consensus. For example, if information about a person P’s 
recommendations on a brand B are perceived to be high consensus, high distinctiveness, and 
high consistency, it implies that P’s recommendation is caused by the fact that B is a good 
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product. According to this principle, people associate a particular reason with a particular 
outcome if the outcome exists when the reason exists, and is absent when the reason is absent. 
 In the context of celebrity endorsement advertising, previous researchers adopted 
attribution theory to identify consumers’ perception of multiple product endorsements. 
Attribution theory (Kelley, 1972) suggests that, since multiple product endorsements do not 
imply the distinctive action, consumers’ trait inferences may result in less favorable evaluations 
on multiple product endorsers than on single product endorsers. Some early studies confirmed 
that a celebrity endorses multiple products is sufficient to erode consumers' perceptions of 
endorser trustworthiness, as well as their ad and brand evaluations. Mowen, Brown, and 
Schulman (1979) manipulated knowledge of the number of products endorsed by a celebrity via 
a paragraph that listed four additional products the celebrity had agreed to endorse. The 
dependent measure was the combined likability and familiarity of the celebrity endorser. The 
findings revealed that the celebrity was perceived more negatively when subjects were told that 
multiple products were endorsed by the celebrity. Using written instructions, Mowen and Brown 
(1981) also manipulated knowledge of the number of products endorsed by a celebrity. Other 
manipulated factors were the prestige of the product endorsed, type of endorser, and number of 
additional endorsers. Dependent measures included trustworthiness, likability, ad evaluations, 
brand evaluations, and purchase intentions. Knowledge of the number of products endorsed 
produced no differences in participants’ perceptions on the spokesperson's likability and 
trustworthiness. However, individuals informed of multiple product endorsements viewed the 
advertisement and the product less favorably and indicated less interest in buying the product. In 
a recent study, Trip et al. (1994) also applied three types of information to measure the 
effectiveness of multiple product endorsements and found that the number of products a celebrity 
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endorses negatively influences consumers' perceptions of endorser credibility and likability, as 
well as attitudes toward the advertisement. 
 However, it should be noted that Kelley’s (1967) co-variation theory is rather classical in 
that it mainly focused on causality. For example, the co-variation theory only tells what the 
causes are for consumers’ negative responses to multiple celebrity endorsements. As the second 
major derivative from Heider’s (1958) attribution theory, the correspondent inference theory was 
proposed to deal with perceiver’s process of attribution (Jones & Davis, 1965). The goal of 
correspondent inference theory is to use an observed behavior to identify the characteristics of 
person or actor performing that behavior. Specifically, the objective of correspondent inference 
theory is to identify circumstances under which it is justifiable to make correspondent inferences 
about the actor, where a correspondent inference is described as “a straightforward extrapolation 
from the behavior observed” (Jones, 1990, p. 47). Correspondent inference theory regards three 
pieces of information as being particularly important for observers to make causal inferences to 
the actor. First, correspondent inferences are most proper when the actor has his/her own volition 
for free choice as to whether he/she performs the observed behavior. Second, the actor’ 
behaviors are sufficiently diagnostic to the extent that they are unexpected. When an individual 
behaves in a way that is completely understandable, the behavior does not necessarily reveal 
anything about the individual’s personal characteristics (Jones & Harris, 1967). Third, behaviors 
that have a single and clear result are more diagnostic of the actor’s motives in performing that 
behavior, thereby serving as a stronger basis for correspondent inferences (Jones & Davis, 1965). 
Even though the correspondence inference theory was widely applied and tested in social 
psychology contexts, its use in advertising, especially in the study of celebrity endorsements, has 
been limited. However, our knowledge of how celebrity endorsements work must be enlightened 
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by a famous sub-theory derived from the theory of correspondence inference: correspondence 
bias.   
 The Correspondence Bias. A variety of attribution theories have generally 
conceptualized human beings as rational and logical creatures. In addition, early theories 
analyzing causes of attributions were normative in nature in that they offered prescriptions 
regarding how and what information should be used in order to arrive at a accurate and valid 
attribution (Silvera & Laufer, 2005). Nevertheless, people tend to deviate from the normative 
prescriptions of early attribution theories in several ways. Perhaps the most notable of those 
deviations is perceivers’ tendency to ascribe people’ behavior to personality based factors when 
the observed data are more consistent with situational explanations. One of the earliest 
explanations for why people consistently make this perceptual error is the argument, drawing on 
principles from Gestalt psychology, that behavior engulfs the field (Heider, 1958). This tendency, 
referred to as the ‘correspondence bias’ (Gilbert & Jones, 1986), or ‘fundamental attribution 
error’ (Ross, 1977), has proven to be an extremely robust phenomenon (Quattrone, 1982). 
Moreover, the inability of the research community to agree upon the explanation of 
correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) has stimulated a substantial amount of research 
on the topic. The perspective on ‘process’ concerning attributions seem to be relevant to the topic 
of celebrity endorsements. That is to examine the cognitive steps involved in the process of 
attribution for the purpose of identifying potential sources of error in each step 
 Before looking to the detailed attribution process, one influential study about 
correspondence bias is worth recognizing. In the study from Jones and Harris (1967), 
participants were asked to read an essay that either supported or opposed Fidel Castro’s regime 
in Cuba. In half of the cases, they were told that the writers were given free choice with regard to 
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the attitudes they expressed in the essay. The other half were told that the writers were forced to 
express a particular opinion. The participants were then asked to speculate on what the writers’ 
actual opinions concerning the Castro regime were. This task should have been very simple 
when the writers were free to express their own opinion. When the writers were forced to present 
a specific opinion, however, the participants did not have any clue regarding their real standpoint. 
Surprisingly, the participants in both conditions believed that the attitude expressed in the essay 
represented the writers’ actual position. The participants ascribed the writers’ behavior to inner 
factors, despite the existence of a clear situational constraint.  
 Since the study of Jones and Harris (1967), researchers have tried to identify causes of 
the correspondence bias and to discover contexts in which interesting applications of this bias 
could be found. A common explanation for the correspondence bias involves selective attention, 
by which observers tend to focus on the actor, who is more prominent and accessible than the 
background of the situation (Taylor & Fiske, 1975). Other researchers have claimed that this bias 
occurs particularly when the observers are unable or unmotivated to correct their perception by 
taking the situation into account (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). In 
fact, most of explanations on the causes of correspondence bias have been explained in reference 
to the attributional process. 
The Attributional Process. Many researchers have tried to break the attributional process 
into a number of stages or sub-processes in order to know the detailed mechanism of attribution. 
The first of those process models was proposed by Quattrone (1982). According to the researcher, 
observers use an “anchoring and adjustment heuristic” when they make attributions (Quattrone, 
1982, p. 595). That is, they use the observed behavior to establish an anchor, or starting point, for 
their assessment of the actor’s disposition, and then adjust this anchor of information about 
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external or situational constraints that might have influenced the behavior (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).  So, people’s anchoring and adjustment heuristic indicates that insufficient adjustment 
would induce the correspondence bias. After that, several models concerning the attributional 
process have been developed (Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope, 1986) and probably the most complete 
model that is worth articulating further was proposed by Gilbert and Malone (1995). Their 
attributional process model depicts attributions as involving four stages: 1) situation perception, 
2) behavioral expectation, 3) behavior perception, and 4) attribution (See Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Attributional Process Model: Gilbert & Malone (1995) 
 
According to Gilbert and Malone (1995), people’s tendency to the correspondence bias 
comes from their information processing difficulties in the first three stages of attributional 
process. In the first stage of situational perception, the observer must first recognize the situation 
in which the actor is behaving in order to make an proper attribution; however, situations are not 
always easy to be recognizable because they are not often specified physically (Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995). In the second stage of behavioral expectation, audience pressure, peer 
expectations, and sometimes fear of terrorists might all influence the actor’s behavior in various 
ways, but none of these contextual forces are readily available to an external observer. In the 
third stage of behavior perception, when the causal influence of the situation is ignored or 
overlooked, observers tend to make biased dispositional attributions. For example, in the study 
from Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977), participants evaluated two people who were playing 
38 
 
a general knowledge quiz game. The participants were informed that one of these people was 
assigned the role of composing and asking difficult questions and the other one had to answer 
those questions. The participants tended to ignore the situational constraints that benefited the 
questioners and perceived them as more knowledgeable than the answerers.  
Besides the above inducers to inferential bias, incorrect causal inference also increases 
observers’ correspondence bias. If observers are accurate in their cognitive activity, they must 
not only recognize what the situation is but also understand how that situation is likely to 
influence behavior. However, observers who often lack such accurate understanding are likely to 
have erroneous expectations for how a person would normally behave, thereby misjudging the 
attributional inferences of how the actor actually does behave. For instance, in Milgram’s (1963) 
classic obedience paradigm, observers appear to underestimate the percentage of participants 
who will deliver the maximum shock level. Those who were familiar with Milgram’s research, 
where more than half of participants administered the maximum shock, thought those 
participants who administer high levels of shock behaved normally; whereas, participants who 
refused to administer shocks were disobedient. In contrast, people who had inaccurate 
expectations about what was typical behavior in that situation reacted quite reversely. 
Participants who administered high levels of shock was seen as sadistic and cruel; whereas, 
participants who refused to give high levels of shock were viewed as typical. That Milgram 
research highlights that accurate identification of what behaviors should normally be expected in 
a given situation is crucial to making a valid and correct attribution.   
From the speculation that the first two stages of the attributional process might result in 
errors when observers are unaware of situational constraint information, one can predict that a 
realistic understanding of the situation protects observers against the correspondence bias. 
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Paradoxically, however, it is exactly such a prediction that can cause some errors when an 
observer tries to interpret the behavior (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Observers’ knowledge of the 
situation can result in correspondent expectations for behavior in that situation, which can in turn 
bias interpretations of the actor’s actual behavior through a process called “perceptual 
assimilation” (Trope, 1986; Trope & Alfieri, 1997, p. 663). For example, knowledge that a 
situational force (e.g., a hostile audience) is likely to induce a particular behavior (e.g., a nervous 
speech) induces an observer to expect that behavior. The observer’s expectations are then likely 
to influence his interpretation of the behavior, frequently resulting in perceptions that the 
behavior corresponds more closely with his expectations or with the situational constraints than 
it actually does (Trope, Cohen, & Maoz, 1988). In this example, this perceptual assimilation 
process would result in a perception that the speech was more nervous than it actually was, and 
subsequently in an unduly dispositional inference that the speaker was more nervous than he 
actually was. Trope, Cohen, and Maoz (1988) concluded that when observers expect a particular 
type of behavior, and when the behavior is sufficiently ambiguous to permit perceptual 
assimilation effects, people are more likely to perceive the behavior as corresponding with the 
situation and thus to make stronger dispositional attributions about the actor. 
 Lastly, even when observers accurately identify both the behavior and the situation, if 
they do not properly integrate those pieces of information it is still possible for them to exhibit 
the correspondence bias. The effect of improper information integration on the correspondence 
bias is more clarified in the ‘sequential operations model of attribution’ developed by Gilbert et 
al (1988). According to Gilbert et al. (1988), the sequential operations model of attribution 
process involves three stages (See Figure 2). First, people identify an actor’s behavior (i.e., 
categorization). Second, they attribute the actor’s behavior to his/ her correspondent dispositional 
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inference (i.e. characterization). In the last stage, people take the situation into account and adjust 
their attribution accordingly (i.e., correction). However, although the first two stages are 
relatively automatic and demand low levels of attention, the third stage occurs only if the person 
is paying enough attention (Gilbert et al., 1988). 
 
 
Figure 2. Sequential Operations Model of Attribution: Gilbert et al. (1988) 
 
  Gilbert and Malone (1995) also suggested that the three stages of the attribution process 
in the model differ in terms of the cognitive demands they place on observers. That is, the first 
two stages are relatively automatic and effortless; whereas, the correction stage is substantially 
more cognitively demanding. Thus, when observers lack motivation, mental energy, or cognitive 
skills, they are able to categorize the behavior and characterize the individual as having traits 
corresponding to that behavior, but they are often unable to correct for situational factors and 
thus exhibit correspondence bias. 
 The Correspondence Bias on Celebrity Endorsement. Since Jones and Harris (1967), 
researchers have tried to identify causes of correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) and 
discover contexts in which interesting applications of this bias could be found. Celebrity 
endorsement advertising has been suggested as one study area the theory of correspondence bias 
potentially relates to (Sørum, 2003). In particular, relevancy is in the question of whether and 
when consumers infer that celebrity endorsers have genuine attitudes toward the products they 
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endorse. Despite the high relevance of attribution theory to the study of celebrity endorsement 
advertising, previous research on celebrity endorsements has seldom adopted this perspective. 
Silver (2005) strongly suggested that measures of global celebrity characteristics like credibility 
and trustworthiness are likely to be problematic to the extent that the effectiveness of a celebrity 
endorser varies as a function of the product type, the current popularity of the celebrity, and 
perhaps even societal conditions at the time and place where the advertisement is shown. 
 Kardes (1993) has argued that correspondence bias makes us disregard the situational 
constraints and thus contributes to the effectiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. Most 
consumers know that people advertising something are likely to be well paid to express their 
affection for that product. This is especially true for celebrity endorsers. According to Tripp et al. 
(1994), observers of a celebrity spokesperson who endorses only a product may or may not 
attribute the endorsement to the product itself. Other potential causes for the endorsement exist 
in popularity of the endorser, endorser's ties to the product, company, or advertising agency and 
money paid to the endorser. Among those causes, celebrity monetary benefits and accompanying 
endorsement script in ads have been regarded as the main situational constraints in previous 
studies.  
 As the first study of its kinds, Cronley et al., (1999) carried out an exploratory study with 
the following hypothesis: correspondence bias will occur, even though the participants know that 
the endorser is under very constraining situational circumstances. These researchers showed 
participants an advertisement in which Cindy Crawford endorsed a popular brand of orange juice. 
They had two experimental conditions. In one condition, participants were informed that Cindy 
Crawford did the commercial for free as part of a charity campaign. In the other condition, 
participants were told that she received an advertisement fee. In addition, there were two 
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versions of the advertisement, an extreme and a moderate endorsement. In the extreme version, 
five advantages of the product and three times of Cindy Crawford’s name were presented. In the 
moderate version, no product advantages were mentioned and Cindy Crawford’s name was 
mentioned only once. Cronley et al. (1999) found support for their hypothesis. Participants 
assumed that the endorser actually liked the particular brand of orange juice. This was especially 
true when they were told that she had volunteered, but also when they knew that she was well 
paid. Thus, Cronley et al. (1999) concluded that they had demonstrated correspondence bias. 
They also found that the degree to which participants made dispositional attributions was 
correlated with participants’ attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and the endorser. 
Accordingly, they concluded that correspondence bias is a possible reason why endorsement 
advertisements are effective.  
 Unlike the study from Cronley et al. (1999), Silvera and his colleagues (Sørum et al., 
2003; Silvera et al., 2004) found no evidence for correspondence bias from their experiment 
using similar advertisements including several different endorsers and product types. 
Unexpectedly, these researchers found the reversal of correspondence bias in that endorsers were 
viewed as have genuine attitudes toward the endorsed product less than the typical individual. 
Only similar finding with the study of Cronley el al. (1999) was that correspondent inferences on 
the celebrity endorser are positively related to purchase intentions for the advertised product. A 
number of differences with regard to methodology and participant populations can potentially 
explain the different results from those lines of research and these differences in turn testify to 
the complexity of the process of correspondent inference in relation to celebrity endorsement 
advertising.  
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 In summary, the findings from previous studies on attribution theory and correspondence 
bias found that; 1) correspondence bias is exhibited when people are unable to correct for 
situational factors in a three stages of attributional process (i.e., categorization, characterization, 
and correction) and the correction also depends on individual differences (e.g.,  need for 
cognition and implicit theory of personality); 2) consumers tend to exhibit their tendency to the 
correspondence bias when they evaluate an celebrity’s true motives for the endorsement 
(Cronley et al., 1999); 3) correspondent inferences about an endorser were positively associated 
with participants’ attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and even purchase intentions 
for the endorsed product (Silvera et al., 2004). 
 However, it might be that consumers, as Jones and Harris (1967) pointed out, make 
dispositional attributions to a larger extent than is logically justified. Thus, they might disregard 
the facts that the endorser is well paid and instructed to say by the advertiser. In contrast, several 
studies have shown that correspondence bias occurs even when situational constraints are 
obvious to the observer, although the attributions made are somewhat less dispositional (Gilbert 
& Jones, 1986; Gilbert & Malone, 1995). It is also reasonable to expect that when consumers 
observe a celebrity endorsement advertisement, they are not sufficiently sensitive to the 
situational constraints on the endorser’s behavior. This can cause them to conclude that the 
endorser actually has positive attitudes concerning the product, and that the act of endorsing is an 
expression of genuine affection for the product. However, what if situational constraints are too 
obvious for observers to ignore a celebrity endorser’ ulterior motives (i.e., recognizable from the 
celebrity’s multiple product endorsement) (Tripp et al., 1994)? 
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 Research on suspicion of ulterior motives has given clues to the anti-correspondence bias, 
because when an observer has reasons to suspect that an actor is motivated by external factors, 
the observer is less apt to make dispositional attributions (Fein, Hilton & Miller, 1990). 
Suspicion of Ulterior Motives about Celebrity Endorsers 
 This section deals with previous research on suspicion of ulterior motives and how 
situational information about the ulterior motives of celebrity endorsers is processed differently 
in the mind of suspicious consumers. In addition, with recognition that there was no theoretical 
examination on the suspicion for celebrity endorsement study, this section provides an overall 
review of previous studies on suspicion in marketing literature and their applicable points in 
celebrity endorsement contexts such as multiple product endorsements. 
 Perceivers’ Suspicion Mechanism. Suspicion of ulterior motives was defined as 
questioning the motives that underlie another person’s behavior or questioning the authenticity of 
that behavior (Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993). According to Fein (1996), suspicion is “a dynamic 
state in which the individual actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about the 
motives or genuineness of a person's behavior” (p. 1165). However, suspicion is more than 
simply entertaining multiple hypotheses about the motives underlying a behavior. Suspicion is a 
frequently experienced mental state (Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990). For instance, perceivers are 
likely to experience suspicion when they observe employees ingratiating with their boss or a 
child suddenly offering loving sentiments just before asking for something he/she wants. Hilton 
et al. (1993) also stated that suspicion can be triggered by a variety of circumstances, such as 
when perceivers are warned about the insincerity or untrustworthiness of an individual or group, 
when perceivers' expectations have been violated strongly, and when perceivers recognize 
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situational cues in the contextual information surrounding an actor's behavior that suggest 
ulterior motives. 
 A unique mechanism of suspicion is that suspicious perceivers have a tendency to 
generate alternative causal explanations for a target person’s behavior (Fein, 1996; Fein & Hilton, 
1994; Fein et al, 1990; Vonk, 1998). In contrast, unsuspicious perceivers tend to be predisposed 
to take a person’s behavior at face value and infer that it reflects the person’s true personality or 
attitude, even when the situation provides an adequate explanation for the behavior (Jones & 
Davis, 1965). A suspicious person, however, engages in a relatively sophisticated attributional 
thought process in which he/she actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about the 
motives of another’s behavior. As a result, suspicious perceivers tend to refrain from taking 
behavior at face value and be in a state of suspended judgment, at least until their suspicions 
have been resolved (Fein, 1996).  
 Another important mechanism of being suspicious is that a target person’s behavior and 
contextual information, or both, subsequent to suspicion arousal can significantly influence a 
perceiver’s attributional processing (Fein et al., 1990; Hilton et al., 1993). In the Fein et al. (1989) 
study, for example, participants read about the activities of a man with modest means courting an 
older and very wealthy widow. The man wrote poems, sent flowers and candy often, and told her 
that he wanted to marry her. Despite all of these loving behaviors, participants were unwilling to 
infer whether the man was truly in love with the woman or was simply after her money. They 
were only able to disambiguate the suitor’s behavior and generate negative or positive 
attributions about his true intent after reading unrelated information about the man’s behavior 
that inferred greed or altruism.  
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 Lastly, it should be distinguished that the influence of suspicion on willingness to invest 
cognitive effort in the scrutiny of persuasive messages is twofold, depending on how suspicion is 
approached. Suspicion can be regarded as the response aroused by a specific persuasive source 
or a dispositional characteristic of the receptor. First, starting from the source perspective, a 
highly suspicious source might arouse reactance (Worchel & Brehm, 1971). In other words, this 
suspicion can arouse feelings of threats against the customer’s sense of freedom, provoking 
reactance, which will inhibit any willingness to invest cognitive effort in the scrutiny of the 
message (Fitzsimons & Lehman, 2004). This effect has been identified to be strong enough to 
overwhelm receptors’ inter-individual differences (Echebarria-Echabe, 2010). Another 
perspective involves regarding suspicion as a dispositional characteristic of the receiver. Here, 
suspicion is regarded as a dispositional characteristic that affects receivers’ attitudes towards 
persuasive attempts in general. So, highly suspicious subjects will show a preventive attitude 
towards persuasive messages. In the social perception domain, Fein and Hilton (1994) found that 
observers who are in general suspicious of the motives underlying actors´ behavior engage in 
relatively sophisticated styles of attribution processing. 
 Suspicion and Correspondence Bias. Extant research suggests that people are not good 
at detecting insincerity due to the correspondence bias (O’Sullivan, 2003). As mentioned in the 
previous section on correspondence bias, perceivers tend to take actors' behavior at face value 
rather automatically, and they rarely devote the cognitive resources necessary to successfully 
complete the more cognitively effortful task of correcting their initial correspondence inferences 
in light of contextual information. Interestingly, studies on suspicion have showed conditions 
similar to those used in the research of correspondence bias, in which the identification of the 
actor's behavior was clear and the situational constraint was obvious. In the context of this 
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similarity, how does suspicion cause perceivers to avoid this bias? Is it an antidote to the 
correspondence bias? The studies on the suspicion of ulterior motive have made positive answers. 
 According to Fein (1996), ulterior motives trigger a very different mindset than is typical, 
causing perceivers to process information in a relatively unique way. That is, suspicious 
perceivers show a particular attribution style which explains why salient ulterior motive 
information leads to suspension of judgment, whereas other information that is at least as salient 
does not. More specifically, this suspicious mindset can be characterized as a state of 
“attributional conservatism” in which suspicious perceivers raise substantially their thresholds 
for accepting behavioral information at face value (Fein et al., 1990, p. 1165; Hilton et al., 1993). 
That is, once they have become suspicious, perceivers are more likely to perceive a wide range 
of behavior as attributionally ambiguous. This mindset may stem in part from the desire not to be 
duped by another individual. Therefore, the suspicious perceiver may focus to an unusually large 
degree on the potential hidden agendas of all actors, not only the actor in question. When, in this 
frame of mind, perceivers may begin to question the motives even if any contextual information 
that suggests any particular ulterior motives is not available for the actors.  
 The most fundamental effect that suspicion has on perceivers is that it causes them to 
hesitate to take behavior at face value, do the work of correction, and even evoke a mindset that 
facilitates this process (Fein, 1996). This assertion was proved by Fein et al. (1990) in the essay 
paradigm study similar to ones used in studies on the correspondence bias. Fein et al. (1990) 
compared the inferences made by participants who learned that an author's choice of positions 
advocated in his essay was constrained by the demands of his job (i.e., no choice condition) with 
those made by participants who learned that the author was not under strong constraint but that 
his choice of positions may have been influenced by a motive to ingratiate himself to a superior 
48 
 
or to avoid an unwanted job (i.e., ulterior motives condition). The findings indicated that the 
participants in the no choice condition exhibited the typical correspondence bias in their 
inferences. That is, participants’ inferences on the author's true attitude did not differ 
significantly as a function of the attitude expressed in the author's speech. The participants who 
had reason to be suspicious, on the other hand, did not fall prey to this bias. 
 As a matter of fact, one previous study showed that a suspicious mindset is a quite 
effective antidote to the correspondence bias (Fein, 1996). Marchand and Vonk (2005) tried to 
identify the process of becoming suspicious and discovering ulterior motives. Participants read 
about a likable behavior, and then sequentially received ten cues about potential ulterior motives 
of the actor. Participants were asked to think aloud while they were reading and their thoughts 
were coded. They found that participants evaluate the actor less positively as more information is 
presented. In addition, they also showed the expected quadratic effect for suspicion. Perceivers 
who were initially certain of their evaluation soon began to doubt the actor’s motives as 
suspicious. As more information was presented, they became progressively more certain that the 
actor indeed had ulterior motives, until finally they were certain. Taken together, these findings 
demonstrate that suspicion is a dynamic process that unfolds over time as people grapple with 
the possibility that an actor has ulterior motives, and then become convinced. 
 Suspicion on Communicators’ True Motives. Recent research in social psychology and 
related disciplines has identified conditions under which persuasion attempts backfire because of 
recipients’ suspicious minds on the communicator’s true motives (e.g., Campbell & Kirmani, 
2000; DeCarlo, 2005; Friestad & Wright, 1994; Main, Dahl, & Darke, 2007). In cases when 
persuasion motives (e.g., to get someone to change his or her opinions) are salient by a number 
of factors, such as their explicit behaviors (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000) or the belief that the 
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agent will personally benefit commissions from their supporting behaviors (Friestad & Wright, 
1994), recipients are likely to distrust the communicator’s recommendations and will adjust their 
attributions for plausible situational constraints (Fein, 1996; Fein et al., 1990). Despite this 
advance, little is known about the effects that consumers’ suspicion of ulterior motives is likely 
to exert on their acceptance of a celebrity endorsement in advertising contexts. Notably some 
studies of suspicion on sales agents’ motives help us understand how consumers cope with a 
celebrity endorsement when they feel suspicious on the celebrity’s true motives.      
 Even though not focused on celebrity advertisements per se, Campbell and Kirmani 
(2000) found that two factors, accessibility of persuasion motives and consumers’ cognitive 
capacity, have an interactive effect on inferences of persuasion motive and salesperson 
perceptions. An interesting finding from Campbell and Kirmani’s research suggests that when 
perceivers were suspicious of a salesperson’s ulterior motives, more negative persuasion 
inferences were generated that, in turn, negatively influenced perceptions of the salesperson. To 
these researchers, suspicion was regarded as one of coping mechanisms in consumers’ 
‘persuasion knowledge model’ (Friestad & Wright, 1994). A basic idea of persuasion knowledge 
model is that a consumer is able to use her persuasion knowledge to identify that an agent is 
attempting to influence her and to try to manage the persuasion episode to achieve her own goals. 
In a similar vein, Campbell and Kirmani (2000) proposed that when the situation makes ulterior 
motives accessible, persuasion knowledge will be used to infer an underlying persuasion motive 
and will thus influence the evaluation of the salesperson. In contrast, when ulterior motives are 
less accessible and consumers are cognitively constrained, persuasion knowledge will not be 
used in evaluating the salesperson. This finding implies that when recipients are come to believe 
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that the motive behind a sales person is insincere or manipulative (i.e., suspicious) by some 
situational constraints, they will likely resist their compliance with sales person’s tactics. 
 It is also worth noting that situational constraints, whether it comes from a sales person’s 
message tactics, diversely relevant information about the person, or other perceived behaviors, 
eventually induce negative impressions from consumers when they are enough to be suspicious. 
This fact hints that the tactical advantages of celebrity endorsers also appear to be limited by 
certain situational constraints. For example, endorser effectiveness is reduced when perceivers 
feel suspicious on the celebrity’s ulterior motive by the fact that he/she endorses several products 
(Tripp et al., 1994). The semi-structured interview conducted by Tripp el al. (1994) revealed 
consumers’ strong reactions to celebrities’ multiple product endorsements. In their study, all 
interviewees mentioned that celebrities endorse products because they are paid for those 
endorsements. All of interviewees, to some extent, questioned whether the endorser used or even 
liked his/her endorsed products. Also, those researchers found that some interviewees felt 
consumers would react negatively due to the endorser appearing in ads for more than one 
product. These interviewees questioned the sincerity of the endorser relative to the product 
endorsement while other interviewees stated that they thought the endorser should be loyal to 
one product. Taken as a whole, the interviews suggest that consumers do not actively process 
information regarding how many products a celebrity endorses. However, when the number of 
products endorsed does become salient, consumers doubt whether the endorser actually likes, 
uses, or purchases the products endorsed. In this regard, consumers question the endorser's 
trustworthiness, either directly or indirectly. Silvera (2005) also proposed that endorsing several 
products may create the likelihood that the celebrity has an ulterior motive to cash in the value of 
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their name recognition, and such ulterior motives will reduce an observer’s tendency to make 
correspondent inferences.  
 To summarize, the findings of previous studies on suspicion of ulterior motive suggested 
that; 1) suspicious perceivers have a tendency to generate alternative causal explanations for a 
target person’s behavior and cognitively engage in relatively sophisticated styles of attribution 
processing (Hilton et al., 1993); 2) the most fundamental effect that suspicion has on perceivers 
is that it causes them to hesitate to take behavior at face value, do the work of correction, and 
even evoke a mindset that facilitates this process (Fein, 1996); 3) suspicion study indirectly 
suggested that endorsing several products creates the likelihood that the celebrity has an ulterior 
motive to cash in the value of their name recognition and such ulterior motives must play an 
important role preventing correspondent inferences to the behavior of endorser (Silvera & Laufer, 
2005).  
Proposed Theoretical Framework 
 Before proceeding to the development of specific research hypotheses, in order to clarify 
main concepts of correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, a guiding theoretical 
framework was developed with reference to Gilbert el al.’s (1988) model of sequential 
operations of attribution.  
  Figure 3 shows the proposed theoretical framework that was applied in this study. The 
framework proposes that people draw correspondence bias or suspicion outcomes based on the 
results of a three-staged process: categorization (i.e., identifying action), characterization (i.e., 
drawing dispositional inferences about the actor), and correction (i.e., adjusting those inferences 
with information about situational constraints). In particular, in a no-suspicion condition, people 
will not do the work of correction because they make dispositional inferences on the behavior of 
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an actor as it is. In a low-suspicion condition (i.e., low constraint condition), people also will not 
do the work of correction because they tend to underestimate situational constraints and 
overestimate actor’s dispositions. That is, they will show correspondence bias. However, in a 
high-suspicion condition, people will do the work of correction because suspicion causes them to 
hesitate to take the behavior of an actor at face value and arise more sophisticated thinking. 
Accordingly, they will not show correspondence bias and even produce less correspondence 
inference to the actor.   
 Based on literature of celebrity endorsements, it should be also noted that some factors 
regarding perceived product congruence with a celebrity endorser and individual difference in 
personality will moderate the sequential operation between characterization and correction. The 
different roles of those moderators are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. A Proposed Theoretical Framework 
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Research Hypotheses 
 The primary goal of this section is to generate multiple research hypotheses on the basis 
of theoretical relationships between suspicion and its persuasive effects within the context of 
celebrity endorsement advertising. Since both conceptual and theoretical foundations were 
already discussed at length in the preceding literature review, this section is devoted to 
investigate points of interest including; 1) the antecedent role of suspicion, with the explanatory 
support of correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, on consumers’ correspondence 
inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity, 2) the differential role of consumers’ 
perceived product congruence with a celebrity endorser on their correspondence inference on the 
endorsement behavior of a celebrity, 3) the moderating roles of personality constructs, need for 
cognition and implicit theory of personality, in correspondent inferential processes, and 4) the 
mediating role of correspondence inference from both suspicion and perceived product 
congruence to attitudinal and behavioral consequences.   
 Antecedents of Correspondence Inference on celebrity endorsement. The first set of 
hypotheses regards antecedent conditions that might cause the evocation of correspondence 
inference with differing degrees of impact. Based on previous literature review, this study 
speculates that receivers’ suspicion on celebrity endorsers’ genuine motives, aroused from their 
situational information and their perception on product congruence with the chosen celebrity, 
would be an influential factor on consumers’ endorser-relating attributions.  
 Low Suspicion and Correspondence Bias. It is generally expected that consumers’ 
suspicion on celebrity endorsers’ genuine motives will negatively affect their correspondence 
inference on the celebrity’s endorsement behavior in advertising. Many researchers confirmed 
that individuals’ correspondence inference that celebrity endorsements reflect true affection for 
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endorsed products on the part of endorsers should be doubted because a large amount of 
endorsement fee given to celebrities should be viewed as a strong incentive toward the 
endorsement behavior (Atkin & Block, 1983; Kamin, 1989; Tripp et al., 1994).  
 Although relationships between suspicion and correspondence inference are negatively 
associated, the negative strength of correspondence inference depends on the degrees of 
suspicion; that is, how much people take actors’ situational information as being suspicious 
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In particular, previous research concerning correspondence inference 
on celebrity endorsements suggested that certain situational information such as a large amount 
of endorsement fee, could be a low-suspicion inducer affecting consumers’ correspondence 
inference because money compensation for endorsement has been commonly aceepted to the 
public and celebrities are favored as product endorsers due to their reference and expert power 
(as reviewed in Chapter 2). However, this study claims that low-suspicion situation could be 
better explained by a theoretical phenomenon called ‘correspondence bias.’ By definition, 
correspondence bias is a tendency “to assume that a person's behavior is a true reflection of their 
beliefs or opinions and thus their underlying dispositions when in fact their behavior could be 
explained entirely by situational factors” (Gilbert & Malone, 1995, pp. 22). Theory of 
correspondence bias suggests that people tend to make strong correspondence inferences (i.e., 
liking for the product) from behavior and fail to adjust sufficiently for situational factors (i.e., 
endorsement fees) (Frieden, 1984; Gilbert & Johns, 1986). In other words, correspondence bias 
is exhibited when people are unable to correct for situational factors in the sequential operations 
of attribution: categorization, characterization, and correction (Gilbert et al., 1988). In addition, 
O’Sullivan (2003) found evidence that correspondence bias significantly undermined the ability 
to detect honesty and deception accurately when observers thought positively about someone. 
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 In the context of celebrity endorsements, several studies have assessed correspondence 
bias by manipulating subjects’ awareness of situational factors that were linked to the actor’s 
behavior and found that correspondence bias always occurs in association with situational 
information on a monetary incentive for the endorsement (e.g., Cronley et al., 1999; Sorum et al., 
2003). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed; 
 H1:  Consumers’ correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity 
 in an advertisement will not be significantly lower under a low-suspicion condition than 
 under a no-suspicion condition because of their tendency to correspondence bias. 
 Suspicion of ulterior motives. In a nonverbal communication literature, there is ample 
evidence that most people cannot distinguish honest from deceptive behavior of others 
(Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 1999; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Malone & 
DePaulo, 2001). One of the reasons why people are so poor at detecting deception is a 
perceiver’s “truthfulness bias” (Marchand et al., 2005, p. 243) That is, people tend to accept 
everything they see at face value and cannot comprehend something without accepting it as true. 
Gilbert (1991) proposed that people do have the power to assent, reject, and suspend their 
judgment, but only after they have initially believed the information to which they have been 
exposed. The interesting speculation from studies on the truthfulness bias is that it keeps its pace 
through correspondence bias even when the situation surrounding the behavior of an actor 
provides alternative explanations (Vonk, 1999). 
 However, there is one particular circumstance in which correspondence bias can be 
overcome, namely, when a perceiver becomes suspicious about a person’s ulterior motives (Fein, 
1996). Fein (1996) described suspicion of ulterior motives as a state in which perceivers hold 
multiple and rival hypotheses about the motives or sincerity of the actor’s behavior. The most 
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fundamental effect that suspicion of ulterior motives has on perceivers is that it causes them to 
hesitate to take behavior at face value, do the work of correction, and even evoke a mindset that 
facilitates this process (Fein, 1996). As a consequence, suspicion of the underlying ulterior 
motives of an actor can result in less favorable perceptions of the actor (Fein et al., 1990; Vonk, 
1998). Conditions under which the endorsement behavior of a celebrity is suspicious to 
consumers have not been empirically studied in the literature. However, qualitative interviews 
conducted by Trip el al. (1994) revealed that when consumers recognize multiple product 
endorsements from a celebrity endorser, they show strong suspicion on his/her genuine liking of 
the endorsed product. Silvera and Laufer (2005) also indirectly suggested that endorsing several 
products creates the likelihood that the celebrity has an ulterior motive to cash in the value of 
his/her name recognition and such ulterior motives must play an important role preventing 
overestimating consumers’ correspondence inference to the behavior of the endorser. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is drawn with respect to the persuasive effects of high suspicion; 
 H2:  Consumers’ correspondence inferences on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity 
 in an advertisement will be significantly lower under a high-suspicion condition than 
 under no- or low-suspicion conditions because of their tendency to high suspicion of 
 ulterior motives. 
 Perceived Product Congruence. Consistent with foregoing arguments, correspondence 
bias may have played a significant role in the way consumers evaluate the endorsement behavior 
of a celebrity. However, another possible explanation for keeping consumers on the high level of 
correspondence inference could be found when endorsed products are highly matched with 
celebrities.  The high matching factor could make consumers think that celebrities do not 
actually take part in an advertisement because of money but out of genuine affection for the 
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product. This may explain why study participants in Cronley et al.’s (1999) study did not 
question Cindy Crawford’s true motives, therefore showing correspondence bias. In a similar 
vein, a high-suspicion condition may not necessarily induce less correspondence inferences to 
celebrities’ affection for their endorsed products. For instance, consumers, even if they are 
exposed to the information of multiple celebrity endorsements, could think that the celebrity 
really like the endorsed product in a specific advertisement because of highly perceptual matches 
between them. 
 In this study, consumers’ perceived product congruence with a celebrity is also presumed 
as a potential determinant of the direction of correspondence inferences. The basis of this 
assumption was derived from the theory of schema congruity, which predicts that the extent to 
which new information conforms to consumer expectations is based on previously defined 
category schemas in memory (Mandler, 1982). Prior research in category-based processing also 
indicates whether new information is congruent or incongruent with the existing schemas can 
influence an individual's inferential judgment of the information (Sujan, Bettman, & Sujan, 
1986). When an object is perceived as fitting into previously defined category schema, it is 
favorably evaluated on the basis of affect transfer (Wansink & Ray, 1996). Within the context of 
celebrity endorsements, schema congruity occurs when the image of an endorser (e.g., Cindy 
Crawford as a supermodel) and the image of a product (e.g. healthy drinks) are relevant such that 
the relationship between them can be readily addressed within the existing celebrity and/or 
product category schemas. Such schema congruity generally produces more favorable responses 
to advertisements than schema incongruity because congruent advertisements conform to 
consumers' expectations and allow predictability (Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1989). 
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 In McCracken’s (1989) conception of celebrity’s meaning transfer model, celebrities 
serve as the site for social meanings to converge. Endorsers become carriers of those meanings 
into whatever social space that uses their name, face, or image. For meaning to adhere to a 
product, McCracken (1989) indicated that the match must synchronize the celebrity image and 
endorsed product. However, meaning transfer seems to hinge on audience perceptions based on 
their schema congruity an endorser has already cultivated. For instance, previous studies found 
that celebrity endorsers are appropriate where product purchase involves high social and 
psychological risks (Friedman & Friedman, 1979; Atkin & Block, 1983). Misra & Beatty (1990) 
also found that a given level of expected congruency promotes recall and liking of the brand in 
such cases when actor Clint Eastwood promoted rugged blue jeans (vs. board games) and 
Olympic gymnast Mary Lou Retton promoted an energy drink instead of a pricey wine. In a 
recent study, St. James (2003) investigated the image transfer on evaluations of high-technology 
products and concluded that despite the fact that entertainers do not in reality necessarily have 
expertise in relation to new technology products, the image of a science-fiction starship captain 
lent the actor who portrayed him a stronger association with technology and thus more credibility 
for endorsing the technology product. 
 In fact, researchers on correspondence bias have admitted that attribution requires 
observers to perform something of a matching test in which they compare the actor’s behavior 
with their expectations for that behavior and determine whether the behavior meets these 
expectations (Gilbert et al. 1995). Even though not studied yet in the previous literature, 
aforementioned theoretical tenets suggested that the correspondence bias and suspicion outcomes 
could be differentiated by perceivers’ product congruence or incongruence between the celebrity 
endorser and the endorsed products. In line with the discussion, the following set of research 
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hypotheses can be put forth to determine whether correspondence inference varies with product 
types a certain celebrity endorses and whether these relationships differ in consumers’ 
correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives.        
 H3a: Consumers’ correspondence inferences on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity 
 in an advertisement will be significantly greater for a high congruent product than for a 
 low congruent product.      
 H3b: Consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for a high 
 congruent product than for a low congruent product; whereas, consumers’ tendency to 
 suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for a low congruent product than for a 
 high congruent product.      
 
 Need for Cognition as a Moderator. Contrary to general assumptions on the 
correspondence bias, some people failed to show correspondence bias when they are cognitively 
busy (Gilbert et al., 1988). In other cases, researchers found no evidence for correspondence bias 
and even a reversal of it (Sørum et al., 2003; Silvera & Austad, 2004). This suggests that certain 
individuals might be less prone to correspondence bias and, in other words, individual 
differences might play an important role in the process of attribution. The fourth set of research 
hypotheses is concerned with whether and how individual differences in need for cognition could 
influence the effects of suspicion on correspondent inference in the attribution process of 
celebrity endorsements.  
 Need for cognition has been shown to affect various stages of attribution process, where 
limited cognitive resources, such as low need for cognition, prevent adequate correction of the 
initial categorization of the actor in the sequential operations of attribution, so resulting in 
correspondence bias (D'Agostino & Fincher-Kiefer, 1992; Webster, 1993; Silvera, 2005; Tal-Or 
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& Papirman, 2007). Petty & Cacioppo (1986) defined need for cognition as an individual’s 
tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors and showed that high and low 
need for cognition subjects differ in the information processing strategies used in social 
judgment tasks. When instructed to form an impression of a target person, high need for 
cognition subjects expend more effort in the processing and integration of inconsistent 
information and are less prone to the primacy effect than low need for cognition subjects 
(Ahlering & Parker, 1989; Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1989). Therefore, high need for 
cognition subjects are more likely to carefully process and elaborate the arguments of persuasive 
messages and less likely than low need for cognition subjects to rely on heuristics and other 
peripheral cues to assess the validity of these messages (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Those findings indicate that perceivers with high need for cognition 
should not be subject to the bias because sufficient cognitive resources are devoted to their 
correction process. More recently, D’Agostino & Fincher (1992) found that individuals with high 
need for cognition, who are more motivated to process information, are less prone to make the 
correspondence bias. 
 Irrespective of individuals’ cognitive capacity, when perceivers are highly suspicious of 
an actor, they find themselves actively trying to determine which dispositions are implicated in a 
behavior early in the process (Hilton et al., 1993).  Also, high level of suspicion can arouse 
feelings of threats against people’s sense of freedom, provoking reactance (Fitzsimons & 
Lehman, 2004). Reactance will inhibit any willingness to invest cognitive efforts in the scrutiny 
of the message. This effect will be strong enough to overwhelm receptors’ inter-individual 
differences. For instance, although it has been demonstrated that subjects with high need for 
cognition relative to subjects with low need for cognition are more disposed to engage in more 
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systematic information processing (Petty, Tormale, Hawkins, & Wegener, 2001), this difference 
can fade away in the face of a persuasive source that arouses high suspicion. Therefore, the 
differences between high and low need for cognition subjects are expected to disappear in the 
high-suspicion condition. Thus, the following hypotheses are established; 
 H4a: Consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias will not appear for people with high 
 need for cognition but people with low need for cognition; whereas, consumers’ tendency 
  to suspicion of ulterior motives will appear for people with both low and high for 
 cognition.      
 In association with the hypothesis 4b, one would expect that relationships between 
correspondence bias and need for cognition could not be all same for both high and low 
congruent products in advertisements.  For example, perceivers with high need for cognition, 
even though their level of suspicion is low, make more efforts in attribution processing on the 
endorsement behavior of a celebrity when the celebrity and product are clearly low matched; 
therefore, they will generate more negative correspondence inferences enough to overcome their 
correspondence bias. In contrast, even if people with low need for cognition perceive low 
product congruence in an advertisement, they still show the correspondence bias because of their 
limited cognitive thinking. In order to find out the relationship among three constructs, 
correspondence inference, product congruence, and need for cognition, the following hypothesis 
is proposed;  
 H4b: In a condition of high product congruence, consumers’ tendency to 
 correspondence bias does not become stronger for people with low need for cognition 
 than people with high need for cognition. In comparisons, in a condition of low product 
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 congruence, consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for people 
 with low need for cognition than people with high need for cognition.  
 H4c: In both levels of high and low product congruence, consumers’ tendency to 
 suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for people with high need for cognition 
 than people with low need for cognition. 
 Implicit Theory of Personality as a Possible Moderator.  In addition to the difference 
in individuals’ need for cognition, social psychologists have provided a substantial amount of 
research examining the impact of other individual factors on the attribution process such as 
attribution complexity (Newman, 1996; Bloomberg & Silvera, 1998), cognitive development 
(Piaget, 1952; Newman, 1991), ideocentrism (Newman, 1993), and implicit theory of personality 
(Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Differential aspects of those factors 
from the need for cognition is that they primarily have moderating effects on the final two stages 
of the attribution process when observers interpret or perceive the behavior and integrate 
situational and behavioral information. Among those individual factors, this study will test the 
role of implicit theory of personality as a possible moderator on consumers’ inferential process 
of attribution in the context of celebrity endorsements.  
 According to Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993; Dweck, Chiu, & 
Hong, 1995), two types of implicit theory of personality have been identified within individuals. 
One type is entity theorists who view personality as being permanent. The other type is 
incremental theorists who regard personality as being dynamic with greater potential for change 
and development. A person’s ‘implicit theory of personality’ has been shown to relate to 
attributions in general and to the correspondence bias in particular. Hong (1994) suggested that 
entity theorists are more likely to demonstrate correspondence bias than incremental theorists 
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because entity theorists are more prone to make spontaneous trait inferences than incremental 
theorists. That means entity theorists make significantly stronger correspondence inferences 
about the celebrity endorser than others because they believe someone’s personality (e.g., 
celebrities themselves) is hard to be changed. In addition, this study also postulates that if the 
implicit theory of personality as a factor of psychological difference moderates the process of 
correspondence bias, it also should affect the process of high suspicion on celebrity endorsers’ 
motives. For example, it could be possible that even under a high suspicious condition, entity 
theorists are less expected to show a correction process on their correspondence inferences than 
incremental theorists. Based on this line of reasoning, the following hypotheses are generated; 
 H5: Consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for entity theorists 
 than incremental theorists; whereas, consumers’ tendency to suspicion of ulterior 
 becomes stronger for incremental theorists than entity theorists.      
 
 Correspondence Inference as a Mediator. The final concern of this study is the 
persuasive consequences of correspondence inference that probably occurs when consumers are 
exposed to celebrity endorsement advertising. This study limits the outcomes of correspondence 
inferences to the primary indicators for advertising effectiveness, which include attitudes toward 
the ad and brand and behavioral intention. Although these attitude measures are unable to 
provide a full assessment of possible causal attribution effects, they are deemed to be appropriate 
outcome variables in this study because all three factors explicitly reflect the receiver’s 
evaluations as the major dimensions of attributional consequences (Kelly & Michela, 1980; 
Decarlo & Leigh, 1996).  
 Consumers’ correspondence inferences on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity are 
likely to have directional effects on ad/brand evaluations. Previous research findings indicates 
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that significant relationships exist not only between correspondence inferences and attitudes 
toward the ad and brand, but also among three outcome measures including behavioral intention 
(MacKenzie, Lutz, & Belch, 1986; Cronley et al.; 1994; Lord, Lee & Sauer, 1995). In particular, 
correspondence attributors will positively evaluate the ad and brand, and even have positive 
behavioral purchase intention, based on congruent associations between the celebrity and what 
the product is supposed to be (e.g., the endorser must reflect his/her real experience with the 
product). On the other hand, Correspondence attributors will negatively evaluate the ad and 
brand, and even have negative behavioral purchase intention when they perceive a certain level 
of suspicion from the endorser’s situational information. As such, as outcomes for suspicion and 
product congruence, correspondence inferences also can influence consumers’ ad or brand 
attitudes and behavioral intentions. In light of these assumptions, the following hypotheses are 
proposed; 
 H6a: Consumers’ correspondence inferences will be significantly associated with their 
 attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and behavioral intention. 
 
  Besides the relationships between correspondence inference and attribution consequence, 
this study is also concerned with whether and how correspondence inferences could influence the 
effects of suspicion and perceived product congruence on attitudinal and behavioral responses to 
celebrity advertisements. That is, the issue here is focused on the mediating role of 
correspondence inferences between their antecedents (suspicion and perceived product 
congruence) and consequences (ad attitude, brand attitude, and behavioral intention). With 
references to the mediating effect of causal inferences that already been suggested by attribution 
researchers (e.g., Kelley & Michela, 1980; Decarlo & Leigh, 1996), the hypothesis on the 
mediating role of correspondence inference is posited as below; 
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 H6b: Consumers’ correspondence inferences will mediate the effect of suspicion  
 attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and behavioral intention. 
 H6c: Consumers’ correspondence inferences will mediate the effect of perceived 
 product congruence on attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and behavioral 
 intention. 
 
 Figure 4 illustrates the mediating role of correspondence inference in celebrity 
endorsement advertisements, which integrates the first five sets of hypotheses proposed in the 
present study. The model presupposes multiple dependent relations and mediating links: that is, 1) 
the main effect of suspicion in hypotheses 1 and 2; 2) the interaction effect of suspicion and 
perceived product congruence in hypotheses 3a-b; 3) the moderating effects of need for 
cognition and implicit theory of personality in hypotheses 4a-c and 5a-b; 4) the mediating effects 
of correspondence inference on the causal relationships between main factors (suspicion and 
perceived product congruence) and ad attitude, brand attitude, and behavioral intention in 
hypotheses 6a-c.  
 All suggested hypotheses require rigorous investigations based on the proposed 
mediating model in order to provide theoretical and managerial implications with respect to the 
applicability of the correspondence bias and suspicion perspectives to consumer processing of 
celebrity advertising and the differential effects of individual factors on that process. Those 
proposed hypotheses will be tested by the methodological process described in the next chapter. 
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Figure 4. A Proposed Mediation model of Celebrity Correspondence Inference 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
 The current study employed a series of pilot studies and a main study to test the proposed 
hypotheses. This chapter gives an overview about the study design including pretests for stimuli 
advertisements, sampling, data collection procedure, and measured variables. Before specifying 
each experimental step, main constructs were first conceptualized to clarify particular 
characteristics of this study.  
Conceptualization of Main Constructs 
 It was necessary for this study to conceptually redefine some important concepts or 
constructs in order to appropriately operationalize them and thereby help achieve an acceptable 
level of construct validity before performing experiments. Based on conceptualizations in the 
relevant literature, key constructs in this research were redefined as follows: 
 • Attribution: The perception a receiver generates to infer the cause of an actor’s behavior. 
 In this study, it specifically refers to an individual’s cognitive activity of ascribing the 
 celebrity’s motivation for product endorsement in the advertisement to one or more 
 causes. 
 • Correspondence (Dispositional) inference: The perception a receiver generates to infer 
 that a celebrity’s motive for supporting the product in the advertisement is attributed to 
 the endorser’s underlying true personality and disposition(s), such as the celebrity 
 endorser’s honest feeling or belief about the advertised product. 
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 • Correspondence bias: The tendency for a perceiver to draw dispositional inferences 
 from the endorsement even though he or she has recognized the situational constraint(s) 
 that might actually cause the endorsement. 
 • Suspicion: The state in which a perceiver hold multiple and rival inferential hypotheses 
 about the celebrity endorser’s dispositional behavior in the advertisement when, from 
 certain situational forces, he/she perceives the endorser’s ulterior motive(s), such as 
 the endorsers’ self-interest, making money or enhancing personal goals. 
 • Product Congruence (Schema Congruity): The extent to which new information (e.g., 
 new product) conforms to consumer expectations based on previously defined category 
 schemas in memory: Within the context of celebrity endorsement, schema congruity 
 exists when the image of an celebrity endorser and the image of a product are relevant 
 such that the relationship between them can be readily addressed within the existing 
 celebrity and product category schemas. 
 • Need for Cognition: An individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive 
 endeavors: Individuals with higher need for cognition tend to invest and enjoy cognitive 
 efforts more than lower need for cognition individuals. 
 • Implicit theory of personality: Assumptions that lay people hold about the nature of the 
 self and particular objects or social worlds: Individuals with entity theories made more 
 extreme trait judgments about the behavior of a celebrity endorser as compared to 
 individuals with incremental theories.   
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Study Design 
 The experimental method of research was used for establishing the evidence of causality 
between constructs. The primary objectives of experiments were to test; 1) the main effects of 
suspicious condition on the evocation of correspondence bias or suspicion outcome regarding the 
behavior of a celebrity endorser in the exposed advertisement (i.e., Hypotheses 1 & 2), 2) the 
interaction effects of product congruence on the causal relationships between suspicions 
conditions and correspondence bias or suspicion outcome (i.e., Hypotheses 3a-b), 3) the 
moderating effects of personality constructs, need for cognition and implicit theory of 
personality, between suspicions conditions and correspondence bias or suspicion outcome in 
each product congruence condition (i.e., Hypotheses 4a-c & 5), and 4) lastly, the relationships 
between correspondence inference and attitudinal or behavioral measures in each suspicious 
condition (Hypotheses 6a-c).  
 To test proposed hypotheses 1, 2, and 3a-b, a 3x2 between-subjects factorial design was 
employed with no- versus low- versus high- suspicion conditions and high versus low product 
congruence conditions. To test proposed hypotheses 4a-c and 5, a 3x2 x2 between-subjects 
factorial design was employed with adding two factors of personality constructs, need for 
cognition (low versus high) and implicit theory of personality (entity versus incremental theorist), 
to the previous 3x2 between-subjects factorial design (See Figure 5). In addition, a no-suspicion 
condition, as a role of control group, was contrived as a part of the design in order to compare its 
correspondence inference as a baseline rate with correspondence inferences from low- or high- 
suspicion conditions. In this study, the types of suspicious conditions and perceived product 
congruence are manipulated variables, while the rest of constructs are measured variables. The 
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dependant variables are correspondence inference, attitude toward the advertisement, attitude 
toward the brand, and behavioral intention for the endorsed brand.  
 
 
Figure 5. Factorial Design for Experiment 
 
 
Pretests and Test advertisement 
 This study requires three pretests for developing test advertisements. Three pretests were 
conducted to; 1) select a appropriate sports celebrity whom subjects both have no name 
recognition of  and understand his/her popularity of, 2) identify brands that are congruent and not 
congruent with the chosen celebrity and that subjects are not familiar with, and 3) create three 
levels of suspicious conditions based on situational information cues. 
 Celebrity Selection. The first pretest was designed to determine an appropriate sports 
celebrity endorser in test advertisements. To overcome potential problems with using a familiar 
celebrity with participants, this study chose a European sports celebrity not known to Americans. 
Though celebrities are by definition known to the public and generally famous, people’s minds 
are varied considerably on their familiarity, likability, trustworthiness, and identification with a 
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celebrity. Such high variation in participants’ evaluation of a celebrity, even though randomly 
distributed across experimental conditions, could generate an error variation that even ruins 
treatment effects. 
 Thirty-five participants were recruited in online pretests. Participants’ recognition on the 
name of a sport celebrity was tested among European sports celebrities within a cycling sports 
category (See Appendix A). Among 4 athletes, Samuel Sánchez (2008 Beijing gold medalist in 
the road race), Chris Hoy (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the track and sprint), Julien Absalon 
(2004 Athens and 2008 Beijing gold medalist in the cross-country mountain bike), and  Māris 
Štrombergs (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the BMX), French Olympic mountain bike cyclist 
Julien Absalon was selected as a sports celebrity endorser in the test advertisements due to 
participants’ responses to zero recognition. It might be noted that one fictitious sports figure 
specialized in racing bicycles has been chosen for experimental manipulations of a celebrity 
endorser in a previous study in the literature (Till & Shimp, 1998). To minimize the confounding 
effect of endorser gender, it was determined to consistently use a male endorser for every 
stimulus advertisement. 
 Product Selection. The second pretest was to determine a product type and distinguished 
levels of celebrity and product congruence within the selected product type. As with celebrity 
selection, it was also very important to create and use made-up or unknown brands for this 
study’s experiment in order to eliminate the possible effects of brand familiarity and perceived 
brand quality that might have existed and varied in the potential participants’ minds. In addition, 
as Tripp et al. mentioned (1994), when subjects are exposed to unknown brands, multiple 
product endorsement effects, such as suspicion aroused, should be observed and possibly be 
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stronger than when exposed to familiar brands since subjects could rely only on peripheral cues 
in order to report their attitude toward the brand and purchase intention. 
 For the second pretest, the beverage product category was chosen as a product type. In 
the content analysis of Advertising Age’s top 300 U.S. magazines in the time period from 
September 2002 to February 2005, Grau, Roselli, and Taylor (2007) found that food and 
beverages ranked as one of the most frequent product type sports celebrities endorsed: sporting 
goods (28%), clothing/shoes/apparel (22%), entertainment (9%), electronic appliance (7%), 
cosmetic/personal care (6%) and food/beverages (6%). Among six product types, the beverage 
category has been generally identified as one of low involvement products in the well-known 
framework for advertising planning, Foote, Cone & Belding (FCB) matrix (Vaughn, 1986). In 
addition to the high frequency in associations with sports celebrity endorsement, the beverage 
product was considered to be familiar and available to the subject population. Although it was 
expected that the individual variance on this factor would be considerable when participants are 
drawn from the consumer panelists whose age and lifestyle are likely to vary to a greater extent 
than those of homogeneous samples such as students, the choice of low involvement product 
category would prevent the affect of subjects’ own unknown confounding factors on the study’ 
experimental conditions. 
 Sixty-four participants were recruited in the online pretest to select a high congruent 
product and a low congruent product with the chosen sports celebrity in the stimulus 
advertisement (See Appendix A). With respect to product relevancy, studies on involvement 
have shown potential differences in the processing of advertisements from different product 
categories (Johar & Sirgy 1991; Petty et al., 1983). Therefore, this study would choose two 
different products within the same beverage products: coffee, milk, soft drink, sports/energy 
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drink, fruit juice, and tea. Among those beverage products, it took for granted that the 
sports/energy drink as a sports related product is highly congruent with the chosen sports 
celebrity; therefore, remains what to choose the other that meet the same level of personal 
involvement with the sports/energy drink and the low level of congruence with the chosen sports 
celebrity.  
 As demonstrated by the celebrity endorsement literature (Misra & Beatty, 1990; Till & 
Busler, 2000), the degree of product congruence with a sports celebrity was operationalized in 
terms of perceived match between the image of a sports celebrity and the image of an endorsed 
product based on a match-up factor. In order to select two products with different levels of 
congruence with the chosen sports celebrity, participants was asked to rate each beverage 
product on six seven-point semantic differential scales including very inappropriate/very 
appropriate, inconsistent/consistent, very unlikely/very likely, very irrelevant/very relevant, does 
not match/matches very well, and does not go together/ goes together (α = .86). These scales 
were adapted from several studies on match-up hypothesis (Kamins & Gupta, 1994; Misra & 
Beatty, 1990; Till & Busler, 2000) and the mean score of six items were calculated to represent 
each participant’s overall involvement with each beverage. The results of the pretest indicated 
that soft drink is the most incongruent and sports/energy drink is the most congruent with the 
chosen sports celebrity among five beverage products: coffee (M: 2.82, SD: 1.66), milk (M: 3.86, 
SD: 1.87), soft drink (M: 2.75, SD: 1.67), sports/energy drink (M: 5.92, SD: 1.44), fruit juice (M: 
4.37, SD: 1.87), and tea (M: 3.03, SD: 1.57). The paired t-test reveals that the difference of 
congruence between soft and sports/energy drink is statistically significant (t = -3.09, p <.001). 
For these selected products, fictitious brand names, ‘ENERGY’ for the sports/energy drink and 
‘ORANGINA’ for the soft drink were developed and used to eliminate the possible effects of 
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brand familiarity and perceived brand quality that might have existed and varied in the minds of 
potential participants. 
 Design of Test Advertisements and Suspicious Information. This study created six 
different types of stimuli in associations with two levels of celebrity-product perceived 
congruence and three levels of suspicious condition. Firstly, for the chosen sports celebrity, 
Julien Absalon, two full-page color print advertisements were designed to represent two levels of 
celebrity-product congruence with the help of an advertising professional to make the 
advertisement more realistic (see Appendix B). Each set of two advertisements was constructed 
to be equivalent, except for the product type advertised. In order to minimize variances in their 
message and creative components, two advertisements had identical layouts and spacing with a 
photo of the endorser appearing on the middle of the page. Each advertisement contained a brief 
line of copy for the endorsed brand (e.g., ‘ENERGY, My first choice of sports drink’) as a 
personal statement made by the celebrity, which appeared in the bottom side of the page. A 
picture of each brand appeared in the lower left-hand side of the advertisement. In order to 
minimize the effect of prior knowledge with the brand, the made-up brand named ENERGY for 
the high congruence product and ORANGINA for the low congruence product were used for all 
treatment conditions. A pretest revealed that none of eighty-four participants had heard of those 
brand names. 
    Besides two levels of product congruence with the sports celebrity, this study requires the 
observation of consumer responses to the advertisements with three levels of suspicion aroused 
from situational information. A link between Julien Absalon and each suspicious condition was 
established by having each participant read informational contents about his profile and contract 
status as a celebrity endorser after being exposed to test advertisements. According to Fein 
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(1996), suspicion is “a dynamic state in which the individual actively entertains multiple, 
plausible rival hypotheses about the motives or genuineness of a person’s behavior” (pp. 1165). 
In the psychology literature, this definition has been used widely in guiding the experimental 
conditions by differentiating information about actor-target relationships such as a student vs. a 
professor and a man vs. a very wealthy widow (Fein et al., 1989; Fein, 1996; Marchand & Vonk, 
2005). Those studies also found that the largest changes in participants’ suspicious evaluation 
emerged on the basis of target information. Such information about actor-target relationships 
could not be found in the celebrity advertising people usually watched on television or magazine. 
Also, consumers saw many advertisements without any given contextual information on the 
endorsing behaviors of a celebrity. However, in the advertising and marketing literature, it has 
been found that consumers’ suspicion of ulterior motives on the endorsing behavior of a celebrity 
could be triggered by such cues as his large amount of money contract revealed to the public 
(Cronley et al., 1999: Moore et al., 1994; Silvera et al., 2004) or his presence on multiple product 
advertisements (Mowen & Beatty, 1990; Mowen et al., 1979; Tripp et al., 1994). 
 Based on aforementioned literatures on suspicion of ulterior motives, this study 
operationalized consumers’ suspicion of the ulterior motives on certain celebrity endorsers as the 
state that is evoked by the increase in cues that are specifically related to the ulterior motives of a 
celebrity endorser such as large amounts of money and multiple product endorsements. No 
suspicious condition on celebrity’s ulterior motives was presented within the context of a 
nonpaid celebrity endorsement. In particular, in order to make it sure that participants did not 
perceive the celebrity’s ulterior motives, his endorsement motivation as supporting for the 
underprivileged was specified in the situational information. For no suspicious condition, 
following two of information items were presented after the stimulus advertisement.  
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 • Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 
 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish 
 mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins. 
 
 • Among some of possible non-alcoholic beverages on the French market, Julien Absalon 
 decided to endorse the brand, ENERGY (or ORANGINA) as part of his support for 
 children and young people in South Africa.  
 
 The low suspicious condition was manipulated with disclosing the contact fee of 8 
million dollars to emphasize that Julien Absalon was extremely well compensated for his 
appearance. This endorsement amount for a famous sports celebrity refers to the informal 
investigation from celebrity management organizations’ fee schedule. Though a large amount 
contract fee could be viewed by subjects as a strong ulterior motive toward the endorsing 
behavior of a sports celebrity, this study contends that only this information could not evoke high 
suspicion from subjects’ minds because the practice of fee compensation becomes general 
knowledge to consumers and they tend to believe celebrities like the endorsed product regardless 
of endorsement fees (Cronley et al., 1999: Moore et al., 1994; Silvera et al., 2004). The 
following two information items were used in the low suspicious condition. 
 • Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 
 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish 
 mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins. 
 
 • Julien Absalon contracts 8 million dollars per year for endorsing the brand, ENERGY 
 (or ORANGINA).  
 
 Studies on multiple product endorsements provided evidence that multiple product 
endorsements not only resulted in detrimental effects on consumers’ trustworthiness on the 
celebrity endorsers but induced more negative evaluations of the advertisement and the brand 
(Mowen & Beatty, 1990; Mowen et al., 1979). According to Tripp et al. (1994), this negative 
effect is distinct from any effects that occur due to increased exposure to the celebrity endorser. 
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Those researchers also confirmed that individuals reacted less favorably to the advertisement 
itself as knowledge of number of products endorsed increased to four. This study regards the 
informational cue of multiple product endorsements as an inducer enough to create the high 
suspicion that the celebrity has ulterior motives to cash in the value of their name recognition or 
to build his/her personal image. As shown in the following three information items, information 
cues about the increased amount of endorsement fees and other five endorsement brands were 
revealed in the high suspicion condition. 
 • Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 
 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish 
 mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins. 
 
 • Julien Absalon contracts 8 million dollars per year for endorsing the brand, ENERGY 
 (or ORANGINA).  
 
 • Besides ENERGY (or ORANGINA), Julien Absalon now endorses 5 different brands in 
 Europe. He earns more than 30 million dollars from those endorsement deals. 
     - Numericable (cable television operator) 
     - Pearl iZUMi (mountain Biking Shoes) 
     - NICKEL (cosmetics) 
     - Archos (MP3 player) 
     - Celio (men’s clothing) 
 
 In Fein and his colleagues’ studies (1989; 1990; 1996), suspicion of ulterior motives was 
experimentally induced. Participants received a description of a situation that put them in a state 
of suspicion. Subsequently, additional information was provided that could change participants’ 
judgments in one direction or the other. It is important to note that in those studies, researchers 
did not check manipulated suspicious conditions because they knew participants were already 
suspicious of the actor’s behavior from the contextual information. Like previous studies on 
suspicion in the psychology literature, this study’s three levels of suspicion were also induced by 
manipulated situational information cues. However, in order to clarify the manipulation, 
difference between high and low suspiciousness to the sports celebrity was pretested (See 
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Appendix A). In the third pretest, participants received constant profile information about the 
sports celebrity, Julien Absalon; however, different types of situational information about Julien 
Absalon were presented depending on suspicious conditions. Eighty four participants were asked 
to indicate which informational cue aroused more suspicion on the ulterior motives behind the 
endorsed behavior of Julien Absalon. With eight no responses, sixty four subjects chose the 
sports celebrity with multiple product endorsements as being more suspicious: whereas,  twelve 
people chose the sports celebrity with only the endorsement fee as being more suspicious (χ2 = 
18.47, p <.001). 
Sampling Method 
 A random sample of 3,000 potential participants was selected from the computer 
database of consumer panels provided by SurveyMonkey. The company has approximately more 
than 30 million registered adult members of a nationwide consumer panel in the United States 
and all of them are selected by the criteria of SurveyMonkey’s qualifying points. The stratified 
sampling method was used to guarantee that a specific of subsample of the population is 
adequately represented. Initial subsample is representative of the U.S. population in terms of 
gender (1500 males - 50% and 1500 females - 50%) and age (330 panelists aged between 19 and 
29 years - 11%, 480 panelists aged between 30 and 44 years - 16%, 1700 panelists aged between 
45 and 60 years - 57%, and 490 panelists aged over 60 years - 16%). These ratios are compatible 
with those reported in the U.S. Census Bureau regarding to the intercensal estimates of the 
resident population by sex and age for the United States as of July 1, 2010. Those initial mail 
recipients were also randomly distributed according to their race, occupation, educational level, 
household income, and state in which they currently reside. With an effort to make such 
demographic characteristics equivalent over the six groups (four treatment groups and two 
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control group), each potential participant was randomly assigned to one of the six experimental 
conditions with 500 initial panelists per group. The online survey continued until at least 60 
responses were collected in each cell group. All participants were more than 18 years old. About 
20-25 minutes were required for participants to complete a questionnaire. There were no 
anticipated risks and all responses were strictly anonymous. Before the progress onto data 
collection, all of research protocols involving the use of human subjects were approved by IRB 
at the University of Tennessee Knoxville.  
Experimental Procedure for Main Study 
 Because this study employs a field experiment method using an online consumer panel, 
the data-gathering procedure is different from that used in laboratory settings. First, three 
electronic files were created with reference to the results of pretests. The first file includes 
instructions on the research objective and rights on the human subjects. The second file contains 
6 different contents of stimulus advertisements according to the treatment/control of three 
suspicion levels and two celebrity-product congruence levels. The third customized file for each 
treatment/control condition is made up of questions on dependant variables, manipulation check, 
and demographics. After fixing technical problems associated with the flow of online survey and 
readability, an invitation e-mail containing a link to one of these files is sent out to the randomly 
selected consumer panelists. Those subjects are people who opted in to an online survey sample 
list provided by SurveyMonkey’s authorized research. 
 Second, those who wanted to participate in the current experiment were guided to access 
the assigned experimental content by clicking a link in the invitation e-mail at their convenience. 
At the beginning of the online survey, participants were asked to consent to their rights human 
subjects and participation via a checkbox query. If the subject consented, he or she was then 
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asked to proceed to the stimulus ad and information, and then fill out post-exposure 
questionnaire on his or her own pace. Once participants accessed the experimental content, they 
were instructed to: (1) look at a given advertisement for 20-30 seconds or longer if they wished; 
(2) assume that they find the advertisement while reading a magazine; and (3) carefully read and 
follow the directions in each section when filling out the post-exposure questionnaire. During 
filling out questionnaire, referring back to the advertisement is allowed because there are many 
memory-based questions spanning the whole questionnaire. Also, to control for potential order 
effects, the logically ordered question were altered for a new order. The data resulted from this 
study were used only for study analysis. The online survey questionnaire was deleted after 
gathering all data; instead, the printed version of questionnaire remains in a locked file cabinet in 
the researcher’ office for one years, upon which time they will be destroyed. A copy of the 
survey questionnaire and experiment materials are attached (See Appendix B).  
Measures 
 The experimental research requires that a researcher operationally define abstract 
concepts in concrete forms and the variables under consideration be measured (Wimmer & 
Dominick, 2000). In this study, the post-exposure questionnaires contained measures tapping 
correspondence inference, attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and purchase 
intention as dependent variables. In addition, two personality measures, need for cognition and 
implicit of personality, were adopted from previous literatures to identify their moderating roles 
on the dependent variable, correspondence inference. 
 Dependent Variables. A crucial step in this study was to measure how patterns of 
correspondence inference differ across suspicious conditions. In this study, correspondence 
inference is operationalized as the extent to which participants, with reference to situational 
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constraints, made dispositional attributions regarding the endorser’s attitude toward the brand. It 
should be noted that correspondence inference was measured in a forced condition: that is, 
participants were asked to rate how much they agree or disagree with each of the listed causes of 
the endorsing behavior of the sports celebrity. Although people make causal inferences naively 
by natural activation of attributional thinking (Heider, 1958), the forced method of measuring 
attributions was necessary to evoke the participants’ dormant inferential activity and thereby to 
ensure a sufficient number of attributional responses for statistical analyses.  
 Correspondence inference was measured with a composite scale adopted from Pilkonis 
(1977), Cronley et al. (1999), and Sorum et al. (2003). Participants were asked to indicate their 
level of likeliness ranging from 1(not at all likely) to 9 (extremely likely) on the following six 
statements. A total of six items for this measure were found to be internally consistent (α = .86) 
and for the statistical use, the mean score of six items were calculated to represent each 
participant’s index of correspondence inference. 
 • Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] 
 to convey his belief in the brand. 
 
 • Julien Absalon frequently uses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink 
 (ORANGINA)]. 
 
 • Julien Absalon doesn't like the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink 
 (ORANGINA)]. 
 
 • Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink  
 (ORANGINA)] to express her feeling about the brand based on her actual experience. 
 
 • Julien Absalon views the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] 
 as a good brand. 
 
 • Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] 
 to talk about the brand based on his actual experience and knowledge with the brand. 
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 According to Mitchell and Olson (1981), attitude is defined as “an individual's internal 
evaluation of an object such as a branded product” (pp. 318). Mitchell and Olson (1981) also 
suggested that attitudes are considered relatively stable and enduring predispositions to behave‖ 
in a certain way. Thus, attitude measures have been considered useful predictors of consumer 
behavior toward a product or service by advertising scholars and practitioners (MacKenzie, Lutz, 
& Belch, 1986; Mitchell, 1986; Mitchell & Olson, 1981; Spears & Singh, 2004). In this study, 
attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and purchase intention were measured as 
dependent variables in order to find out the relationships of participants’ correspondence 
inference with those attitude measures.  
 Attitude toward the ad, defined as a person’s favorable or unfavorable evaluation to a 
particular advertising stimulus during a particular exposure occasion, were assessed with a 
seven-point, semantic differential scale anchored by pleasant/ unpleasant, likable/unlikable, 
desirable/undesirable, appealing/unappealing and good/bad. Those five items were adapted and 
slightly modified from the attitude studies of these items were found to be internally consistent 
(α = .92). The mean score of five items were calculated to represent each participant’s index of 
attitude toward the advertisement. 
 Spears and Singh (2004) defined attitude toward the brand as “relatively enduring, one 
dimensional summary evaluation of the brand that presumably energizes behavior” (pp. 55). 
After a series of factor analyses, those researchers developed a comprehensive scale for attitude 
toward the brand. Their scale was deemed appropriate for the present study because their five 
items seem to encompass most sub-dimensions of brand attitude definitions. Therefore, to 
measure attitude toward the brand, this study used a seven-point, semantic differential scale 
anchored by appealing/unappealing, bad/good, unpleasant/pleasant, favorable/favorable, and 
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likable/unlikable. These items were found to be internally consistent (α = .89). The mean score 
of five items were calculated to represent each participant’s index for attitude toward the brand. 
 Behavioral Intention refers to a person‘s motivation in the sense of his or her conscious 
plan to exert effort to carry out a behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In this sense, intentions are 
easily differentiated from attitudes. Bagozzi, Tybout, Craig, and Sternthal (1979) defined 
behavioral intentions as personal action tendencies relating to the brand. Spears and Singh (2004) 
more specifically defined purchase intention as “an individual‘s conscious plan to make an effort 
to purchase a brand” (p. 56).  This study used the construct, behavioral intention, as a dependent 
variable because it is a more inclusive measure than purchase intention and fictitious brands in 
the stimulus advertisement are not on the market. After the leading statement, “if ENERGY 
(ORANGINA) is on the US market,” participants were asked to indicate their degrees of 
agreement or disagreement using a 7-point Likert type scale with the following four statements.  
A total of four items for this scale were found to be internally consistent (α = .85) and for the 
statistical use, the mean score of six items were calculated to represent each participant’s overall 
behavioral intention. 
 •Next time when I purchase a sports drink (or soft drink), I will buy ENERGY 
            (or ORANGIA).  
 
 •I will consider drinking ENERGY (or ORANGIA). 
 
 •I would search for more information about ENERGY (or ORANGIA)  
            (e.g., visit Website(s)). 
 
 •If special sale is offered, I will buy ENERGY (or ORANGIA).  
 
 Moderating Variables. One of purposes of this study is to examine the possibility that 
individual’s information processing difference between high and low need for cognition and 
implicit theory of personality may influence the correspondence inference. Cacioppo and Petty 
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(1982) defined need for cognition as “the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy 
thinking” (pp. 116). According to them, need for cognition could moderate the effectiveness of 
an advertisement through its influence on the preferred style and amount of processing. The need 
for cognition scale was administered after the subjects had completed the questionnaire 
containing the dependent measures, a procedure similar to that used by Haugtvedt, Petty, and 
Cacioppo (1992). The subjects were told that the scale contained statements about situations that 
require subjects' reactions to demand for cognitive effort. The abbreviated, 18-item need for 
cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) was used to assess participants’ agreement (1 = 
complete disagreement and 7 = complete agreement) with 18 phrases designed to detect their 
disposition to engage in hard and systematic thinking (e.g., “I find satisfaction in deliberating 
hard and for long hours”, or “learning new ways of thinking does not excite me very much”).  
These items were found to be internally consistent (α = .88). Self ratings on those statements 
were averaged to classify the subjects into two groups by the conventional median split method 
(Median = 4.34). The high need for cognition group had ratings above the median and the low 
need for cognition group had ratings below the median.  
 Implicit theory of personality was defined as “the two different assumptions people make 
about the malleability of personal attitudes” (Dweck et al., 1995, pp. 267) where entity theory 
refers to a fixed, nonmalleable trait and incremental theory implicates a malleable quality that 
can be changed over time. Originally, Dweck et al. (1995) developed scales for implicit theory of 
personality in conceptually specific domains such as intelligence, morality, and world, but they 
also designed a three-item scale in order to assess the overall entity versus incremental theory of 
the person in a particular domain. The items in this implicit person theory scale are: 1) "The kind 
of person someone is something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much," 2) 
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"People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be 
changed," and "Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to 
really change that" (α = .87).  This study adopted this three-item overall scale of implicit theory 
of personality, each of which was measured on a 6 point Likert scale and  averaged to form an 
overall implicit theory score (ranging from 1 to 6), with a higher score indicating a stronger 
incremental theory. Also, to ensure that only participants with clear theories are included, this 
study followed the same format and scoring method of a previous study on implicit theory of 
personality (Dweck et sl., 1993) where participants were classified as entity theorists if their 
overall implicit theory score is 3.0 or below and classified as incremental theorists if their overall 
score is 4.0 or above.  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
 
 This chapter reports the results of main experiment following the description of sample 
profile, equivalency checks for sample group, and manipulation checks for test advertisements. 
The statistic package program, SPSS 20.0, was used to assess the data for descriptive and 
analytic statistics.  Procedures and analyses that were taken in each phase are detailed in the 
following sections. 
Sample Profile 
 A week after deploying online questionnaires including test advertisements to the 
selected consumer panelists, a total of 323 responses among selected 3,000 consumer panelists 
(response rate 10.8%) were collected. However, the final sample for statistical inference included 
a total of 289 responses after cleaning out responses with too many missing values or contrary to 
the treatment of experimental conditions. The number of participants in each experimental 
condition is; 1) 52 for the group of no suspicion and low product congruence, 2) 46 for the group 
of low suspicion and low product congruence, 3) 42 for the group of high suspicion and low 
product congruence, 4) 55 for the group of no suspicion and high product congruence, 5) 50 for 
the group of low suspicion and high product congruence, and 6) 44 for the group of high 
suspicion and high product congruence. 
 The composition of final sample was fairly representative of the U. S. population in terms 
of gender and age. Of the sample of 289 participants, 48.4% (n = 140) were male and 51.6% (n = 
149) were female. The majority of participants are 45-60 (n = 109, 37.7%) years old followed by 
the age group of 30-44 (n = 76, 25.6%), over 60 (n = 70, 25.0%), and 18-20 (n = 34, 11.8%). For 
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the educational level, participants with a graduate degree made up the majority (n = 90, 31.1%); 
the rest were associate or bachelor degrees (n = 86, 29.8%), some college (n = 78, 27.0%), a high 
school degree (n= 27, 9.3%), and less than a high school degree (n = 8, 2.8%). Table 1 shows 
these demographic profiles of the experimental participants. 
 
Table 1. Sample Demographic Characteristics 
 
Demographic 
Characteristics 
 
Category 
Frequency 
(n=289) 
Percent 
(%) 
Gender 
 
Male 
Female 
140 
149 
48.4 
51.6 
Age 18-29 
30-44 
45-60 
Over 60 
34 
76 
109 
70 
11.8 
25.6 
37.7 
25.0 
Education Less than high school degree 
High school degree 
Some college 
Associate or bachelor degree 
Graduate degree 
8 
27 
78 
86 
90 
2.8 
9.3 
27.0 
29.8 
31.1 
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Sample Group Equivalency Checks 
 In order to guarantee what an experimental design tries to achieve, it was important to 
attain an acceptable level of equivalency over six experimental conditions in terms of sample 
demographic profiles and distributions of scores for possible confounding variables. If the 
comparison groups are similar to each other on all confounding variables at the beginning of the 
experiment, the variation of the dependent variable is mainly due to the systematic difference 
between groups in an experiment, resulting in increasing internal validity of the study (Wimmer 
& Dominick, 2000). As demonstrated in Table 2, no significant differences among six groups 
were found in the proportions of gender (suspicion: χ2 = .190, p = .910; product congruence: 
χ2= .002, p = .966). Table 3 also shows that the distribution of age was not significantly different 
over the six groups (suspicion: χ2 = 2.324, p =.888; product congruence: χ2 = 3.030, p =.387). 
 
Table 2. Gender Equivalency Check: Pearson Chi-Squire Test 
 
Conditions N 
Gender (%) 
χ2 Sig. 
Male Female 
Suspicion      
High 86 40(13.8) 46(15.9) 
.190 
(df = 2) .910 
Low 96 47(16.3) 19(17.0) 
No 107 53(18.3) 54(18.7) 
Product 
Congruence      
High 149 72(24.9) 77(26.6) .002 
(df = 1) .966 Low 140 68(23.5) 72(24.9) 
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Table 3. Age Equivalency Check: Pearson Chi-Squire Test 
 
Conditions N 
Age (%) 
χ2 Sig. 
18-29 30-44 45-60 Over 60 
Suspicion        
High 86 8(2.8) 24(8.3) 33(11.4) 21(7.3) 
2.324 
(df=6) .888 
Low 96 12(4.2) 20(6.9) 39(13.5) 25(8.7) 
No 107 14(4.8) 29(10.0) 37(12.8) 27(9.3) 
Product 
Congruence        
High 149 22.(7.6) 37(12.8) 52(18.0) 35(12.1) 3.030 
(df=3) .387 Low 140 12(4.2) 36(12.5) 57(19.7) 35(12.1) 
 
 Following the Chi-Squire test on gender and age, series of one-way ANOVAs and t-tests 
were conducted to test whether the levels of perceived source credibility and product 
involvement are significantly different among the six groups. As described in the literature, the 
constructs, source credibility and product involvement, have been widely accepted as affecting 
consumers’ cognitive and attitudinal responses on advertising. The measurement of source 
credibility, comprising the dimensions of expertise, attractiveness, and trustworthiness, was 
adopted from Ohanian’s (1990) source-credibility scale. All three measures of source credibility 
were internally consistent (expertise: α = .94; attractiveness: α = .92; trustworthiness: α = .89). 
Product involvements with sports and soft drinks were tested using Zaichkowsky’s (1994) 
revised personal involvement inventory, which were also internally consistent (α = .85). 
Subscales for each measure were averaged for the analysis. Table 4 indicates that the distribution 
of each measure of source credibility and product involvement was not significantly different 
over three suspicion groups (expertise: F = 2.216, p =.298; attractiveness: F =.270, p =.763; 
trustworthiness: F =.948, p =.389; product involvement with sports drink: F =.291, p =.748; 
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product involvement with soft drink; F =.625, p =.536).  As shown in Table 5, with the exception 
of expertise, the proportions of attractiveness, trustworthiness, and product involvement were not 
significantly different between high and low product congruence groups (expertise: t = -5.209, p 
< .01; attractiveness: t = -1.752, p =.081; trustworthiness: t =.948, p =.389; product involvement 
with sports drink: t = 2.454, p =.085; product involvement with soft drink: t =.803, p =.407). The 
significant difference of expertise between two levels of product congruence groups are highly 
acceptable because two groups were conditioned based on products’ matching with the source’s 
expertise. In sum, the impact of gender, age, source credibility, and product involvement were 
successfully controlled in the six experimental conditions. 
 
 
Table 4. Source Credibility & Product Involvement Equivalency Check on Suspicion: 
 
Equivalency 
Measures 
Suspicion 
F Sig. No Low High 
Mean 
(max.=7) SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Source 
Credibility         
Expert 4.47 2.04 4.02 2.08 4.23 2.14 1.216 .298 
Attractiveness 4.51 1.69 4.43 1.51 4.35 1.42 .270 .763 
Trustworthy 4.51 1.69 4.25 1.35 4.30 1.22 .948 .389 
Product  
Involvement         
Sports Drink 3.36 1.96 3.41 1.98 3.20 1.86 .291 .748 
Soft Drink 3.69 2.06 3.60 2.08 3.94 2.14 .625 .536 
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Table 5. Source Credibility & Product Involvement Equivalency Check on Product Congruence: 
Independent T-Test 
 
Equivalency 
Measures 
Product Congruence 
t Sig. Low High 
Mean 
(max.=7) SD Mean SD 
Source 
Credibility       
Expert 3.62 2.05 4.85 1.94 -5.209 .000** 
Attractiveness 4.27 1.59 4.59 1.51 -1.752 .081 
Trustworthy 4.38 1.38 4.35 1.52 .948 .389 
Product  
Involvement       
Sports Drink 3.41 1.88 3.06 1.95 2.454 .085 
Soft Drink 3.84 2.17 3.64 2.03 .803 .407 
Note. ** p<0.01. 
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Manipulation Checks 
 Six stimuli, including two test advertisements with the variation of perceived product 
congruence and three situational information cues inducing different levels of suspicion, were 
created for the main study. Manipulation checks were conducted to ensure that participants in 
three suspicious conditions perceived the types of situational information cue as intended and to 
check if there were significant differences in the compatibility between the sports celebrity 
(Julien Absalon) and his endorsed drink products (ENERGY and ORANGIA). In regard to three 
types of situational information cues, which were designed to generate different degrees of 
suspicion (Fein et al., 1989; Echebarria-Echabe, 2010), participants were asked to indicate their 
levels of agreement ranging from 1(highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely) on the following 
questions.  
• Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] 
because of his hidden interests. 
 
• Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] 
because of his certain financial goals.  
 
• Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] 
to present his image to the public.  
 
• The fact that Julien Absalom endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink 
(ORANGINA)] makes me suspicious of his ulterior motives.  
 
 Perceived product congruence with the chosen celebrity in two conditions was tested with 
a multiple item measure, adapted contextually from Fleck and Quester’s (2007) bi-dimensional 
congruence scale. Participants were asked to indicate their levels of agreement ranging from 
1(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) on the following questions. Reliability tests confirmed 
a sufficient level of internal consistency for both measures (suspicion: α = .84; product 
congruence: α = .92), suggesting no need to remove any item for the manipulation check. 
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• I am not surprised that this person (Julien Absalon) endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) 
[or the soft drink (ORANGINA)]. 
• With this endorsement, I can understand the brand (ENERGY) [or the soft drink 
(ORANGINA)] better.  
 
• One would expect this person (Julien Absalon) to endorse the sports drink (ENERGY) 
[or the soft drink (ORANGINA)]. 
 
• That this person (Julien Absalon) endorses the brand (ENERGY) [or the soft drink 
(ORANGINA)] tells me something about it. 
 
 The result of one-way ANOVA in Table 6 revealed that there were significant effects of 
situational information manipulations on suspicion (F = 21.549, p <.01). Furthermore, as shown 
in Table 7, the results of planned contrasts confirmed that three sets of suspicious condition were 
perceived as intended. The suspicion mean score for the high suspicious condition (M = 4.80, SD 
=.87) was significantly higher than that for the no suspicious condition (M = 4.49, SD =.82; t = 
4.241, p <.001). Likewise, the suspicion mean score for the low suspicious condition was 
significantly higher than that for the no suspicious condition (M = 3.93, SD =1.08; t = 2.226, p 
<.05). Significant differences between two levels of treatment groups for product congruence 
were confirmed by the independent t-test (high: M = 4.32, SD = 1.18; low: M = 3.79, SD = 1.22; 
t = -3.723, p <.001) which is shown in Table 8. Thus, group differences on the dependent 
measures could be reasonably ascribed to the treatments. 
 
 
Table 6. Manipulation Checks on Suspicious Conditions: One-Way ANOVA 
 
Suspicious 
Conditions N 
Mean 
(max.=7) SD F Sig. 
High 86 4.80 0.87 
21.549 .000** Low 96 4.49 0.82 
No 107 3.93 1.08 
Note. Between groups df=2; Within groups df=286. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 7. Manipulation Checks on Suspicious Conditions: Planned Contrasts 
 
Suspicious 
Conditions 
Value of 
Contrast SE t Sig. 
No vs. Low .561 .132 4.241 .000** 
Low vs. High .311 .140 2.226 .027* 
Note. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 8. Manipulation Checks on Product Congruence: Independent T-Test 
 
Product  
Congruence N 
Mean 
(max.=7) SD t Sig. 
High 149 4.32 1.18 
-3.723 .000** 
Low 140 3.79 1.22 
Note. ** p<0.01. 
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Hypotheses Tests for the Main Experiment 
 This study delves into consumers’ correspondence inference on a celebrity endorser 
based on his/her suspicious information and perceived product congruence. Primarily, the study 
examines 1) the main and interaction effects of suspicion and perceived product congruence, 2) 
the interaction effects of need for cognition and implicit theory of personality with suspicion, and 
3) the meditational effects of correspondence inference between two main conditions and 
advertising related attitudes. In order to find out those relationships empirically, series of 
factorial ANOVAs with rigorous planned contrasts and regressions with mediation tests were 
conducted within satisfied assumptions of parametric tests on normal distribution, homogeneity 
of variance, and independence. 
 The Results of Multivariate Analysis. For two independent variables, suspicion and 
perceived product congruence, a series of multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) were 
performed on dependent variables: correspondence inference, attitude toward the advertisement, 
brand attitude, and behavioral intention. As a preliminary check for MANOVA's assumption of 
homoscedasticity, Box's M test was conducted for both independent variables. The result of 
Box's M test was not significant respectively (suspicion: p = 25.00; perceived product 
congruence: p = 23.59), which indicates equality of the variance/covariance matrices among 
treatment groups in each dependent variable (Field, 2005). With the use of Wilks' lambda 
criterion, the combined dependent variables were significantly affected by the degree of 
suspicion (Wilks' λ =.791, F = 8.78, p <.01) and perceived product congruence (Wilks' λ =.889, F 
= 8.825, p <.01). The MANOVA results also reflected moderate associations for both suspicion 
(ƞ2 = .11) and perceived product congruence (ƞ2 = .11) with the combined dependent variables. 
Because omnibus MANOVAs indicated significant main effects of the degree of suspicion and 
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perceived product congruence on the combined dependent variables, it was appropriate to further 
investigate the nature of hypothesized relationships between treatments and individual dependent 
variables through univariate ANCOVA procedures (Field, 2005). 
 The Effects of Suspicion. H1 stated that consumers’ correspondence inference on the 
endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will not be significantly lower under a 
low suspicious condition than under no suspicious condition. Furthermore, H2 envisioned that 
consumers’ correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an 
advertisement will be negatively associated with their suspicion aroused from high suspicious 
condition. The objectives of those two statements are to test whether consumers show 
correspondence bias in low suspicious condition and overcome the bias in high suspicious 
condition. A 3 (degree of suspicion) x 2 (degree of perceived product congruence) ANOVA was 
conducted on consumers’ index of correspondence inference. Type III sums of squares were used 
in the analysis due to the different numbers of participants in each groups. Also, as a preliminary 
check for ANONA’s assumption of homogeneity of variance between groups, Levene’s test was 
conducted. The result of Levene’s test was not significant for the dependent variable, which 
indicates the high probability value for the data set (Field, 2005).  
 
Table 9. Results of the 3(Suspicion) x 2(Product Congruence): Two-Way ANOVA 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. ƞ
2 
 
Correspondence 
Inference (CI) 
Suspicion (S) 2 60.57 39.03 .000** .22 
Product Congruence (PC) 1 23.99 15.46 .000** .05 
S x PC 2 5.23 3.37 .003** .02 
 Error 283 1.55    
Note. R Squared =.259 (Adjusted R Squared=.246).  ** p<0.01. 
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As shown in Table 9, the result of ANOVA analysis revealed that there was a significant main 
impact of the suspicion treatments on the correspondence inference (F = 39.03, p <.01, ƞ2 = .22). 
In order to examine the occurrence of correspondence bias for participants in low (i.e., multiple 
product endorsements) or high (i.e., multiple product endorsements) suspicious conditions, mean 
differences between each suspicious condition were compared and tested with planned contrasts. 
In this study, the statistical method of planned contrasts is more useful than post hoc tests 
because specific hypotheses should be tested. The results of planned contrasts (see Table 10) 
showed that mean difference between the low (M = 5.64, SD = 1.08) and no (M = 5.95, SD = 
1.37) conditions was not significantly different (t = -1.71, p =.089). However, the mean value for 
correspondence inference in the low suspicious condition (M = 4.42, SD = 1.38) was 
significantly lower than that in the low suspicious condition (t = -6.41, p <.01).  The pattern of 
mean values among the three suspicious conditions was consistent with the hypothesized 
downside linear relationship, Based on these results, H1 and H2 were fully supported. 
 
 
 
Table 10. Planned Contrasts of CI Regarding Main Effects 
 
Independent 
Variables Level (Mean/SD) 
Mean 
Diff. df t Sig. 
Suspicion 
No (5.95/1.37) Low (5.64/1.08) -.31 286 -1.71 .089 
Low (5.64/1.07) High (4.42/1.38) -1.22 286 -6.41 .000** 
No (5.95/1.37) High (4.42/1.38) -1.53 286 -8.23 .000** 
Product Congruence Low (5.10/1.51) High (5.66/1.31) .56 287 3.36 .001** 
Note. ** p<0.01. 
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 The Effects of Perceived Product Congruence. H3a predicted that consumers’ 
correspondence inferences on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will 
be significantly greater for a high congruent product than for a low congruent product. Also, in 
associations with suspicion, H3b predicted that consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias 
becomes stronger for a high congruent product than for a low congruent product; whereas, 
consumers’ tendency to suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for a low congruent 
product than for a high congruent product. The former hypothesis was examined in its main 
effect from the aforementioned 3 x 2 factorial ANOVA. In order to support the H3b, three 
criteria were applied; 1) the interaction between suspicion and perceived product congruence, 2) 
the occurrence of correspondence bias in low suspicious conditions and the overcome of 
correspondence bias in high suspicions conditions at both levels of product congruent conditions, 
and 3) the increase of mean differences between each suspicious condition from high to low 
product congruent conditions. In some senses, the third criterion tests the moderating role of 
product congruence on suspicion; therefore, it was assessed by means of procedure suggested by 
Baron and Kenny (1986).   
 For the main effect, Table 10 indicated that the mean value for the correspondence 
inference in the high product congruent condition (M = 5.66, SD = 1.31) was significantly higher 
than that in the low product congruent condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.51; F = 15.46, p <.01, ƞ2 
= .05), which was also supported by the planned contrast (t = 3.36, p <.01) in Table 11. Despite 
the effect size was small, same ANOVA results also revealed a significant degree of suspicion by 
product congruence for the correspondence inference (F = 3.37, p <.01, ƞ2 = .02). The second 
requirement for H3b was tested using the planned contrasts. The results of planned contrasts (see 
Table 7) showed that, in the high product congruent condition, the mean difference between the 
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low (M = 6.08, SD =.77) and no (M = 5.98, SD = 1.41) conditions was not significantly different 
(t =.42, p =.675); however, in the low product congruent condition; the mean value for 
correspondence inference in the low suspicious condition (M = 5.17, SD = 1.16) was 
significantly lower than that in the no suspicious condition (M = 5.92, SD = 1.16; t = -2.85, p 
<.01).  The mean differences between low and high suspicious conditions were shown to be all 
significantly different at both high (low suspicion: same as above; high suspicion; M = 4.79, SD 
= 1.28, t = -5.22, p <.01) and low (low: same as above; high: M = 4.03, SD = 1.51, t = -4.12, p 
<.01) product congruent conditions. Lastly, Figure 6 demonstrates differences in the suspicion 
treatment effects between low and high product congruent groups for participants’ 
correspondence inferences. While the treatment effects did materialize among low and high 
product congruent groups, these effects appeared not to be more pronounced among participants 
with higher suspicion. Therefore, H3a was supported and H3b were partially supported. 
 
 
Table 11. Planned Contrasts of CI on Perceived Product Congruence by Suspicion 
 
Moderating 
Variables 
Suspicion    
No Low High Mean Diff. t Sig. 
High PC 
5.98(1.41) 6.08(.77)  .10 .42 .675 
 6.08(.77) 4.79(1.28) -1.29 -5.22 .000** 
Low PC 
5.92(1.34) 5.17(1.16)  -7.45 -2.85 .005** 
 5.17(1.16) 4.03(1.51) -1.14 -4.12 .000** 
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Figure 6. Correspondence Inferences for Interaction Effects 
 
 
 The Moderating Roles of Need for Cognition. H4a was employed to test whether the 
effects of suspicion would be moderated by an individual’s own levels of need for cognition. 
H4a stated that consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias will not appear for people with high 
need for cognition but people with low need for cognition; whereas, consumers’ tendency to 
suspicion of ulterior motives will appear for people with both low and high for cognition. In 
addition, to better understand the moderating role of need for cognition, H4b and H4c were 
proposed to look at how the role would be changed according to different levels of product 
congruence. H4b specified that, in a condition of high product congruence, consumers’ tendency 
to correspondence bias does not become stronger for people with low need for cognition than 
people with high need for cognition; whereas, in a condition of low product congruence, 
consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for people with low need for 
cognition than people with high need for cognition. For the high suspicious condition, H4c 
envisioned that in both levels of high and low product congruence, consumers’ tendency to 
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suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for people with high need for cognition than 
people with low need for cognition. The numbers of participants selected by the conventional 
median split method (Median = 4.34) in each sell was ranged from 22 to 31, and Levene’s test 
resulted in the homogeneity of variance between all groups.   
 First, A 3 (degree of suspicion) x 2 (degree of perceived product congruence) x 2 (degree 
of need for cognition) ANOVA was conducted on consumers’ index of correspondence inference. 
As shown in the Table 12, significant simple main effect was found for need for cognition (F = 
40.02, p <.01, ƞ2 = .13), which means that participants with low need for cognition (M = 5.73, 
SD = 1.21) shows more correspondence inferences than participants with high need for cognition 
(M = 4.97, SD = 1.43).  
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Table 12. Results of the 3(Suspicion) x 2(Product Congruence) x 2(Need for Cognition) Design: 
Three-Way ANOVA 
 
Dependent 
Variable Source of Variation df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. ƞ
2 
 
Correspondence 
Inference (CI) 
Suspicion (S) 2 66.52 50.74 .000** .27 
Product Congruence (PC) 1 33.81 25.80 .000** .09 
Need for Cognition (NFC) 1 52.46 40.02 .000** .13 
S x PC 2 7.70 5.88 .003** .04 
S x NFC 2 13.80 10.53 .000** .07 
PC x NFC 1 2.09 1.59 .208 .01 
S x PC x NFC 2 1.02 .78 .460 .01 
 Error 277 1.31    
 Low PC      
 Suspicion (S) 2 52.06 37.59 .000** .27 
 Need for Cognition (NFC) 1 35.87 25.90 .000** .13 
 S x NFC 2 7.76 5.60 .005** .07 
 Error 134 1.39    
 High PC      
 Suspicion (S) 2 20.30 16.35 .000** .17 
 Need for Cognition (NFC) 1 17.73 14.26 .000** .09 
 S x NFC 2 7.08 5.70 .000** .07 
 Error 143 1.24    
Note. ** p<0.01. 
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As hypothesized in H4a, significant effects was revealed for the suspicion by need for cognition 
interaction (F = 10.53, p <.01, ƞ2 = .07). The results of planned contrasts in Table 13 showed that 
the mean differences of correspondence inference between no and low suspicious conditions 
were not significantly different at both low (no suspicion: M = 6.05, SD = 1.32; low suspicion; M 
= 5.96, SD =.95, t = -.42, p =.677) and high (no suspicion: M = 5.81, SD = 1.45; low suspicion; 
M = 5.31, SD = 1.11, t = -1.83, p =.065) need for cognition. However, the mean differences 
between low and high suspicious conditions were shown to be significantly different at both low 
(low suspicion: same as above; high suspicion; M = 5.08, SD = 1.21, t = -3.80, p <.01) and high 
(low suspicion: same as above; high suspicion; M = 3.58, SD = 1.311, t = -6.16, p <.01) need for 
cognition. Lastly, Figure 6 demonstrates differences in the suspicion treatment effects between 
low and high need for cognition for participants’ correspondence inferences. As with the case of 
suspicion by product congruence interaction, while the treatment effects did materialize among 
low and high need for cognition groups, these effects appeared to be more pronounced among 
participants with higher suspicion. Therefore, H4a was supported. 
 
 
Table 13. Planned Contrasts of CI on Suspicion by Need for Cognition 
 
Moderating 
Variables 
Suspicion    
No Low High Mean Diff. t Sig. 
High NFC 
5.81(1.45) 5.31(1.11)  -.50 -1.83 .069 
 5.31(1.11) 3.58(1.31) -1.73 -6.16 .000** 
Low NFC 
6.05(1.32) 5.96(.95)  -.90 -.42 .677 
 5.96(.95) 5.08(1.21) -.87 -3.80 .000** 
Note. ** p<0.01. 
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 As indicated in Table 12, the interaction among three conditions, suspicion, product 
congruence, and need for cognition, was not found in the analysis of three-way ANOVA. This 
result of non-interaction was predicted by the researcher because it was expected that, thought 
the strength is moderated by need for cognition, directional relationships between suspicion and 
need for cognition were expected to be the same in both levels of product congruence. However, 
in order to explore the effects of need for cognition on correspondence bias and suspicion of 
ulterior motives in each degrees of product congruence, two-way ANOVAs of suspicion by need 
for cognition were executed in each perceived product congruence condition. Significant effects 
were found in Table 12 for the suspicion by need for cognition interaction in both conditions of 
high and low product congruence (high PC: F = 5.70, p <.01, ƞ2 = .07; low PC: F = 5.60, p <.01, 
ƞ2 = .07). Figure 7 also showed materialized effects of need for cognition and pronounced 
dictions of effects on suspicion. Unexpectedly, two important findings were emerged in the 
planned contrast for three treatment groups (see Table 14). The depth analyses revealed that the 
correspondence bias was not found for participants with high need for cognition in the low 
product congruent condition. That is, the mean value for the correspondence inference for 
participants with high need for cognition was significantly lower in low suspicion (M = 4.69, SD 
= 1.05) than that in no suspicion (M = 5.79, SD = 1.50) when the product congruence was low (t 
= -2.88, p <.01). In addition, the consequence of high suspicion was not shown for participants 
with low need for cognition in the high product congruent condition. This result means that the 
mean difference of correspondence inference among high (M = 5.67, SD =.87), low (M = 6.18, 
SD =.79) or no (M = 6.09, SD = 1.41) suspicion was not significant for participants with low 
need for cognition (t = -1.58, p =.117; t = -1.35, p =.182). Therefore, in spite of expected 
findings for all other planned contrasts in Table 14, H4b and H4c were partially supported.  
105 
 
Table 14. Planned Contrasts of CI on Suspicion by Need for Cognition in Each Level of Product 
Congruence 
 
Moderating 
Variables 
Suspicion    
No Low High Mean Diff. t Sig. 
High PC       
High NFC 5.83(1.42) 5.96(.75)  .13 .39 .700 
  5.96(.75) 4.06(1.10) -1.89 -5.74 .000** 
Low NFC 6.09(1.41) 6.18(.79)  .09 .32 .752 
  6.18(.79) 5.67(.87) -.51 -1.58 .117 
 6.09(1.41)  5.67(.87) -.42 -1,35 .182 
Low PC       
High NFC 5.79(1.50) 4.69(1.05)  -1.09 -2.88 .006** 
  4.69(1.05) 2.75(1.24) -1.95 -4.56 .000** 
Low NFC 6.01(1.24) 5.69(1.07)  -.32 -1.04 .301 
  5.69(1.07) 4.67(.96) -1.02 -3.23 .002** 
Note. ** p<0.01. 
 
 
Figure 7. Correspondence Inferences for NFC Interaction with Suspicion in Each PC Level 
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 The Moderating Roles of Implicit Theory of Personality. H5a stated that consumers’ 
correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will be 
significantly greater for entity theorist than for incremental theorist. Furthermore, H5b proposed 
that consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for entity theorist than 
incremental theorists; whereas, consumers’ tendency to suspicion of ulterior becomes stronger 
for incremental theorists than entity theorists. As another personality moderator for suspicion, 
both main and interaction effects of implicit theory of personality with suspicion was tested 
using a two-way ANOVA. A preliminary analysis revealed a strong tendency for participants to 
become entity theorists which includes 69 in no suspicion, 72 in low suspicion, and 62 in high 
suspicion. Classified incremental theorists consisted of 36 in no suspicion, 23 in low suspicion, 
and 21 in high suspicion. Among 289 participants in this study, 16 participants (5.5%) were not 
classified, which is slightly lower when compared with a typical unclassified frequency of 15-20% 
in the previous studies using the measure of implicit theory of personality (e.g., Dweck et la., 
1995). The result of Levene’s test meets the assumption on the homogeneity of variance between 
all treatment groups.        
 A 3 (degree of suspicion) x 2 (degree of implicit theory of personality) ANOVA was 
conducted on participants’ correspondence inference. Table 15 showed the significant simple 
main effect of implicit theory of personality (F = 6.75, p <.01, ƞ2 = .024), which means that 
entity theorists (M = 5.75, SD = 1.32) shows more correspondence inferences than incremental 
theorists (M = 5.25, SD = 1.46). Contrary to expectations on interaction effects between 
suspicion and implicit theory of personality (F =.858, p =.425, ƞ2 = .14), two types of 
participants of implicit theory of personality did have similar degree of tendencies on 
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correspondence bias and high suspicion outcomes. From the results of the test, H5a was 
supported; whereas, H5b was rejected. 
 
 
 
Table 15. Results of the 3(Suspicion) x 2(Implicit Theory of Personality) Design: Three-Way 
ANOVA 
 
DV Source df Mean Square F Sig. ƞ
2 
 
Correspondence 
Inference 
Suspicion (S) 2 37.75 22.99 .000** .142 
Implicit Theory of 
Personality (ITP) 1 11.09 6.75 .010* .024 
S x ITP 2 1.41 .858 .425 .006 
Error 277 1.64    
Note. R Squared =.221 (Adjusted R Squared=.206).  * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
 
 
 Correspondence Inference and Advertising Effective Measures. H6a was proposed to 
test correlations between consumers’ index of correspondence inference and attitudinal and 
behavioral outcome measures. Table 17 showed Pearson’s correlation coefficients among the 
dependent variables, which indicated all positive and significant relationships. As 
correspondence inferences about celebrity’s true brand attitude and preference increased 
favorably, participants’ attitudes toward the ad, the brand, and behavioral intention also 
increased in favorability. Thus, H6a was supported. In the same table, it should be also noted that 
suspicion had no significant relationship with perceived product congruence; whereas, it had 
significant and negative associations with dependent variables. In contrast, perceived product 
congruence was shown to have strong correlations with dependent variables.  
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Table 16. Intercorrelations among Study Variables: Pearson’s Correlation 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Suspicion — -.056 -.323** -.209** -.224** -.211** 
2. Perceived Product Congruence  — .425** .367** .400** .363** 
3. Correspondence Infer.   — .280** .286** .212** 
4. Attitude toward the Ad    — .574** .521** 
5. Attitude toward the Brand     — .559** 
6. Behavioral Intention      — 
Note. ** p<0.01. 
 
 
 The hypothesized mediating effect of correspondence inference on the links between 
suspicion and attitudinal and behavioral outcome measures (H6b) were assessed using three steps 
of hierarchical regressions plus the Sobel test recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). The 
same procedure was also employed to analyze the mediation role of correspondence inference 
between product congruence and attitudinal and behavioral outcome measures (H6c). In order to 
support each mediation hypothesis, prior to the Sobel mediation test, series of regression 
analyses were conducted specifically to examine: 1) whether suspicion or product congruence 
has a direct effect on correspondence inference; 2) whether suspicion or product congruence has 
a direct effect on ad attitude, brand attitude, or behavioral intention; (3) whether correspondence 
inferences has a direct effect on ad attitude, brand attitude, or behavioral intention.  In the 
purpose of statistical usability for the categorical measures of suspicion and product congruence 
into metric traits, interval scales employed in manipulation checks for suspicion and perceived 
product congruence were used in the regression analysis.  
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 As exhibited in Figure 8, a series of regression analyses revealed six significant causal 
routes which satisfy the first three conditions for the mediation test. Six paths are: 1) suspicion – 
correspondence inference (CI) – ad attitude; 2) suspicion – CI – brand attitude; 3) suspicion – CI 
– behavioral intention; 4) product congruence – correspondence inference – ad attitude; 5) 
product congruence – CI – brand attitude; and lastly 6) product congruence – CI – behavioral 
intention. 
 
 
Note: ** p<0.01. 
Figure 8. Standardized Coefficients from Three Steps of Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
 
 
 The final step was conducted using the Sobel test. In order to drive t statistic, the Sobel 
test uses the magnitude of the indirect effect with comparisons to its estimated standard error 
(Sobel, 1986). Series of Sobel tests in Table 18 revealed that correspondence inference 
significantly mediated the relationships between suspicion and ad attitude (t = -3.19, p <.01), 
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brand attitude (t = -3.30, p <.01), and behavioral intention (t = -2.42, p <.05). For the paths of 
product congruence, correspondence inference significantly mediated only two processes on ad 
attitude (t = 2.41, p <.01) and brand attitude (t = 2.29, p <.01), not behavioral intention (t = 1.14, 
p =.254). Noticeably, the amount of indirect effects of correspondence inference to the direct 
effects in both suspicion and product congruence paths were found to be ascending orders of ad 
attitude (suspicion path: RI =.52; PC path: RI =.21), brand attitude (suspicion path: RI =.52; PC 
path: RI =.18), and behavioral intention (suspicion path: RI =.52). Based on these results, H6b 
and H6c were fully supported. 
 
Table 17. Results of Sobel Mediation Tests for Dependent Variables 
 
Variable Relationships     
IV MV DV PM RI t Sig. 
Suspicion CI 
Aad 36.7 .59 -3.29 .000** 
Abrand 34.4 .52 -3.30 .000** 
BI 24.6 .33 -2.42 .017* 
Product 
Congruence CI 
Aad 17.6 .21 2.41 .016* 
Abrand 15.0 .18 2.29 .022* 
BI 8.2 .09 1.14 .254 
Note. PM: Percentage of the total effect that is mediated. RI: Ratio of the indirect to the direct 
effect.  * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
 
 This chapter is devoted to discuss theoretical and managerial implications that emerged 
from the present study. Beforehand, major findings and interpretations drawn from the 
experiment are presented. Some limitations on the study with future directions will also be 
discussed. 
Research Findings and Interpretations 
 In the main experiment, consumers’ correspondence inference, as a key index in the 
process of attribution, was separately assessed in terms of its antecedents (i.e., suspicion and 
perceived product congruence), moderators (i.e., need for cognition and implicit theory of 
personality), consequences (i.e., attitudinal and behavioral measures), and lastly moderating 
effects. Also, correspondence inferences were compared between each level in antecedents by 
moderators to identify consumers’ tendencies on correspondence bias and high suspicion 
outcomes. Since results of statistical analyses mostly support the hypotheses on causal 
relationships among variables, it is reasonable to say that consumers’ correspondence inference 
is an important indicator for communication effects in celebrity endorsement advertising.      
 For the main effects of two antecedents, significant causal relationships between either 
suspicion or perceived product congruence and correspondence inference were found in the 
experiment while the directional effects were inversed over the two antecedents. From these 
results, it was clear that highly suspicious celebrity endorsers are more likely to induce negative 
correspondence inferences from consumers than low suspicious celebrity endorsers; whereas, 
highly perceived product congruence is more likely to invoke positive correspondence inferences 
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from consumers than does low perceived product congruence. However, interpreting such 
suspicion and perceived product congruence effects on correspondence inference requires 
additional elucidations derived from interactions between the two antecedents in the experiment.  
 One of the most important findings from the experiment is that participants’ tendencies 
on correspondence bias are likely to increase when they feel more on high product congruence 
with the endorser in the advertisement. In fact, participants did not show the correspondence bias 
when they are in a condition of high product congruence: however, participants did show the 
correspondence bias when they are in a condition of low product congruence. In other words, a 
low level of suspicion aroused from the situational information of a large endorsement fee does 
not necessarily invoke consumers’ correspondence bias. For example, consumers may attribute 
the celebrity endorser’s motive to making money when the endorsed product is not highly 
matched with the image of the endorser. Another important finding from the significant 
interactions between suspicion and perceived product congruence is that, regardless of their 
perceptions on the product matching levels, consumers tend to keep a very low level of 
correspondence inferences when they have a high level of suspicion on the endorsers’ true 
attitudes and preferences for the product. This result indicates that when consumers are 
previously aware of a celebrity’s endorsements on several products, they are strongly likely to 
attribute the endorser’s true motives to earning big money or image making, which results in the 
negative tendency of their correspondence inferences. As a summary of those results, it is 
concluded that consumers’ correspondence bias are affected by their perceived levels of product 
congruence with a celebrity endorser; however, consumers do not bias their correspondence 
inferences when they are highly suspicious of the endorser’s ulterior motives whether the 
product is highly matched with the image of the endorser or not.  
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 As with perceived product congruence, individual inference in need for cognition was 
also tested as a potential moderator for the attribution process on a celebrity endorser. The 
ANOVA analysis revealed the main effect of need for cognition on participants’ correspondence 
inference even though it was not predicted in the study. According to the result, it is likely that 
consumers with low need for cognition are likely to show more positive correspondence 
inferences on celebrity endorsers’ true attitude and preference for the product than consumers 
with high need for cognition do. However, this main effect could not be interpreted as it was 
because the construct, need for cognition, is not a causal inducer but just a personality 
differentiator which moderates the relationships between the inducer and the induced 
consequences. Therefore, the moderating role of need for cognition should be explained within 
the interaction terms with suspicious conditions.   
 The findings from the interaction showed another critical moderator on the tendency of 
correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser’s true motives. The hypotheses on need for 
cognition stated that consumers’ tendency to correspondence bias will not appear for people with 
high need for cognition but people with low need for cognition; whereas, consumers’ tendency to 
high suspicion of ulterior motives will appear for people with both low and high for cognition. 
That is, high need for cognition people tend to carefully process and elaborate the arguments of 
persuasive messages including situational information when they are coded as reference points, 
thereby adjusting their correspondence inferences on the endorser; however, low need for 
cognition people are subject to rely on cognitive heuristics and other peripheral cues without 
considering situational information, so keeping their early made correspondence inferences on 
the endorser. Nevertheless, the endorser who arouses high suspicion will inhibit people’s 
willingness to invest cognitive efforts in the scrutiny of the arguments, which overwhelms the 
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influence of need for cognition on the correspondence inference.  As a matter of fact, participants 
with low need for cognition, not high need for cognition, did show the correspondence bias and 
both need for cognition groups react to the high suspicion of ulterior motives. 
 Another important issue here is how the level of need for cognition could determine the 
strength of correspondence bias and the tendency on high suspicion of ulterior motives in 
different perceived product congruence conditions.  One interpretive sign for that query is the 
interaction effects among three constructs, correspondence inference, product congruence, and 
need for cognition. From the hypotheses, it was expected that in a condition of low product 
congruence, consumers with low need for cognition are more likely show the correspondence 
bias than consumers with high need for cognition; whereas, in a condition of high product 
congruence, both high and low need for cognition consumers likely show the correspondence 
bias. Also, it was hypothesized that, in both levels of high and low product congruence, 
consumers’ tendency to high suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for people with high 
need for cognition than people with low need for cognition. However, the significant three-way 
interaction was not present in the analysis. This result may be due to the similar patterns of linear 
graphs between suspicion and need for cognition for each level of perceived product congruence. 
That is, although its effects were not exactly the same, perceived product congruence was shown 
to influence the correspondence inference in a similar way across two groups of need for 
cognition. For instance, if three-way interaction effects were revealed significantly, the 
difference of correspondence inference for high need for cognition participants between low and 
high suspicious conditions should be significantly different between low and high perceived 
product congruence levels. But, it was not.  Only the mean scores of correspondence inference 
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for high need for cognition participants both in low and high suspicious conditions were greater 
when perceived product congruence was high than when it was low. 
 In an alternative way, the two-way ANOVAs between suspicion and need for cognition 
in each level of perceived product congruence were conducted and generated more meaningful 
implications for this study. According to the results, high need for cognition participants did 
show the correspondence bias not in a low product congruent condition but in a high congruence 
condition, but low need for cognition participant showed correspondence bias in both levels of 
perceived product congruent conditions. In addition, unexpectedly, low need for cognition 
participants did not respond to the high suspicion of ulterior motives, keeping their high 
tendency to show the correspondence bias when the endorser and the product were perceived to 
be highly matched. In sum, it can be interpreted that high need for cognition consumers are less 
prone to the correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser’s true attitude to the endorsed product 
even when they perceive the endorsed product is not highly matched with the endorser; however, 
low need for cognition consumers are more likely to show correspondence bias on the celebrity 
endorser’s true attitude to the endorsed product even when they perceive the endorsed product is 
highly matched with the endorser. 
 The results of ANOVA tests and planned contrasts also help to identify the relationship 
that implicit theory of personality, as a possible personality moderator, has on the attributional 
process. Contrary to the expectation, the influence of consumers’ implicit theory of personality 
on their correspondence bias appears not to be significant. Participants as incremental theorists 
did show the correspondence bias just as participants as entity theorists. In the contrast, both 
incremental and entity theorists strongly responded to the high suspicion of ulterior motives. 
However, even though the interactions between suspicion and implicit theory of personality were 
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not significant, it should be cautioned not to infer that there are no relationships between the two 
variables, because, in the experiment, the mean difference between no- and low suspicion for 
incremental theorists (MD = -.50) was found to be marginally significant (p =.069). That is, 
incremental theorists possibly have a less tendency to show correspondence bias on a celebrity 
endorser’s true motives than incremental theorists. Also, expectedly, the mean difference 
between low and high suspicion for incremental theorists (MD = -1.73) was found to almost two 
times stronger than that for entity theorists (MD = -.96), which means that incremental theorists 
have a tendency to more strongly responds to highly suspicious information than entity theorists. 
Therefore, the results could be interpreted such that even though the implicit theory of 
personality would have an impact on consumers’ attributional process, its influence as a 
moderator is tentative. 
 The next inspection for this study was to find out how consumers’ correspondence 
inferences influence their ad attitudes, brand attitudes, and behavioral intention. The correlation 
matrix and multiples regression results strongly indicated that participants’ correspondence 
inferences on a celebrity’s true attitudes toward the product significantly influence the indicators 
of advertising effectiveness. As participants’ correspondence inferences increase in favorability, 
their attitudes toward the ad and brand also increase in favorability. This is also true for their 
behavioral intentions. The high and positive standardized beta coefficient showed that as 
participants have increasingly stronger favorable correspondence inferences about a celebrity’s 
attitudes and preferences for the product, they are more likely to move into purchasing the 
endorsed product. In sum, it was clearly found that the level of consumers’ correspondence 
inferences positively affects their attitudes toward the ad and the brand, and even behavioral 
intentions. 
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 Noticeably, consumers’ correspondence inference appears to have a great impact on their 
ad attitudes, brand attitudes, and behavioral intention. Then, one important question is raised 
how consumers’ correspondence inference, as a consequence of their attributional process, can 
favorably influence the indicators of advertising effectiveness when the level of suspicion or 
perceived product congruence on the endorser differs. In this study, possible answers on those 
inquires were examined by assessing the mediating role of correspondence inference between 
suspicion and perceived product congruence, and three effectiveness measures. For instance, if 
the correspondence inference plays a mediating role between suspicion and ad attitudes, it is 
implied that the correspondence inference not only becomes a direct predictor of a suspicion but 
also determines the effect of suspicion on ad attitudes. Findings from the tests suggested that the 
level of correspondence inference significantly mediated the effects of suspicion and perceived 
product congruence on all dependent variables, which suspicion was negatively related with and 
perceived product congruence was positively associated with. Shortly, consumers’ 
correspondence inference apparently played mediating roles in the paths from attributional 
antecedents to advertising effectiveness factors. However, the mediation by correspondence 
inference does not preclude the possibility that suspicion or perceived product congruence 
directly influence ad attitude, brand attitude, and behavioral intention; instead, the ability of 
those antecedent factors to induce attitudinal and behavioral effectiveness indicates that 
suspicion or perceived product congruence are more likely to induce receivers’ attributional 
processes themselves, facilitating the formation of negative or positive correspondence 
inferences, which in turn influence their ad attitudes, brand attitudes, and even behavioral 
intentions. 
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Theoretical Implications 
 The celebrity endorsement in advertising has been regarded by researchers and 
practitioners as being effective and, therefore, used as one of the main promotional strategies 
until now. To ensure why using a celebrity in advertisements is persuasive, a number of 
researchers have used theoretical models that had the most explanatory power. Among them, 
theories on source credibility and match-up hypothesis presided in the literature as the primary 
theories determining how influential a celebrity endorser would be. However, those theoretical 
perspectives mainly dealt with the question for WHY using a celebrity is effective, not the 
question for HOW consumers are persuaded by the celebrity endorsement. For instance, only a 
source’s positive attributes such as expertise and attractiveness cannot explain how consumers 
respond to celebrity endorsement advertisements when they are already aware of a large amount 
of incentives given to the celebrity or when they were previously exposed to multiple products 
endorsed by the same celebrity. If the celebrity value as a persuasive communicator is valid even 
in such situational constraints, this study argues that consumers should believe the endorsement 
to be reflected on the celebrity’s genuine affection for the product.    
 Correspondence inference theory, originally suggested by Jones and Davis (1965), was 
helpful in forming the theoretical framework for the present study because it explains how 
consumers process a celebrity’s situational information to attribute the genuineness of the 
endorser to a product. Among attribution theories, one psychological process called 
‘correspondence bias’ or in other words ‘fundamental attribution error’ was adopted to explain  
how consumers make correspondence inferences from celebrity endorsers’ attitudes or 
preferences to endorsed products within clearly constrained situational information and why they 
underestimate such constraints (e.g., a large money incentive). The applicability of the 
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correspondence bias theory was supported by some studies (Cronley et al., 1999; Sørum et al., 
2003; Silvera et al., 2004) that consumers tend to exhibit correspondence bias in evaluating a 
celebrity endorser’s motives for recommending a product by viewing the endorser as actually 
liking the endorsed product. However, consumer’s correspondence bias is not likely to happen 
when they clearly perceive the celebrity endorser’s ulterior motives, such as his/her multiple 
product endorsements for making big money or higher publicity. The theoretical perspective on 
suspicion of ulterior motives gave clues to this study about such correspondence bias 
disappearing. According to the theory, when an observer has reasons to suspect that an actor is 
motivated by external factors, the observer is less apt to make dispositional attributions (Fein et 
al., 1990). 
 The findings of this study clearly demonstrated the proper theoretical applications of the 
correspondence bias in the context of celebrity endorsement advertising. As indentified from the 
results of this study, the theory of correspondence bias is capable to better explain how the 
celebrity advertising reaches persuasion to the perceivers than do mere correspondence 
inferences on the celebrity. That is, even though correspondence inference, as it is, could indicate 
the level of favorableness derived from the attributional process, it still cannot explain why the 
inferential errors do not bring about unfavorable consequences for consumers and rather lead to 
positive consequences to the advertisers. In spite of its explanatory capability, the 
correspondence bias to a celebrity endorser was not found to be robust as much as Heider’s 
maxim that behavior “tends to engulf the total field” (1958, pp. 54). In the context of celebrity 
advertising, perceived product congruence and individual’ level of need for cognition were 
identified to moderate consumers’ correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser. As a matter of 
fact, it was found that the more consumers have high need for cognition and the more they 
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perceive low level of product congruence with the endorser, the less their correspondence bias 
will be. Identifying those moderators is truly important from theoretical points of views because 
they help explain the inconsistent occurrences of correspondence bias emerged from previous 
studies (e.g. Cronley et al. 1999).       
 In this study, the theoretical concept, suspicion of ulterior motives, was firstly tested in its 
applicability to the phenomenon of multiple product endorsements. Whereas prior research has 
typically examined consumer responses to celebrity’s multiple product endorsements in the 
context of Kelly’s (1973) covariation theory (e.g., Tripp et al., 1994), this study employed 
consumers’ suspicion of ulterior motives as a determinant of less correspondence inference on a 
celebrity’s true motives when the celebrity is a multiple product endorser. In some senses, 
Kelley’s (1967) covariation theory is not well fitted to experimentally testing consumer 
responses to celebrity’s multiple product endorsements because it is primarily concerned with 
causal attributions which are typically slower and more deliberate judgments (Smith & Miller, 
1983). In contrast, Jones and Davis’ (1965) correspondent inference theory (i.e., suspicion of 
ulterior motives) focuses on inferences about the characteristics of the actor and this trait 
inference is often relatively quick and effortless (Uleman, Newman, &Moskowitz, 1996). As 
expected, the theoretical propositions on suspicion of ulterior motive were proved to successfully 
explain the affect of a celebrity’s multiple product endorsements on consumers’ correspondence 
inference in general and their correspondence bias in specific. That is, when consumers already 
recognize of a celebrity’s presence in multiple product endorsements, unless consumers are 
situated in the conditions of low need for cognition and high perceived product congruence with 
a celebrity, consumers are highly likable to generate lower level of correspondence inferences 
enough to obsolete their correspondence bias on the endorser. Therefore, the high suspicion 
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consumers generate to the celebrity’s genuine motives could be the appropriate answer to Tripp 
et al. (1994)’s question of why “the number of products a celebrity endorses negatively influence 
consumers’ perceptions of endorser credibility and likability” (pp. 543). In addition, this study 
expends the theoretical scope of suspicion of ulterior motives in that even high suspicion 
consumers could do the correspondence bias depending on their level of need for cognition and 
the perceived relationship of a celebrity and the endorsed product.  For low need for cognition 
consumers who think the endorsed product is high matched with a celebrity, recognizing of the 
celebrity’s multiple product endorsements does not cause them to hesitate to take the behavior at 
face value.  
 Consumers’ correspondent inferences about an endorser were found to be positively 
associated with their attitudes toward the ad, the product, the endorser, and even the purchase 
intention for the advertised product (Cronley et al. 1999; Silvera et al., 2004). One of the most 
valuable attempts in this research was to test the mediating role of correspondence inference, as 
an outcome of attributional process, in multiple causal links between the proposed attributional 
antecedents and consequences. Until now, despite some researchers (Kelly & Michela, 1980; 
Decarlo & Leigh, 1996) proposed rather conceptual models concerning the mediating process of 
causal inferences, such a mediation effect of attributions has not been proved empirically and 
also gained little attention in the advertising research. Employing multi-step regressions and 
probability tests on the empirical data, this study clearly supported the mediating roles of 
endorser-generated correspondence inferences in the context of celebrity advertising. That is, 
consumers’ correspondence inferences mediate all the effects of suspicion and perceived product 
congruence on their attitudes toward the ad and the brand, and even their behavioral intentions.  
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Such significant mediation effects of correspondence inference demonstrate its critical roles as 
being latent but influential determinants of the celebrity endorsement advertising.  
Managerial Implications 
 In addition to theoretical implications, the present study provides many implications for 
advertising practice on celebrity endorsements. Most of all, this study used grown-up consumer 
panelists who are varied in age, gender, occupation, and geographic factors. Therefore, findings 
derived from this study can be properly projected over the consumer population, which provides 
advertisers practical reference points for testing practitioners’ theory in use and establishing 
effective celebrity endorsement strategies. 
 Word of mouth communications have been thought to have a more powerful influence on 
consumers’ evaluation on the product than information received through commercial sources 
such as advertising and neutral evaluation reports (e.g., consumer reports) because it usually 
occurs through sources that consumers regards as being credible (Richins, 1983; Herr, Kardes, & 
Kim; 1991). However, it’s not always true especially when advertising uses commercial sources 
that are truly famous for consumers. Good news for adverting practitioners is that consumers 
have a tendency of correspondence bias when the correspondent sources are namely celebrities. 
This study found that correspondence bias occurs when consumers evaluate celebrity endorsed 
advertising. That is, consumers attribute positive attitudes and preferences for the endorsed 
product to the celebrity even when they know that advertisers pays large amount of endorsement 
fees to celebrities in exchange for their favorable images. This should provide one possible 
rationale why the celebrity endorsement is one of the effective advertising strategies.          
 Even though the phenomenon of consumers’ correspondence bias on celebrity endorsers 
is a meaningful implication for the advertising practice, advertisers should be also aware that it is 
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quite complex to determine what situations induce consumers’ correspondence bias. In fact, 
according to the findings of this study, consumers’ knowledge of multiple product endorsements 
from a celebrity leads to their less correspondence inferences on the celebrity’s genuine motives 
enough to negate their correspondence bias. Also, when consumers feel that the endorsed 
product is not highly matched with a celebrity, they are less likely to show the correspondence 
bias. However, these findings do not mean that two types of advertising practices, multiple 
product endorsements and product endorsements from unmatched celebrities, should not be 
executed by advertisers because it is quite understandable that advertisers prefer to use 
celebrities who prove reference powers in their previous advertising and transfer celebrities’ 
favorable images to their new products. Instead, findings suggest for advertisers how to refine 
those practices to overcome negative effects. An ideal choice of a celebrity endorser with high 
credibility in associations with expertise, attractiveness, and trustworthiness will surely 
contribute to achieving effective endorsement effects. Unless that is easily fulfilled, advertisers 
should make their every efforts in estimating which celebrity’s property will be the most 
important to overcome the negative sides of multiple endorsements and to be transferred to the 
endorsed product without inducing consumers’ perceived incongruence. In order to do that, they 
surely need to take into accounts not only checking the prospect celebrity’s projected images and 
occupational backgrounds but also testing perceived fit factors with the chosen product.    
 One of the most interesting findings in this study is that high need for cognition 
consumers are less likely to show their correspondence bias when they perceive the endorsed 
product is not highly matched with a celebrity; whereas, low need for cognition consumers are 
more likely to keep their level of correspondence inference when they perceive the endorsed 
product is highly matched with a celebrity even if they are given the high suspicious information 
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on multiple product endorsements. In other words, the more consumers have high need for 
cognition and the less they perceive the product congruence, the more they respond to the 
suspicious information. In order to make managerial implications for these findings, the 
mechanism between people’s level of cognitive loadings and inferential strength on suspicion 
should be explicated. According to Wiener, LaForge, and Goolsby (1990), cognitive busy 
consumers are less likely to use persuasion knowledge (e.g., considering situational constraints 
for the celebrity’s behavior) than unbusy consumers, therefore less responding to the suspicious 
information.  They also suggested that low level of accessibility on suspicious motives attenuate 
the observer (i.e., consumers) difference. So, if consumers’ level of need for cognition and their 
perceived level of product congruence cannot be totally controlled by advertisers, one possible 
way to influence them is to make them inaccessible to uncontrolled information. To achieve such 
desired communication effects, advertising creators and planners need to be well prepared for the 
ways to better present their endorsement advertisements by improving creativity and originality 
of the advertisements or by establishing an effective media strategy. For instant, consumers’ 
perceptions on the product matching with the endorser could be enhanced by presenting 
supportive and strong copy messages, and making a new character for a celebrity within the 
storytelling advertisement could hide consumers’ recognition of their multiple roles in other 
advertisements.   
 Lastly, the findings of this study showed that as consumers do increasingly stronger 
correspondent inferences about the celebrity's attitudes and preferences for the product, their own 
evaluations on the advertisement, the brand, and even their behavioral intention also increase. 
This has valuable implications for justifying the use of celebrity endorsers in advertisements. 
Above all, in order to generate positive correspondence inferences from consumers, selecting the 
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right celebrity for the viewer and the product is necessitated by advertising practitioners. In 
addition, although this study did not provide comparative data regarding sports celebrities versus 
non-sports celebrities (e.g., movie stars) on their endorsement effects, advertising practitioners 
should be aware of their different points of appeals to their promoted products if they hope to 
generate intended correspondence inferences from target consumers.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
 Not unlike other empirical research efforts, the results and implications presented in this 
study are limited by a number of factors, many of which can be addressed in future studies. First, 
limits come from artificial settings for the online experiment. Only one kind of celebrity endorser, 
sports celebrity, was used in the experiment although athletes as product endorsers are ubiquitous 
in celebrity advertising. In particular, this study chose a French cycling athlete, Julien Absalon, 
who is not familiar to but only makes impressions of being a celebrity to the U.S. consumers, in 
order to impede the effects of participants’ confounding factors (e.g., identification with and 
likability to the celebrity). Other types of celebrity endorsers, such as movie stars and renowned 
fashion models, and those type effects were not extensively explored in this study. In the 
authentic world, celebrities have their own characteristics which are developed by interactions 
with the public and some celebrities often evoke a much richer set of responses and feelings than 
other celebrities (McCracken, 1986). For instance, Michael Jordan has unique attributes of 
expertise and charisma with the endorsed product category, but such characteristics might not be 
evoked by fashion models in general. In addition, this study consistently used a male celebrity 
endorser to minimize gender-caused unexpected effects. Even though it is not clear that celebrity’ 
own gender would affect the way how consumers correspondingly infer celebrities’ endorsement 
behaviors from situational information, some previous academic findings suggested that gender 
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interactions between endorsers and target audiences exist when measuring advertising 
effectiveness. Debevec and Kerman (1984) found that attractive female models induced more 
enhanced attitudes than male counterparts across both gender. Caballero et al. (1989) also 
suggested that males hold greater intentions to purchase from male endorsers and females 
showed greater intentions to buy from female endorsers. Therefore, in order to guarantee the full 
scope of understating, thereby strengthening the external validity of the study, all possible 
contexts of both celebrity type and gender should be examined in the future study.   
 Another artificial limitation of this study is the use of made-up brands (i.e., ENERGY 
and ORANGINA) and magazine-style advertisements. Brand names, ENERGY for a high 
congruent product and ORANGINA for a low congruent product were employed in order to 
impress the genuineness of products on participants. Although a pretest revealed that none of 
participants had heard of those brand names, the word in naming as “orange” might cause 
unexpected impressions to participants. That is, ORANGINA could be perceived by participants 
as being a high congruent product with Julien Absalon due to his healthy image. For future 
experiments, it is vital to rigorously pretest created brands in order to minimize the introduction 
of the effect of prior experience with brands and unintended impression on brand names. In 
addition, one piece of celebrity endorsed advertisement, which was not situated in a real 
magazine, was shown to participants in order to single out the intended effects of suspicion and 
product congruence. Therefore, ecologically, results from the experiment of this study should be 
cautioned to generalize to any branded products on the market and to other media. In reality, 
consumers often have a number of experience and cues that help them evaluate the quality and 
image for each brand, and their evaluations are also affected by the way how the brand is 
positioned and portrayed in the media. 
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 Third, consumers’ correspondence inferences about the celebrity endorsement were 
measured in forced conditional settings and compressed time limits. That is, participants were 
forced to evaluate their degrees on attributional statements regarding the presented endorser’s 
informational cues on suspicious motives within a processing time of 20-25 minutes. The 
possible problem for the forced condition in such a short period is that participants may not 
activate their attributional thinking on the celebrity endorser, if they are not forced to do that in 
real life. Also, although the basic mechanisms must be the same, the process of becoming 
suspicious may take more time outside of the laboratory. However, such a forced measure of 
correspondence inference was necessitated in the experiment for the statistical purposes of 
attaining an acceptable range of responses and inducing participants to bring out their latent 
thoughts. Nonetheless, future research should examine a variety of protocols designed to mirror 
consumers’ inferential processing on suspicion under more natural conditions. 
 Fourth, it is recommended that the hypotheses proposed and tested in this study be 
reassessed with more refined measurement scales and treatments. For the purpose of achieving 
an acceptable level of measurement reliability, this study relied on existing scales and, in fact, 
most of reliable tests verified that measures in use were internally reliable and valid by the 
originators of scales. However, indexes of correspondence inference and suspiciousness were 
created by adopting and contextually redesigning from relevant scales of previous studies 
because measurement scales for those variables have not been developed robustly yet. Therefore, 
in the future study, researchers should establish more reliable and valid scales for measuring 
variables of attributional inferences so as to apply those scales to evaluating the test-retest 
reliability of many findings in this study.  
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 Fifth, the treatment of individual difference variables needs to be refined. This study 
converted the continuous variables, need for cognition and implicit theory of personality, into 
dichotomous variables by splitting the scales at some point in order to analyze moderating effects 
on correspondence inference using ANOVAs. However, the primary argument against this 
practice has been that it generates loss of information about individual differences, spurious 
statistical significance, and overestimation of effect size (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & 
Rucker, 2002). Furthermore, using the short version of implicit theory of personality scale that 
did not include reversed items in this study was found to be increase the skewness of data to the 
right. This skewness of data probably resulted in insignificant moderating roles of implicit theory 
personality between suspicion and correspondence inference. Silvera et al. (2000) also found that 
many of participants were extremely reluctant to be on the low labels of implicit theory of 
personality, being inclined to be entity theorists. In order to avoid those negative consequences, 
future studies should carefully design personality measurement items and adopt the application 
of standard methods of regression and correlational analysis to undichotomized measures in the 
analysis.  
 Sixth, some people would argue that advertising currently is not viewed or read by 
consumers with the cognitive elaboration process such as making causal inferences about any 
observed agent. Others also dispute that findings from experimental designs produce higher 
results than exists in the real world. Actually, advertising can be effective in persuasion by 
making the brand salient in consumers’ minds by way of repeated exposure, slogan, or emotional 
appeal; in contrast, the effectiveness of celebrity endorsements is subject to reduction by 
selective attention, advertising clutter, and the time available to identify and evaluate the 
advertisement (Wells et al., 2008; Amos et al., 2008). So, consumers’ inferential processing of 
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attribution on the celebrity’s attitudes to the endorsed product could not be required for the 
persuasiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. However, a considerable amount of 
advertisements are still created with the hope that consumers actively read and think about the 
central message therein. Indeed, empirical findings from this study suggest that consumers’ 
attributional thinking in associations with correspondence bias and suspicion can significantly 
influence the persuasive effects of advertisements using a celebrity endorser. Therefore, 
consumers’ inferential activity must not be ignored in the future advertising research.  
 Lastly, it should be admitted that the explanatory ability of this study be within the 
proposed model. That is, findings of this study should be explained in the contextual 
relationships of antecedents (i.e., suspicion and perceived product congruence), moderators (need 
for cognition and implicit theory of personality), correspondence inferences, and consequences 
of inferential process (i.e., attitudinal and behavioral measures). However, there are many 
important issues that require further investigations regarding antecedents and moderators on the 
proposed model. For instance, how robust is the proposed model to repeated experiments? How 
do consumers’ correspondence inferences differ in accordance with the sources’ different 
attributes of credibility? How do consumers’ correspondence inferences differ in different groups 
of age and gender? How do consumers’ correspondence inferences differ when their mood states 
changes?  How do consumers’ correspondence inferences differ according to their individual 
differences on personality (e.g., need for control, temporary causal uncertainty, idiocentrism, and 
self construal)? Among those unexplored issues of potential importance, especially the cultural 
difference has gained researcher’s attention for its proven influence on attribution. According to 
researchers (Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999; Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Chiu, 
Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000), the attribution theory cannot be applied to its domain of study 
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universally because cultural differences may exist such that people’ attributional processes are 
influenced by diversity in language and associated cultural meaning systems. Accordingly, future 
studies on these relevant issues are encouraged to better understand how the attribution truly 
works in the celebrity advertising. 
 This study was carefully designed and effort fully processed to expand the theoretical and 
practical knowledge scope regarding celebrity endorsement advertising. For this purpose, this 
study not only proposed a theoretical framework in references to consumers’ attribution 
phenomena of correspondence bias and suspicion but also identified the framework’ applicability 
into the context of celebrity advertising. Even though many meaningful results were found from 
the rigorous assessments on the hypotheses, their contributions to theory and practice, especially 
the attribution perspective this study offer of our current understanding of celebrity endorsements, 
should be continuously refined and interpreted by future advances in the related knowledge 
domain. 
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A: Questionnaire for Pretests 
 
Pretest 1: Celebrity endorser selection 
Have you ever heard of the following European sports celebrities?  Yes _____   No _____ 
1. Samuel Sánchez (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the road race) 
2. Chris Hoy (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the track and sprint) 
3. Julien Absalon (2004 Athens and 2008 Beijing gold medalist in the cross-country 
mountain bike) 
4. Māris Štrombergs (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the BMX) 
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Pretest 2: Product selection  
Please mark in the space closest to the adjective that best reflects your personal perception on the 
match between the following sports celebrity (Julien Absalon) and each non alcoholic beverage 
type below. 
 
 
 
Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 
Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike 
team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins. 
1. Coffee 
2. Milk 
3. Soft drink 
4. Sports/energy drink 
5. Fruit juice 
6. Tea 
very inappropriate ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very appropriate 
Inconsistent ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Inconsistent * 
Very irrelevant ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Very relevant 
Does not match ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Matches very well 
Does not go together ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Goes together 
Very likely ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Very Unlikely * 
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Pretest 3: Suspicious Information checking 
From the following two different information, A or B, which do you think make you more 
suspicious when you evaluate the following celebrity’s true motives for sponsoring a certain 
brand?   
A _____    B _____ 
 
 
Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 
Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike 
team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins. 
 
A: Julien Absalon earned 8 million dollars this year for endorsing a certain brand. 
 
B: Julien Absalon earned 8 million dollars this year for endorsing a certain brand. Besides a 
certain brand, Julien Absalon earned more than 30 million dollars this year for endorsing 5 
different brands. 
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B: Questionnaire for Main Experiment 
       
       
Informed Consent  
You are invited to participate in a survey as part of a doctoral dissertation project. It will take 
about 20 minutes of your time to complete. This study is being conducted by Taewoo Kim, a 
doctoral candidate, in the department of Communication and Information Science at the 
University of Tennessee–Knoxville.  
The purpose of this study is to seek opinions and feedback among consumers to understand how 
YOU perceive the role of celebrities in magazine advertisements. You will be asked to indicate 
your perceptions about the behavior of a celebrity spokesperson and the endorsed product(s), 
attitude toward product(s)/ advertisement, personality of yourself, and lastly some of your 
demographics. 
There are no anticipated risks for study participants. Your participation in this survey is 
voluntary and the information you provide will be confidential. You may decline to answer any 
question. None of the information you supply will be any way associated with your identity at 
any stage of study.   
This study has been reviewed and approved by The University of Tennessee at Knoxville 
Institutional Review Board. If you have questions about the research or the procedures, please 
contact Taewoo Kim at1 (national code) – 865 (local code) – 622 – 0922 or send an email to 
tkim7@utk.edu . If you have questions about your rights as a research participant please contact 
Brenda Lawson in the Office of Research, University of Tennessee-Knoxville, at1 (national code) 
– 865 (local code) – 974 – 7697 or send an email to blawson@utk.edu. 
If you are age 18 or older, please check here.   
By checking the box and completing the survey, you provide your informed consent to 
participate.  
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Test (Stimulus) advertisements  
Please take at least 30 seconds to read the following advertisement.  
 
[High Congruent Ad)] 
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[Low Congruent Ad] 
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Stimulus information for each suspicion case  
Please take at least 30 seconds to read the following information.  
 
[No Suspicion Case] 
● Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 
Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike 
team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins. 
● Among some of possible non-alcoholic beverages on the French market, Julien Absalon 
decided to endorse the brand, ENERGY (or ORANGINA) as part of his support for children and 
young people in South Africa. 
 
[Low Suspicion Case] 
● Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 
Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike 
team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins. 
● Julien Absalon contracts 8 million dollars per year for endorsing the brand, ENERGY (or 
ORANGINA).  
 
[High Suspicion Case] 
● Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 
Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike 
team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins. 
● Julien Absalon contracts 8 million dollars per year for endorsing the brand, ENERGY (or 
ORANGINA).  
● Besides ENERGY (or ORANGINA), Julien Absalon now endorses 5 different brands in 
Europe. He earns more than 30 million dollars from those endorsement deals. 
    - Numericable (cable television operator)  
    - Pearl iZUMi (mountain Biking Shoes) 
    - NICKEL (cosmetics) 
    - Archos (MP3 player) 
    - Celio (men’s clothing) 
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The following questions will ask you about your perception on the behavior of the endorser 
(Julien Absalon) with the endorsed brand, your attitude toward the endorsed brand, your 
attitude toward the advertisement, and your behavioral intention. 
 
Acquaintance with the endorser and the brand (Screening)  
Have you ever heard of the sports celebrity, Julien Absalon?  Yes ________   No ________ 
Have you ever heard of the brand ENERGY (or ORANGIA)?   
Yes ________   No ________ 
 
Measure 1: Source Credibility [15 items & 7-point bipolar type scale]  
Please mark in the space closest to the adjectives that best reflect your perception of the endorser 
(Julien Absalon) in the advertisement you’ve just seen.  
Not an expert ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Expert 
Untrustworthy ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Trustworthy 
Attractive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Unattractive * 
Dishonesty ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Honesty 
Inexperienced ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Experienced 
Undependable ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Dependable 
Not Classy ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Classy 
Knowledgeable ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Unknowledgeable * 
Unreliable ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Reliable 
Ugly ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Handsome 
Unqualified ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Qualified 
Sincere ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Insincere * 
Plain ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Elegant 
Unskilled ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Skilled 
Unsexy ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Sexy 
 
 
* Reversely coded 
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Measure 2: Product Involvement [10 items & 7-point bipolar type scale]  
Please mark in the space closest to the adjective that best reflects your personal perception or 
relevance of the sports drink (or the soft drink).  
Unimportant ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Important  
Interesting ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Boring  
Irrelevant ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Relevant  
Unexciting ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Exciting 
Means a lot ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Means nothing * 
Unappealing ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Appealing 
Mundane ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Fascinating 
Valuable ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Worthless * 
Uninvolving ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Involving 
Not needed ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Needed 
 
 
Measure 3: Congruence between the endorser's chosen profession and the endorsed 
product [4 items & 7-point Likert type scale]   
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.  
1. I am not surprised that this person (Julien Absalon) endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) 
[or the soft drink (ORANGINA)]. 
2. With this endorsement, I can understand the brand (ENERGY) [or (ORANGINA)] better.  
3. One would expect this person (Julien Absalon) to endorse the sports drink (ENERGY) 
[or the soft drink (ORANGINA)]. 
4. That this person (Julien Absalon) endorses the brand (ENERGY) [or (ORANGINA)] tells 
me something about it. 
______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ 
Strongly 
Disagree   Neutral   
Strongly 
Agree 
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Measure 4: Correspondence Inference [5 items & 9-point Likert type scale]  
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.  
1. Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to 
convey his belief in the brand. 
2. Julien Absalon frequently uses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink 
(ORANGINA)]. 
3. Julien Absalon doesn't like the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)]. 
* 
4. Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to 
express her feeling about the brand based on her actual experience 
5. Julien Absalon views the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] as a 
good brand. 
6. Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to 
talk about the brand based on his actual experience and knowledge with the brand.  
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
Strongly 
Disagree    Neutral  
  Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Measure 5: Attitude toward the ad [5 items & 7-point bipolar type scale]  
Please mark in the space closest to the adjectives that best reflect your attitude toward the ad 
(ENERGY) [or (ORANGINA)] in the advertisement you’ve just seen.  
Unpleasant ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Pleasant  
Unlikable ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Likable  
Good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Bad * 
Undesirable ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Desirable 
Unappealing ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Appealing 
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Measure 6: Attitude toward the brand [5 items & 7-point bipolar type scale]  
Please mark in the space closest to the adjectives that best reflect your attitude toward the brand 
(ENERGY) [or (ORANGINA)] in the advertisement you’ve just seen.  
Unpleasant ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Pleasant  
Unlikable ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Likable  
Good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Bad * 
Unfavorable ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Favorable 
Unappealing ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Appealing 
 
 
Measure 7: Behavioral intention [4 items & 7-point Likert type scale]  
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?  
If ENERGY (or ORANGINA) is on the US market …  
1. Next time when I purchase a sports drink (or soft drink), I will buy ENERGY (or 
ORANGIA).  
2. I will consider drinking ENERGY (or ORANGIA). 
3. I would search for more information about ENERGY (or ORANGIA). (e.g., visit Web 
site(s)) 
4. If special sale is offered, I will buy ENERGY (or ORANGIA)  
______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ 
Strongly 
Disagree   Neutral   
Strongly 
Agree 
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Measure 8: Suspicion [4 items & 7-point Likert type scale]  
How much likely do you agree with the following statements?  
1. Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] 
because of his hidden interests. 
2. Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] 
because of his certain monetary or financial goals.  
3. Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to 
present his image to the public.  
4. The fact that Julien Absalom endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink 
(ORANGINA)] makes me suspicious of his ulterior motives.  
______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ 
Highly 
Unlikely   Neutral   
Highly 
Likely 
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The following questions will ask you about your personality. 
 
Measure 9: Need for Cognition [18 items & 7-point Likert type scale]  
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.  
1. I usually end up deliberating about issues even  they do not affect me personally. 
2. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
3. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done: I don’t care how or why it works.* 
4. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
5. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort. * 
6. Thinking is not my idea of fun.* 
7. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought.* 
8. I would rather do something that requires little though than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities.* 
9. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
10. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely chance I will have to think in 
depth about something.* 
11. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.  
12. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
13. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.* 
14. I only think as hard as I have to.* 
15. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
16. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. 
17. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.* 
18. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
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Measure 10: Implicit Theory of Personality [3 items & 6-point Likert type scale]  
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.  
1. The kind of person someone is something very basic about them and it can’t be changed 
very much. 
2. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can’t really be 
changed. 
3. Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really 
change that. 
______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ 
Completely 
Disagree 
Disagree 
 
Mostly 
Disagree 
 
Mostly 
Agee 
 
Agree 
 
Completely 
Agree 
 
 
 
The following questions will ask you about your information. 
Measure 10 - 12: Gender, age, & education [Nominal Scale]  
 
1. Gender:  Male ______      Female ______ 
 
 
2. Age:  18-19 ______  30-44 ______  45-60 ______  0ver 60______ 
 
 
3. Education: Less than high school degree ______ 
                   High School degree ______ 
                   Some college ______ 
                   Associate or bachelor degree ______ 
                   Graduate degree ______ 
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